However, the Tenth Circuit has already held that plaintiff's claims arising out of the Illinois and Colorado domestic proceedings in 16-cv-02480-WJM-STV were barred by Rooker-Feldman. See Tso v. Murray, 760 F. App'x 564, 567-68 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) ("Tso I") (noting that, except for "one insignificant exception," "the harms for which [plaintiff] seeks relief . . . all result from state-court judgments"). Plaintiff has not articulated a persuasive reason why his claims would fare any better were he permitted to file more lawsuits arising out of the same set of facts.
We described the underlying facts in our decision on appeal in the second suit. See Tso v. Murray, 760 F. App'x 564, 566-67 (10th Cir. 2019) (Tso I). The federal district court remanded the first suit to state court because Mr. Tso improperly tried to remove it to federal court after filing it in state court.
The Tenth Circuit has routinely applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar suits challenging state court child support obligations or state court procedures. See, e.g., Tso v. Murray, 760 Fed.Appx. 564, 566-67 (10th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's constitutional claims under Rooker-Feldman doctrine because “the harms for which he s[ought] relief . . . all result[ed] from state-court judgments” on a child support order); Hawks v. Abbott, 365 Fed.Appx. 124, 126 (10th Cir. 2010) (affirming Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal under Rooker-Feldman doctrine
Because it would be futile to grant Plaintiff leave to amend her claims, the Court recommends that the Motion to Amend be denied. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of a pro se plaintiff's claim, where “it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend”); see also Tso v. Murray, 760 Fed.Appx. 564, 569 (10th Cir. 2019) (affirming trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint, after dismissing the complaint on Rooker-Feldman grounds); Vigoda v. Rosendahl-Sweeney, No. 21-cv-00182-STV, 2022 WL 425243, at *9 (D. Colo. Feb. 11, 2022)
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend [#58] is DENIED without prejudice. See Tso v. Murray, 760 Fed.Appx. 564, 569 (10th Cir. 2019) (affirming trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint, after dismissing complaint on Rooker-Feldman grounds); Richardson v. Title IV-D Agency, Colorado, No. 19-cv-01984-RM-NRN, 2020 WL 1695545, at *5 (D. Colo. Jan. 16, 2020) (recommending denial of Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint where amended complaint did not cure Rooker-Feldman deficiencies), recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 948711, aff'd, 842 Fed.Appx. 190 (10th Cir. 2021).
Further, in the case of Tso v. Murray, 760 Fed. Appx. 564 (10th Cir. 2019), the Tenth Circuit again addressed application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to a RICO claim. Relying on its decision in Campbell, the court determined:
However, the Tenth Circuit has already held that plaintiff's claims arising out of the Illinois and Colorado domestic proceedings in 16-cv-02480-WJM-STV were barred by Rooker-Feldman. See Tso v. Murray, 760 F. App'x 564, 567-68 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (noting that, except for "one insignificant exception," "the harms for which [plaintiff] seeks relief . . . all result from state-court judgments"). Plaintiff has not articulated a persuasive reason why his claims would fare any better were he permitted to file more lawsuits arising out of the same set of facts.
Because the damages all flow from the state court's entry of judgment, this relief is also barred by Rooker-Feldman. See Tso v. Murray, 760 F. App'x 564, 567-68 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (noting that, where "the only harms alleged involved deprivations that resulted from the state courts' orders," claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman). Plaintiff's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.
Although plaintiff here claims he is not attacking a "judgment," he does not explain why a state-court order imposing an interstate debt obligation is distinguishable from a state-court order imposing a bond and a forfeiture order. Cf. id.; see also Tso v. Murray, 760 F. App'x 564, 568 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) ("Tso I") (holding that Rooker-Feldman bars claims based on "deprivations that resulted from the state courts' orders") (emphasis added) The Court finds that, for purposes of Rooker-Feldman, there is no basis to conclude that the "interstate debt obligation" alleged in the complaint is reviewable. Second, the order explained the legal basis why plaintiff's contention that he may overcome Rooker-Feldman by alleging that the state-court proceedings and judges were engaged in corruption is not supported by Tenth Circuit precedent. See Docket No. 188 at 17 (citing Bradshaw v. Gatterman, 658 F. App'x 359, 362 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (noting that Tenth Circuit precedent does not support the theory that evidence of "extrinsic fraud" can overcome Rooker-Feldman)).
The Tenth Circuit recently set forth a summary of the factual background of this case when it affirmed this Court's denial of various motions and dismissal of Plaintiff's claims. See Tso v. Murray, 2019 WL 140992, at *1 (10th Cir. Jan. 9, 2019). In brief, this lawsuit arises from Plaintiff's "dissatisfaction with the child-support obligation established in his Illinois divorce from his ex-wife."