Truckweld Equipment Co. v. Swenson Trucking

21 Citing cases

  1. Exxon Corp. v. Alvey

    690 P.2d 733 (Alaska 1984)   Cited 24 times
    In Exxon Corp. v. Alvey, 690 P.2d 733 (Alaska 1984), we had occasion to consider whether the Truckweld rule should be applied to force the joinder as a plaintiff of an employer who had paid worker's compensation benefits.

    Exxon asserts that if it is not entitled to offset the workers' compensation benefits which Alvey received, the trial court should have realigned Loffland as a party plaintiff. Exxon relies on Truckweld Equipment Co. v. Swenson Trucking Excavating, Inc., 649 P.2d 234 (Alaska 1982). In Truckweld we held that where a plaintiff was suing for an amount for which it had been reimbursed by an insurer as well as for the remainder of its claim, the insurer should have been joined as a real party in interest under Civil Rule 17(a) if appropriate procedures were followed.

  2. Municipality of Anchorage v. Baugh Const

    722 P.2d 919 (Alaska 1986)   Cited 17 times
    Describing effect of partially subrogated insurer's ratification of insured's suit against party causing injury

    . . . No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest. In Truckweld Equipment Co. v. Swenson Trucking, 649 P.2d 234, 239 (Alaska 1982), we held that the superior court had properly denied defendant's Rule 17(a) motion to join plaintiff's partially subrogated insurer because the motion was untimely. We also stated, however, that had the motion been timely the insurer should have been joined under Rule 17(a).

  3. Hayes v. Xerox Corp.

    718 P.2d 929 (Alaska 1986)   Cited 69 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an offer of judgment was not conditional upon joint acceptance and therefore was not invalid on those grounds

    When the judgment recovered is less than an offer of judgment made under Rule 68, then the offeree must pay partial attorney's fees incurred subsequent to the offer. See Truckweld Equipment Co. v. Swenson Trucking, 649 P.2d 234, 240 (Alaska 1982); Miklautsch v. Dominick, 452 P.2d 438, 440-41 (Alaska 1969). The cost provision of Rule 68 confers a "limited prevailing party" status on a defendant.

  4. Smith v. Lee

    770 P.2d 754 (Alaska 1989)   Cited 1 times

    Ratification assures that each party not only reaps the benefit but bears the burden of claims litigated on its behalf. Id.; Truckweld Equip. Co. v. Swenson Trucking Excavating, 649 P.2d 234, 238 (Alaska 1982). As noted in Truckweld, ratification requires "explicit adoption of the court proceedings in question."

  5. Fairbanks N. Star Bor. v. Kandik Const

    795 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1990)   Cited 20 times
    Defining "total cost" method of determining damages for breach as the difference between the original bid or estimate and the final cost

    It further provides, however, that no claim should be dismissed for failure to name the real party in interest unless a reasonable time is allowed after objection for ratification, substitution, or joinder of the real party. Id.; Truckweld Equipment Co. v. Swenson Trucking Excavating, 649 P.2d 234, 239 (Alaska 1982). Joinder of the real party in interest has the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.

  6. Tolan v. Era Helicopters, Inc.

    699 P.2d 1265 (Alaska 1985)   Cited 20 times
    In Tolan we did not adopt a rule excluding collateral source evidence in all circumstances; we indicated that “receipt of compensation benefits may be admissible if offered for a purpose other than the diminution of the plaintiff's damages,” and instructed trial courts in such cases to weigh the probative value of the evidence against the dangers of unfair prejudice and confusion.

    ERA's motion to reconsider the court's order denying its motion to join Providence as a real party in interest was based on our unpublished order in Vertecs Corp. v. City of Yakutat, No. 6308 (1982), where we held that a partially subrogated insurer is a real party in interest under Civil Rule 17(a). A few months subsequent to our order in Vertecs we published our opinion in Truckweld Equipment Co. v. Swenson Trucking and Excavating, Inc., 649 P.2d 234 (Alaska 1982), also holding that a partially subrogated insurer can be joined by a timely motion under Civil Rule 17(a). In Truckweld we stated that "[w]e are not impressed by abstract claims of prejudice resulting from the jury's knowledge of partial coverage.

  7. Anderson v. Tuboscope Vetco, Inc.

    9 P.3d 1013 (Alaska 2000)   Cited 10 times
    Adopting three-part test for special employment from Larson's treatise

    However, Anderson disregards our explicit statement that "our holding in Truckweld should not be applied in the workers' compensation context due to the specific statutory procedures set out in AS 23.30.015." 649 P.2d 234, 238-39 (Alaska 1982) (stating that where plaintiff was suing for property damage for which it had been partially reimbursed by insurer, insurer could be considered a real party in interest if insurer was timely joined in action).Exxon Corp. v. Alvey, 690 P.2d 733, 744 (Alaska 1984).

  8. Bohna v. Hughes

    828 P.2d 745 (Alaska 1992)   Cited 47 times
    Agreeing with trial court ruling that insurer breached its obligation of good faith and fair dealing "as a matter of law."

    With pre-judgment interest, it amounted to over $4.6 million.See Alaska Civil Rule 68; Truckweld Equipment Co. v. Swenson Trucking, 649 P.2d 234, 240 (Alaska 1982); Miklautsch v. Dominick, 452 P.2d 438, 440 (Alaska 1969); see also supra note 6. This judgment initially resulted in Allstate paying a total of $167,647.

  9. Selden v. Burnett

    754 P.2d 256 (Alaska 1988)   Cited 8 times
    Finding that when an accountant in the course of giving personal tax advice verbally recommends particular investment to client, accountant owes duty of care to third party only if accountant specifically intends third party to invest relying on his advice and only if accountant makes intent known

    Furthermore, product consumers are often powerless to protect themselves from injury.See Swenson Trucking Excavating, Inc. v. Truckweld Equipment Co., 604 P.2d 1113, 1116 (1980), appeal after remand, 649 P.2d 234 (Alaska 1982). Second, although malpractice insurance might cover the accountant's liability, to allow a non-client to recover would be to spread the loss to the wrong group — namely, the group of fee-paying clients on whom the burden of insurance premiums ultimately falls.

  10. Braham v. Fuller

    728 P.2d 641 (Alaska 1986)   Cited 4 times
    Defining reasonable use rule in context of melting permafrost

    "Whether particular conduct is reasonable under the circumstances is generally considered a question of fact for the jury." Carlson v. State, 598 P.2d 969, 974 (Alaska 1979); Swenson Trucking Excavating, Inc. v. Truckweld Equipment Corp., 604 P.2d 1113, 1118 (Alaska 1980), appeal after remand, 649 P.2d 234 (Alaska 1982). The reasonable use rule applied in this case is closely analogous to a rule of negligence liability, and