The Individual Defendants actually argue the direct opposite, asserting that "the D.C. Courts upheld the Act's precursor statute against challenges similar to the ones levied here." Indiv. Defs.' Mem. at 7 (citing Tuck v. United States, 467 A.2d 727 (D.C. 1983) and Tuck v. United States, 477 A.2d 1115 (D.C. 1984)). While the two Tuck cases did consider the constitutionality of a predecessor to the Act, D.C. Code § 22-801, they do not support the inference the Individual Defendants suggest: that the seizure provision of the Act that Plaintiffs challenge in this case has previously been found constitutional.

See D.C. Code § 22-1004(b). This claim, which Plaintiffs failed to address in their opposition brief, is foreclosed by Tuck v. United States, 467 A.2d 727 (D.C. 1983). In Tuck, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals examined the constitutionality of the District of Columbia's animal cruelty law, as it existed prior to the Animal Protection Act, and held that the law was not unconsitutionally vague.

A law is only unconstitutionally vague if "no standard of conduct is specified at all." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tuck v. United States, 467 A.2d 727, 731 (D.C. 1983)); see also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971). 21 DCMR § 700.3 unambiguously provides that "all solid wastes shall be stored and containerized for collection in a manner that will not provide food, harborage, or breeding places for insects or rodents, or create a nuisance or fire hazard."

Whatever the level of scrutiny, however, a statute is not unconstitutionally vague even if it requires that a person's conduct conform to a somewhat amorphous — yet comprehensible — standard; it is unconstitutionally vague only if "no standard of conduct is specified at all." Tuck v. United States, 467 A.2d 727, 731 (D.C. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971)). Therefore, it is well established that "a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits. . . ."Morales, 527 U.S. at 56, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (citing Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-403, 86 S.Ct. 518, 15 L.Ed.2d 447 (1966)).

D.C. Code § 22-505(a) can be narrowly construed to apply to physical conduct rather than speech. See Tuck v. United States, 467 A.2d 727, 731-32 (D.C. 1983) (court has authority to adopt narrowing construction of a statute); McIntosh v. Washington, 395 A.2d 744, 757 (D.C. 1978) (court under obligation to interpret statute to support its constitutionality); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988) (court has duty to construe statute where possible to avoid constitutional infirmity). As applied to appellant, the statute can be construed to prohibit individuals from physically opposing District juvenile supervisors.

In Jordan v. UnitedStates, 269 A.2d 848, 849 (D.C. 1970), the court reversed a conviction in view of the absence of expert testimony that a dog was mistreated by being left outside in sub-zero weather. In Tuck v. United States, 467 A.2d 727, 730-33 (D.C. 1983), the only other case interpreting § 22-801, the court upheld the statute against a constitutional challenge on grounds of vagueness. Decisions in other jurisdictions, however, have held that proof of an intention to inflict injury or cause pain or suffering is not an essential ingredient of active cruelty consisting of torturing or tormenting, or cruelly beating or killing an animal, and that the offense is complete where one intentionally, knowingly, and without justifiable cause voluntarily commits acts which unnecessarily inflict pain and suffering upon the animal.

MACK, Associate Judge: A homo sapiens is entitled to own animals but is not entitled to torment or cruelly destroy them (despite the suggested one-hundred-and-one options for disposal of a carcass) — at least not in the District of Columbia.See Tuck v. United States, 467 A.2d 727 (D.C. 1983). In this case, we have the difficult task of balancing a citizen's basic right to privacy against the necessity for police intrusion to thwart conduct which is threatening the life of animals in contravention of a legislative prohibition.