The judgments, docketed on the judgment docket of the Superior Court of Forsyth County, are liens upon said land. C. S., 614. They were liens on said land at date of the registration of plaintiff's deed, and plaintiff's title, under the deed as a conveyance, is subject to the liens of the judgments. Wimes v. Hufham, 185 N.C. 178; Mills v. Tabor, 182 N.C. 722; Realty Co. v. Carter, 170 N.C. 5; Trust Co. v. Sterchie, 169 N.C. 21; Tarboro v. Micks, 118 N.C. 162; Bostic v. Young, 116 N.C. 766. The fact that defendants recovered judgments not only against the Engle Land Company, but also against Lindsay Patterson, and that the indebtedness upon which the judgments were recovered was his indebtedness, and not that of the company, as alleged in the complaint and admitted by the demurrer, cannot be held to affect the validity of the judgments, or the right of defendants to enforce the same, by execution and sale of the real property of the Engle Land Company, upon which the judgments are liens. Nor is the validity of the liens affected by the fact that the indebtedness upon which the judgments were rendered was incurred subsequent to 1 January, 1917, at which time plaintiff had been in possession of the land under an unregistered deed for more than seven years.

When a judgment for the payment of money is duly docketed in the Superior Court of a county, it becomes a lien on the real property in such county owned by the judgment debtor at the time of the docketing or acquired by him "at any time thereafter, for ten years from the date of the rendition of the judgment." G.S. 1-234; Durham v. Pollard, 219 N.C. 750, 14 S.E., (2) 818; Thompson v. Avery County, 216 N.C. 405, 5 S.E., (2) 146; Keel v. Bailey, 214 N.C. 159, 198 S.E. 654. Since the plaintiff was unable to establish her allegation that Junius McCullen took title under the deed of 26 August, 1941, in the capacity of a trustee for her, it inevitably followed upon the record here presented that Junius McCullen was the absolute owner of the property in controversy under such deed, and that the lien of the Faison judgment and that of the judgment of the Standard Fertilizer Company attached to such property at the moment that the title vested in Junius McCullen. Trust Co. v. Sterchie, 169 N.C. 21, 85 S.E. 40; Moore v. Jordan, 117 N.C. 86, 23 S.E. 259. Therefore, the trial court erred in vacating the finding of the jury on the sixth issue as a matter of law, and in refusing to adjudge that the judgment of the Standard Fertilizer Company constitutes a lien upon the property in issue.

Recorded prior in point of time, we think the judgment lien will prevail over the attempted lien created by the deed of trust. See Bliss v. Brown, 78 Kan. 467, 96 P. 945 (1908); Leslie v. Harrison Nat. Bank, 97 Kan. 72, 154 P. 209 (1916); 15 R. C. L., sec. 284; Weil Bros. v. Casey, 125 N.C. 356; Trust Co. v. Sterchie, 169 N.C. 21. If valid, in construing the deeds we think the language only applies to the division of the real estate and had no effect on the judgment.

Judgments become liens at the same instant upon the acquisition of property and attach simultaneously, without regard to the order of their entry or rendition. Kristerson v. Tate (Iowa) 63 N.W. 350; Moore v. Jordan (N.C.) 23 S.E. 259, 42 L.R.A. 209; Roelfe v. McComb (Tenn.) 75 Am. Dec. 748; Colonial Trust Co. v. Stercie (N.C.) 85 S.E. 40; Ware v. Delahoye, 95 Iowa, 667, 64 N.W. 640; Hulbert v. Hulbert, 216 N.Y. 430, L.R.A. 1916D, 661, 111 N.E. 70, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 180; Mautela v. Lane, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 391, 55 S.W. 504. C.B. Craven, for respondents.

Nothing else appearing, the judgment of defendant against W. S. Whiting having been docketed some nine days before the deed of Whiting to plaintiff would take priority over plaintiff's deed. Eaton v. Doub, ante, 14. This priority is given by virtue of the statutes before mentioned. This Court has rigidly upheld the registration acts — a hard holding in the Eaton case, but necessary to the safe conduct of business. It makes no difference how full and formal the notice is, actual or otherwise, it will not supply the place of registration. Trust Co. v. Sterchie, 169 N.C. 21; Davis v. Robinson, 189 N.C. 601; Saleeby v. Brown, ante, 138; Trust Co. v. Currie, ante, 260. The question now to be considered is whether those salutary cases can be differentiated from the present case.

