Opinion
2:23-cv-04844-BHH-MGB
04-24-2024
Anthony Tucker, Plaintiff, v. Wellpath Recovery Solutions, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Anthony Tucker (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is currently in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Mental Health (“SCDMH”) as part of the Sexually Violent Predator Treatment Program (“SVPTP”), which is operated by Defendant Wellpath Recovery Solutions (“Wellpath”) in a segregated maximumsecurity facility within Broad River Correctional Institution. See S.C. Code § 44-48-20. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges a Fourteenth Amendment violation, slander, and defamation of character in relation to what seems to be some sort of disciplinary action taken against him at the SVPTP facility. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Unfortunately, the illegible and incoherent nature of Plaintiff's allegations makes it very difficult to ascertain the true facts underlying these claims. The Complaint states that on or around July 16, 2023, a staff member reported that Plaintiff was “sitting out on the floor area masturbating . . . in plain sight for all to see.” (Id. at 5, 8.) Plaintiff appears to contest this charge and claims that the shift captain reviewed the “camera feed” and “did not see [Plaintiff] openly masturbating on tape.” (Id. at 8.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff's case manager still required him to complete a “behavioral assignment,” apparently telling Plaintiff that he needed to “fess up” and “confess.” (Id. at 6, 8.) The Complaint alludes to some sort of “hearing” and a “behavior management committee review,” but the undersigned can discern little else. (Id. at 9-11.) Based on the above, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and asks that his “previous behavioral level be reinstated.” (Id. at 8.)
Upon reviewing the initial filings in this matter, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his case was not in proper form because he had submitted an incomplete Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees (“Form AO 240”), which is construed as a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), (2). (Dkt. No. 7 at 1.) The undersigned also warned Plaintiff that while the Court could not evaluate the substance of his Complaint until he brought his case into proper form, a cursory review of the pleading indicated that this action may be subject to summary dismissal. (Id. at 2-4.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the undersigned granted him twenty-one days, plus three days for mail time, to file a properly completed Form AO 240 and an amended pleading that cured the deficiencies identified in the original Complaint. (Id. at 1, 4.) The undersigned emphasized that if Plaintiff did not follow these instructions within the time permitted by the order, his case may be summarily dismissed. (Id. at 1-2, 5.)
Although Plaintiff eventually submitted a properly completed Form AO 240 (Dkt. No. 2-2), he failed to provide the Court with an amended pleading. In an abundance of caution, the undersigned issued a second order affording Plaintiff another opportunity to comply with the Court's instructions. (Dkt. No. 10.) Unfortunately, Plaintiff never filed an amended pleading and the time to do so has long since expired. Accordingly, the instant action remains limited to the claims presented in the original Complaint as summarized above. (Dkt. No. 1.)
LEGAL STANDARD
The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Wellerv. Dep'tof Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though Pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985).
DISCUSSION
Despite receiving ample time to comply with this Court's instructions, Plaintiff has failed to file an amended complaint that cures the deficiencies identified in his initial pleading. As a result, this action remains subject to summary dismissal for the reasons discussed below.
Turning first to Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim, any constitutional violations fall under the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must show two essential elements: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff has not named a party amenable to suit under § 1983, as Wellpath Recovery Solutions does not constitute a “person” for purposes of the statute. See Martin v. Correct Care Recovery Sols., No. 4:22-cv-2042-HMH-TER, 2023 WL 5782339, at *8 (D.S.C. July 17, 2023) (explaining that a medical provider like Wellpath whose medical staff provide healthcare services to institutions is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983), adopted, 2023 WL 5199718 (D.S.C. Aug. 14, 2023); see also Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that a medical department is a group of persons working in a department, building, or facility, and therefore cannot qualify as a “person”). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim against Wellpath is subject to summary dismissal. (Dkt. No. 7 at 3.)
Nonetheless, even if Plaintiff had named a proper defendant here, his confused allegations still fail to state an actionable Fourteenth Amendment claim. Assuming Plaintiff is in fact attempting to challenge a disciplinary action taken in response to the purported masturbation incident described above, the Court must look to the standard set forth in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), which provides that an involuntarily committed individual
has constitutionally protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and such minimally adequate training as reasonably may be required by these interests. Whether [the individual's] constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing these liberty interests against the relevant state interests. The proper standard for determining whether the State has adequately protected such rights is whether professional judgment in fact was exercised. And in determining what is “reasonable,” courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional, whose decision is presumptively valid.Id. at 307; see also Haynesworth v. Correct Care Recovery Sols., No. 2:17-cv-3247-CMC, 2018 WL 6695715, at *2-3 (D.S.C. Dec. 20, 2018) (applying Youngberg to individuals committed through SVPTP), a/d, 774 Fed.Appx. 156 (4th Cir. 2019).
As the undersigned previously explained to Plaintiff (Dkt. No. 7 at 4), the incoherent nature of his allegations make it difficult for the Court to determine whether Wellpath staff appropriately exercised their professional judgment in bringing the purported charge against him and in the disciplinary process that unfolded thereafter. More specifically, the Complaint does not address whether Plaintiff received notice of the charge against him or was afforded an opportunity to be heard and present evidence regarding the same. See Haynesworth, 2018 WL 6695715, at *3 (analyzing sufficiency of process afforded to SVPTP plaintiff under Youngberg); Martin v. Correct Care Recovery Sols., No. 4:22-cv-2042-HMH-TER, 2023 WL 5782339, at *10 (D.S.C. July 17, 2023) (explaining that SVPTP plaintiff was entitled to “some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views”), adopted, 2023 WL 5199718 (D.S.C. Aug. 14, 2023); see also Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1277-78 (stating that the court cannot serve as a “mind reader” for a pro se plaintiff or “construct full-blown claims” on his behalf). Without more, the Court simply cannot determine whether Plaintiff has an actionable Fourteenth Amendment violation here, and any such claims must therefore be dismissed.
With respect to the remaining state law claims, the Complaint seems to suggest that Plaintiff's “character was defamed” by virtue of the false allegations made against him.(Dkt. No. 1 at 8.) However, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, meaning they possess only that power authorized by Article III of the United States Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute. In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Pursuant to this limited power, there are two primary bases for exercising original federal jurisdiction: (1) “federal question,” under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) “diversity of citizenship,” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
“At base, defamation is a state-law tort claim.” Cannon v. Peck, 36 F.4th 547, 559 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991) (“Defamation, by itself, is a tort actionable under the laws of most states, but not a constitutional deprivation.”).
If a federal district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action, it may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims that are “so related” to the claims under the court's original jurisdiction “that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Without original jurisdiction, however, a federal court generally cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. See id. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction). Because the Complaint does not allege a valid federal cause of action or diversity of citizenship, this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claims. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (stating that “if the federal claims are dismissed . . ., the state claims should be dismissed as well”); see also Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants.”)
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's action is subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that this action be DISMISSED without further leave to amend, as Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to do so. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).