Opinion
A-13906 0398
11-06-2024
KEVIN G. TUCKFIELD, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Michael L. Barber, Barber Legal Services, Boston, Massachusetts, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Nancy R. Simel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Trial Court No. 3SW-15-00246 CR Kenai, Lance Joanis, Judge.
Michael L. Barber, Barber Legal Services, Boston, Massachusetts, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Nancy R. Simel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Kevin G. Tuckfield was convicted of first-degree sexual assault and third- degree assault following a jury trial at which he represented himself. On appeal, Tuckfield argues that he was forced to represent himself because the superior court denied his requests for a new attorney after his relationship with his existing attorney broke down. We reject this argument.
Former AS 11.41.410(a)(1) (2015) and AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(A), respectively. The judgment incorrectly states that Tuckfield was also convicted of two counts of second-degree sexual assault, but these counts were merged into the first-degree sexual assault conviction. See Nicklie v. State, 402 P.3d 424, 426 (Alaska App. 2017) ("Alaska law does not recognize the existence of a merger 'for sentencing purposes only.' Because of the prohibition against double jeopardy announced in Whitton [v. State, 479 P.2d 302 (Alaska 1970)], when a defendant is found guilty of counts that must merge, the merger results in a single conviction of record[.]"). Clerical mistakes in judgments may be corrected by the court at any time. See Alaska R. Crim. P. 36.
Requests by an indigent defendant for new counsel are entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. As this Court has held, animosity between counsel and a defendant may constitute cause for removing counsel if "the attorney-client relationship has deteriorated to the point where the attorney is incapable of effective communication with the defendant or the attorney is incapable of objective decisionmaking about the case." But "a defendant may not purposely frustrate the defense attorney's efforts and then claim that the attorney-client relationship has become nonfunctional because of the defendant's own lack of cooperation."
See Moore v. State, 123 P.3d 1081, 1087 (Alaska App. 2005).
Douglas v. State, 166 P.3d 61, 88-89 (Alaska App. 2007) (quoting LaBrake v. State, 152 P.3d 474, 482-83 (Alaska App. 2007)).
Id. at 89.
In this case, the superior court held several ex parte representation hearings to resolve Tuckfield's various requests for a new attorney, two of which had to be continued after Tuckfield initially refused to appear. Tuckfield's attorney indicated that she would be able to continue to represent Tuckfield. Tuckfield's attorney also stated that she was trying to work with Tuckfield in formulating a defense but that he was inconsistent about the defense strategy he wanted her to take. The court invited Tuckfield to provide further details about his disagreements with his attorney, but he did not do so.
Based on this record, the superior court reasonably concluded that Tuckfield's attorney was capable of effectively communicating with Tuckfield and making objective decisions about his defense, and it was not an abuse of discretion to deny Tuckfield's requests for a new attorney. Furthermore, the superior court's denial of Tuckfield's request did not invalidate Tuckfield's decision to represent himself. As this Court has previously held, "the fact that a defendant makes a request for selfrepresentation only because the court refuses to appoint substitute counsel does not make the request equivocal."
Massey v. State, 435 P.3d 1007, 1010 (Alaska App. 2018).
Lastly, Tuckfield raises an issue on appeal arising from the superior court's handling of a threat that Tuckfield made against his attorney during his first trial. But Tuckfield's first trial ended in a mistrial, and the convictions at issue in this case were obtained at Tuckfield's second trial. We therefore agree with the State that any error in how the court handled Tuckfield's threat is moot.
We AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.