Opinion
2012-01-24
Karrie L. TRUGLIA, appellant, v. Joseph A. TRUGLIA, respondent.
Larkin, Axelrod, Ingrassia & Tetenbaum, LLP, Newburgh, N.Y. (William J. Larkin III of counsel), for appellant. *913 Alysia R. Baker, Goshen, N.Y., for respondent.
Larkin, Axelrod, Ingrassia & Tetenbaum, LLP, Newburgh, N.Y. (William J. Larkin III of counsel), for appellant. *913 Alysia R. Baker, Goshen, N.Y., for respondent.
Martin R. Goldberg, Middletown, N.Y., attorney for the child.
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Alfieri, J.), dated December 2, 2010, as, after a hearing, granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was for an award of pendente lite maintenance and directed her to pay the defendant pendente lite maintenance in the sum of $2,628.47 per week.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
“Modifications of pendente lite awards should rarely be made by an appellate court and then only under exigent circumstances, such as where a party is unable to meet his or her financial obligations, or justice otherwise requires” ( Palmeri v. Palmeri, 87 A.D.3d 572, 573, 929 N.Y.S.2d 153 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Renga v. Renga, 86 A.D.3d 634, 635, 928 N.Y.S.2d 547). “Any perceived inequities in pendente lite support can best be remedied by a speedy trial, at which the parties' financial circumstances can be fully explored” ( Conyea v. Conyea, 81 A.D.3d 869, 870, 917 N.Y.S.2d 874; see Renga v. Renga, 86 A.D.3d at 635, 928 N.Y.S.2d 547; Malik v. Malik, 66 A.D.3d 968, 968, 886 N.Y.S.2d 826).
In determining an award of pendente lite maintenance, a court should not rely on the new statutory formula in Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5–a) in actions, such as this one, commenced prior to its effective date ( see Ingersoll v. Ingersoll, 86 A.D.3d 684, 685, 927 N.Y.S.2d 420). Here, however, the Supreme Court's award, while erroneously arrived at using the new statutory formula, can be upheld in accordance with the prior standard under former Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(6)(a). The award of pendente lite maintenance reflected “ ‘an accommodation between the reasonable needs of the moving spouse and the financial ability of the other spouse ... with due regard for the preseparation standard of living’ ” ( Dowd v. Dowd, 74 A.D.3d 1013, 1014, 903 N.Y.S.2d 501, quoting Levy v. Levy, 72 A.D.3d 651, 652, 897 N.Y.S.2d 910). The plaintiff has not demonstrated any exigent circumstances that would warrant a modification of the pendente lite maintenance award.