Opinion
01 C 3679
December 17, 2001
Plaintiff Fund brought this lawsuit against Bozman Plumbing, Inc. for failure to pay fringe benefits to its employees. The case marks the fourth time in six years that plaintiff has initiated a cause of action against this defendant.
The Amended Complaint alleges that Bozman failed to make fringe benefit contributions to the fund during the period between December 1, 1999 and August 31, 2000. There is a disagreement about whether Bozman remained bound by a 1996 agreement to make contributions. Bozman says that it was free and clear after May 31, 1999 because it notified plaintiff in writing that it intended to terminate the 1996 Agreement on the date of its expiration. This may be true, plaintiff says, but Bozman continued to act like an employer under the terms of the agreement, so it is bound by its "course of conduct" to pay benefits. There is a question of fact here regarding Bozman's conduct; defendant acknowledges as much in its reply brief.
Next, defendant argues that any claim that it owes fringe benefits before March 1, 2000 is barred by res judicata as it was already litigated and settled in a previous proceeding before Judge Guzman. (See No. 99 C 6842, Order of Stipulation to Dismiss, March 1, 2000). Plaintiff counters that the scope of the stipulation in the prior case is more limited than Bozman suggests. But I do not see how plaintiffs can avoid the plain language of the dismissal order when considered in light of the complaint from that prior case. The plaintiff sought recovery for a certain amount of past due contributions plus all "additional contributions" that became due during the pendency of the 1999 action. Judge Guzman's order dismissed, with prejudice, "all matters in controversy for which the action was brought." It seems simple enough that plaintiff agreed to settle all of the disputes it had with Bozman up to the date of the dismissal. I will not, however, exclude claims for February and March 2000 because plaintiffs allege — and defendants do not deny — that these payments were not due until after the March 1 dismissal.
Defendant acknowledges that any remaining issues are best left for summary judgment.
The motion to dismiss [7] is granted in part and denied in part. Claims for benefits due during December 1999 and January 2000 are barred by res judicata. Plaintiff's motion to strike [10] is denied as moot.