Finally, since the trial court does possess such wide discretion to set aside a judgment on the basis of Rule 60(b), this court will reverse the trial court's denial of Rule 60(b) relief only where it appears from the record that it abused its discretion. See, Tucker v. Tucker, 403 So.2d 273 (Ala.Civ.App. 1981). We note that while the wife filed a motion for a new trial within the time allowed by Rule 59(b), Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, she did not appeal from the denial of this motion.
The trial court's findings are presumed to be correct and we are not authorized to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court unless the judgment was so unsupported by the evidence as to be palpably wrong. Tucker v. Tucker, 403 So.2d 273 (Ala.Civ.App. 1981). The determination of whether to grant or to deny relief under rule 60(b), except as to a void judgment, falls within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal unless it is plainly shown that the trial court abused its discretion.
The trial court's findings are presumed to be correct and we are not authorized to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court unless the judgment was so unsupported by the evidence as to be palpably wrong. Tucker v. Tucker, 403 So.2d 273 (Ala.Civ.App. 1981). The determination of whether to grant or to deny relief under rule 60 (b), except as to a void judgment, falls within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal unless it is plainly shown that the trial court abused its discretion.
The standard of review applied by the appellate courts to such a determination by the trial court is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Tucker v. Tucker, 403 So.2d 273 (Ala.Civ.App. 1981). In determining whether there was an abuse of discretion in denying the relief, this court looks to the grounds presented by the motion and the matters presented in support thereof.
Where a trial is presented before the trial court and the evidence conflicts, the customary presumption applies as to the correctness of the trial court's findings of fact; and the reviewing court is not authorized to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court unless it is palpably wrong, not supported by the evidence, or manifestly unjust. Tucker v. Tucker, 403 So.2d 273 (Ala.Civ.App. 1981); 2B Ala. Digest, Appeal Error, Key No. 1011.1 (7) (1982). In this instance the trial court's action is clearly supported by the evidence and is not palpably wrong or manifestly unjust.
Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Conner, 387 So.2d 125 (Ala. 1980). In deciding a rule 60 (b) motion to set aside a judgment of divorce, the trial court has wide discretion, and its determination will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion. Tucker v. Tucker, 403 So.2d 273 (Ala.Civ.App. 1981); McSween v. McSween, 366 So.2d 293 (Ala.Civ.App. 1979). It is also the rule in this state that a settlement agreement given effect by a divorce decree must be fair, reasonable and just, and free from fraud, duress or other coercion.
It is clear that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the husband's motion. Tucker v. Tucker, 403 So.2d 273 (Ala.Civ.App. 1981). We affirm.
In ruling upon a Rule 60 (b) motion, the trial court exercises a judicial discretion (except where the ground is a void judgment), and its decision thereon will not be overturned on appeal unless that discretion was abused. Ex parte Hartford Insurance Co., 394 So.2d 933 (Ala. 1981); Tucker v. Tucker, 403 So.2d 273 (Ala.Civ.App. 1981); Ingram v. WAAY Television, 394 So.2d 65 (Ala.Civ.App. 1981). The husband offered no real evidence that there was anything materially wrong as to the substance of the appraisal.