" In Havens v. Bank, 132 N.C. 223, Walker, J., cites with approval McNeill v. Bank, 46 N.Y. 325, in which it is said: "It has also been settled by repeated adjudications that, as between the parties, the delivery of the certificate with assignment and power endorsed passes the entire title, legal and equitable, in the shares, notwithstanding that by the terms of the charter or by-laws of the corporation the stock is declared to be transferable only on its books; that such provisions are intended solely for the protection of the corporation, and can be waived or asserted at its pleasure, and that no effect is given to them, except for the protection of the corporation; that they do not incapacitate the shareholder from parting with his interest, and that his assignment, not on the books, passes the entire legal title to the stock, subject only to such liens or claims as the corporation may have upon it, and excepting the right of voting at elections." Cox v. Dowd, 133 N.C. 537; Bleakley v. Candler, 169 N.C. 21; Bank v. Dew, supra. Under these conditions it was not necessary to transfer the stock on the company's books.

The deed and a mortgage securing the purchase price constituted one act, and such mortgage, executed and registered at the same time with the deed, has priority. Trust Co. v. Sterchie, 169 N.C. 23; Hinton v. Hicks, 156 N.C. 24; Bunting v. Jones, 78 N.C. 242. This being so, an omission in one instrument will be supplied by a statement in the other; and in the case now before the Court the stated consideration of the amount of the purchase money of the 42 1/5 acres, which appears in the deed, at least designates a limit beyond which the purchase price, as referred to in the deed of trust, could not possibly go.

No grantee could rely upon the convenants in his deed," citing, among other cases, Gaylord v. Gaylord, supra. In Walters v. Walters, 172 N.C. 330, the same matter was fully discussed again, and it was held, "The grantor cannot set up a parol trust in his own favor against the grantee, saying the ruling in Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150 N.C. 222, that a parol trust cannot be set up by the grantor as to the conveyance in fee to his grantee, is not only upheld by the reasoning and authorities therein cited, but that case has since been upheld and reaffirmed in Ricks v. Wilson, 154 N.C. 289; Jones v. Jones, 164 N.C. 322; Cavenaugh v. Jarman, ib., 375; Trust Co. v. Sterchie, 169 N.C. 22; Campbell v. Sigmon, 170 N.C. 351, and Walters v. Walters (when here before), 171 N.C. 313." In very recent cases, Allen v. Gooding, 173 N.C. 96, and Chilton v. Smith, 180 N.C. 472, Gaylord v. Gaylord has been again cited with approval.

The whole subject has, however, been too fully discussed by Mr. (96) Justice Walker in Avery v. Stewart, supra, and the principles are too well settled to need any further consideration by us. But the defendant insists, however, strenuously that as to the Neal tract of land he cannot be decreed to execute title to the plaintiff for one-half under his oral trust, as found by the jury, because it was held in Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150 N.C. 222, that when a deed has been executed the grantor cannot allege that there was an oral trust which he could enforce against the trustee, because this would be to contradict the deed. This principle is well settled and has been repeatedly cited and approved, Trust Co. v. Sterchie, 169 N.C. 22, and cases there cited; Campbell v. Sigmon, 170 N.C. 351. It has no application, however, in this case.

" To same effect, Bourne v. Sherrill, 143 N.C. 381. The ruling in Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150 N.C. 222, that a parol trust cannot be set up by a grantor as to a conveyance in fee to his grantee, is not only upheld by the reasoning and authorities therein cited, but that case has since been upheld and reaffirmed in Ricks v. Wilson, 154 N.C. 286; Jones v. Jones, 164 N.C. 322; Cavenaugh v. Jarman, ib., (331) 375; Trust Co. v. Sterchie, 169 N.C. 22; Campbell v. Sigmon, 170 N.C. 351; and in this very case, when here before, 171 N.C. 313. The demurred ore tenus to the complaint "because it did not state a cause of action" was properly sustained.