Opinion
Rehearing Denied Dec. 30, 1976. Selected for Official Publication.
The Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division, appealed from a ruling of
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the District Court, Arapahoe County, William B. Naugle, J., reversing order suspending a driver's license for point accumulation. The Court of Appeals, Sternberg, J., held that evidence that motorist who was charged with four-point offense of driving 41 miles per hour in 30-mile per hour zone in city paid $15 to city court clerk did not prove motorist's conviction of offense for which she was ticketed for purpose of suspending motorist's driver's license for point accumulation.
Affirmed.
Willard B. Rogers, Jr., Aurora, for plaintiff-appellee.
J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Jean E. Dubofsky, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Arthur G. Staliwe, Special Asst. Attys. Gen., Denver, for defendants-appellants.
STERNBERG, Judge.
Following proceedings before a hearing examiner of the Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division, plaintiff's driver's license was suspended for point accumulation pursuant to § 42--2--123, C.R.S. 1973. She appealed to the district court which reversed the order of suspension and enjoined the Department from interfering with her driving privileges. The Department appeals and we affirm the order of the district court.
Plaintiff's driving privileges were suspended by the Department because she had allegedly accumulated 12 points against her driving record within a 12 month period. Of these points, four were based on an alleged conviction of a charge of driving 41 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour zone in the City of Golden, a four point offense. With respect to this charge, the record indicates only that $15 was paid on September 26, 1974, to the Golden Municipal Court Clerk, and the plaintiff, at the license suspension hearing before the examiner, challenged this as not constituting a 'conviction' within the statutory meaning of that word.
We agree with the district court that proof of payment of $15, even if it be assumed that it was to pay a fine, does not prove that there was a conviction of the offense for which plaintiff was ticketed. From all that appears in the record, the payment could have been for a reduced charge constituting a three point violation. Thus, the Department was without authority to enter the suspension.
The Department relies upon the presumption of the correctness of records, citing Campbell v. State, 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385 (1971); and Michels v. Motor Vehicle Division, 32 Colo.App. 106, 506 P.2d 1243 (1973). However, that presumption is rebuttable, and is insufficient where, as here, the evidence at the hearing establishes that there was neither a specific court judgment nor a signed acknowledgment of guilt as prescribed by §§ 42--4--1501(4)(a) and 42--4--1505(2)(a), C.R.S. 1973. Therefore, suspension of plaintiff's driving privileges is without proper foundation. See Gurule v. State, Colo.App., 558 P.2d 587 (announced October 14, 1976).
Judgment affirmed.
COYTE and ENOCH, JJ., concur.