Moreover, it was unnecessary to allege apprehension by the victim as "apprehension is not an essential element of an assault in which it is alleged that the defendant attempted to commit a violent injury upon the victim." Tucker v. State, 245 Ga. App. 551, 553(1) ( 538 S.E.2d 458) (2000). Accordingly, Counts IV and VII in the indictment against English were not subject to the special demurrers, and it was error for the trial court to dismiss the charges.

" Under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), "[a] person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults . . . [w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury." Thus, an aggravated assault occurs when a simple assault, as defined in OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2), is committed in the aggravated manner set forth in OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). Tucker v. State, 245 Ga. App. 551, 552 ( 538 SE2d 458) (2000). T. Y. B. does not contest the fact that a pot of boiling water constitutes an "object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to . . . result in serious bodily injury" as required under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).

(Footnote omitted.) Tucker v. State, 245 Ga. App. 551, 553 (1) ( 538 SE2d 458) (2000). The trial court charged the jury that "assault is an intent to commit a violent injury to the person of another or an act which places another person in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury."

The wording of the indictment is sufficient to charge aggravated assault upon a peace officer. See generally Tucker v. State, 245 Ga. App. 551, 553 ( 538 SE2d 458) (2000); Stevenson, 234 Ga. App. at 106 (3) (b). As the evidence and the indictment support finding the guilty verdicts on Counts 2, 3, and 5 as being for aggravated assault upon a peace officer, the remaining issue is how the trial court's charge to the jury might affect interpretation of the verdict.

In order to show ineffective assistance of trial counsel, an appellant must show both that (1) trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that but for trial counsel's error, the outcome would have been different.Tucker v. State, 245 Ga. App. 551, 554(3) ( 538 S.E.2d 458) (2000). (a) Branesky complains of the following testimony from a caseworker: "[W]hen I talked to the children, the children were able to tell me what happened, and I believed them in what they were telling me."

Accordingly, no bifurcation was required. See Kellum v. State, 258 Ga. 536 ( 371 S.E.2d 405) (1988), overruled on other grounds, 262 Ga. 795, 798 (1993); Tucker v. State, 245 Ga. App. 551, 554 ( 538 S.E.2d 458) (2000). Moreover, as set forth in Kellum, 258 Ga. at 536-537, the trial court properly gave limiting instructions only for similar transactions, and not those contemplated in Head, 253 Ga. at 432.

The officer told her to keep looking for it while he ran a check on her license and that, if she found the card, to hold it outside the window. Tucker v. State, 245 Ga. App. 551 ( 538 S.E.2d 458) (2000). Matheson found the card, held it outside the window, then accidentally dropped it. As she got out of the car to retrieve the card, the officer asked her if she would perform field sobriety tests.

(b) Kirkland contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to excuse for cause all jurors who owned stock in a victim, Home Depot. Assuming deficient performance, we find that Kirkland has not carried his burden of showing prejudice, that is, a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the results of the proceeding would have been different. Tucker v. State, 245 Ga. App. 551, 554 (3) (S.E.2d) (2000). Prejudice is presumed only in very rare circumstances, as when the assistance of counsel is denied altogether or when counsel actively represents conflicting interests.