For the purpose of determining the validity of the order from which this appeal is taken, we assume that the allegations of fact in the complaint, as distinguished from conclusions of law, are true. We also assume that the affirmative allegations of fact in the several further answers, as distinguished from conclusions of law and from denials of facts alleged in the complaint, are true. Trust Co. v. Currin, 244 N.C. 102, 92 S.E.2d 658. The questions for us are whether, on these assumptions, the allegations struck from the further answers constitute, or are germane to, a valid and sufficient defense to the cause of action, if any, alleged in the complaint. In search of the solution to those questions, we turn first to the law of this State and then to the Constitution and laws of the United States to ascertain what, if any, effect they have upon the law of North Carolina otherwise applicable.
In considering plaintiff's motion to strike (demurrer), the facts alleged by defendant are deemed admitted. Jenkins Co. v. Lewis, 259 N.C. 86, 88, 130 S.E.2d 49; Pack v. McCoy, 251 N.C. 590, 112 S.E.2d 118; Trust Co. v. Currin, 244 N.C. 102, 92 S.E.2d 658. "Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest . . ."
The demurrer and motion to strike defendant's pleas in bar present squarely for decision the sufficiency of such pleas, because the demurrer, for the purpose, admits the truth of factual averments well stated, and such relevant inferences as may be deduced therefrom, but not legal inferences or conclusions of law asserted by the pleader, McKinney v. High Point, 237 N.C. 66, 74 S.E.2d 440, and the motion to strike, for the purpose of the motion, makes similar admissions. Trust Co. v. Currin, 244 N.C. 102, 92 S.E.2d 658. On 10 November 1955, F.L. Taylor was operating a Cadillac auto, mobile, owned by the, plaintiff here, Troy Lumber Company, which was involved in a collision with an automobile driven by defendant E. M. Hunt. The present action is to recover property damage to the automobile allegedly caused by the actionable negligence of the defendant.
Being named as the insured under the policy, defendant unquestionably can maintain an action against the insurance company as the named insured. Wachovia Bank Trust Co. v. Currin, 244 N.C. 102, 107, 92 S.E.2d 658, 662 (1956). Even though defendant's debt to FmHA exceeded the amount of the proceeds from the insurance company, that does not alter the fact that defendant had an enforceable right to force the payment of the proceeds.