Suit by West Disinfecting Company against the Trustees of Crosby Independent School District, in the Justice Court of Dallas County, for the purchase price of certain supplies furnished to said school district. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appealed to the district court which rendered judgment for plaintiff in the amount sued for. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed this judgment in part and in part rendered judgment, and in part remanded the cause, 121 S.W.2d 661, and the plaintiff has brought error to the Supreme Court. The case was referred to the Commission of Appeals, Section A, for their opinion thereon and the Supreme Court adopted same and ordered judgment entered in accordance therewith.

In order to recover on a claim based on a contract with a school district, the plaintiff must allege and prove that, at the time the claim was contracted, funds were legally available to the school district to pay the claim. Trustees of Crosby Independent School District v. West Disinfecting Co., 121 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1938), writ dism'd, 135 Tex. 492, 143 S.W.2d 749 (1940). However, if a school district enters into a contract conditioned upon the later availability of funds, and those funds later become available, the contract then becomes valid.

Bowles v. Angelo, 188 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Tex. Civ. App.- Galveston 1945, no pet.) (concluding that "if the jurisdiction necessary to relieve against a wrong is not to be found in the specific grants of jurisdiction to the justice [court] or the county court, then it has either been specifically granted to the district court, or conferred upon that court in the grant to it of all residuary jurisdiction."); Tex. Soap Mfg. Corp. v. McQueary, 172 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1943, no writ) (holding that a justice court "has no jurisdiction to issue writs of injunction"); Trustees of Crosby Indep. Sch. Dist. v. West Disinfecting Co., 121 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1938), writ dism'd, 135 Tex. 492, 143 S.W.2d 749 (1940) (stating that justice courts "cannot exercise the extraordinary powers of equity jurisdiction in granting injunctions" because "such powers are conferred exclusively on the district courts."); Poe v. Ferguson, 168 S.W. 459, 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1914, no writ) (holding that neither "the Constitution or laws" grant justice courts jurisdiction to issue writs of injunction); see also Tex. Const. art. 5, § 8 (providing that district courts have the power to issue writs necessary to enforce their jurisdiction).

In a proper case, injunctive relief may be granted without exhausting all administrative appeals to the State authorities. Warren v. Sanger Independent School District, 116 Tex. 183, 288 S.W. 159, 160 (1926); Alvin Independent School District v. Cooper, 404 S.W.2d 76 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1966, no writ). BISD relies upon Trustees of Crosby Independent School District v. West Disinfecting Co., 121 S.W.2d 661 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1983), writ dism'd w.o.j., 135 Tex. 492, 143 S.W.2d 749 (1940); Schenker v. City of San Antonio, 369 S.W.2d 626 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hinojosa v. San Isidro Independent School District, 273 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1954, no writ) for the proposition that administrative remedies must be exhausted. However, in both West Disinfecting Co. and Hinojosa exhaustion was required because there were questions of fact to be resolved.

To the same effect is the holding in Aldine Independent School District v. Standley, 154 Tex. 547, 280 S.W.2d 578, 586, in which case it was said that it is 'the well established rule that valid claims against a school district cannot be paid by the district unless funds for the current year of the claim are available to pay said claim at the time of demand or judgment upon such claim.' In Crowell Independent School Dist. v. First Nat. Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 163 S.W. 339, and Trustees of Crosby Independent School Dist. v. West Disinfecting Co., Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 661, it was held that the petitions were fatally defective in failing to allege that funds were available to pay the claims sued upon. The evidence amply supports the court's finding that no funds were available to pay appellant's claim, other than for which judgment was rendered.

It has been held that a petition, to be sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the court in matters of detail pertaining to the general management of schools, must allege that application has been made to the proper school authorities and a ruling had thereon, and that in the absence of such allegation, the petition is subject to general demurrer. Barnhart v. County Board of School Trustees, supra; State ex rel. Nevills v. Sanderson, Tex. Civ. App. 88 S.W.2d 1069, 1070, par. 2, and authorities there cited; Trustees of Crosby Independent School Dist. v. West Disinfecting Co., Tex. Civ. App. 121 S.W.2d 661, 663, par. 3, and authorities there cited. The order of the trial court granting a temporary injunction herein is, under the authorities above cited, reversed and said injunction dissolved.