Thus, whether defendant and Williams shared profits is irrelevant to determining whether defendant may be held liable for Williams's conduct under a joint enterprise theory. See also Troutman v Ollis, 164 Mich App 727, 733; 417 NW2d 589 (1987) ("The term 'joint enterprise' has been defined as the pursuit of an undertaking by two or more persons having a community of interest in the object and purposes of the undertaking, and an equal right to direct and govern the movements and conduct of each other . . . ."). The joint enterprise theory of liability is most frequently applied in the automobile negligence context.
Again, we find no error. In Troutman v Ollis, 164 Mich. App. 727, 734; 417 N.W.2d 589 (1987), this Court recognized the concept of joint enterprise in the context of automobile negligence cases, quoting Farthing v Hepinstall, 243 Mich. 380, 382; 220 N.W. 708 (1928): To constitute a joint enterprise between a passenger and the driver of an automobile within the meaning of the law of negligence, there must be such a community of interest in its operation as to give each an equal right of control.
Defendant Sturm next asserts that the trial court erred when it refused to allow him to amend his answer to assert the existence of a joint enterprise as an affirmative defense. Under this theory, the negligence of one person is imputed to another to charge the latter with liability to a third person injured by reason of the negligence of the former. Troutman v Ollis, 164 Mich. App. 727, 733; 417 N.W.2d 589 (1987). The theory rests on the assumption that the person sought to be held responsible was engaged in a joint venture with the one who was actually negligent.