Failure by the public to use the full four rods anticipated by the highway-by-user statute simply results in the public's acquiring less than four rods. Indeed, a highway by user is not "affected by the fact that the land within the highway boundaries may be of a width less than four rods ormore than four rods." Trowbridge v State Hwy Comm'r, 296 Mich. 587, 599; 296 N.W. 689 (1941) (emphasis added). Trowbridge held that the fact that the strip of land between the paved portions of a super highway was wider than four rods would not prevent that strip from becoming a highway by user under the statute because a highway by user is as wide as actually used.

The maintenance activities of the public authority must give the owner notice that title is being denied. Trowbridge v State Hwy Comm'r, 296 Mich 587, 599; 296 NW 689 (1941). The pertinent inquiry is not whether there is actual notice, but rather whether the property owner ought to have notice.

Bain v. Fry, 352 Mich. 299, 89 N.W.2d 485 (1958) (use must be so open, hostile and notorious as to provide notice to the landowner that title to the land is denied). Trowbridge v. Van Wagoner, 296 Mich. 587, 296 N.W. 689 (1941) (public use must be accompanied by some act by public authorities sufficient to give landowner notice that title to the land is denied). South Branch Ranch Co. v. Emery, 191 Mich. 188, 157 N.W. 419 (1916) (mere use by public will not establish a public prescriptive right, some act of public control is necessary).

Defendant claims that the road was created by user, under that statute, and is, therefore, 4 rods wide. For this conclusion defendant relies on Bumpus v. Miller, 4 Mich. 159, and Kruger v. LeBlanc, 70 Mich. 76. If they were authority therefor, we agree with the trial court that the later decisions of this Court, in Wayne County Savings Bank v. Stockwell, 84 Mich. 586, Smith v. State Highway Commissioner, 227 Mich. 280, and Trowbridge v. State Highway Commissioner, 296 Mich. 587, are to the contrary, holding that a highway by user becomes such to the width and extent used. We agree with the trial court that privately owned land cannot become public road by user beyond the portion used as such merely by the above noted statutory pronouncement to that effect.

Adverse possession for 15 years is a statutory bar, and actual knowledge of such adverse holding is not required when the circumstances are such that the contiguous holder ought to have such knowledge. Bird v. Stark, 66 Mich. 654, cited with approval in Gould v. Fiero, 262 Mich. 467, and more recently in Trowbridge v. State Highway Commissioner, 296 Mich. 587. There was undisputed testimony that defendant entered into the possession of the land in 1897, or, at the latest, 1899, when the fence was built, under the impression that it was the land which it bought, and the court might have very properly instructed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant on these facts.