Troutman et al. v. Williams Furniture Corp.

5 Citing cases

  1. Baldwin v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.

    108 S.E.2d 409 (S.C. 1959)   Cited 10 times

    Messrs. Turner, Padget Graham, of Columbia, for Appellants, cite: As to burden being upon claimant to establishthat accident arose out of and in the course of his employment: 214 S.C. 81, 51 S.E.2d 363; 188 S.C. 393, 199 S.E. 530. As to the law concerning the "going to and fromwork" rule: 201 S.C. 257, 22 S.E.2d 715; 205 S.C. 423, 32 S.E.2d 240; 208 S.C. 139, 37 S.E.2d 286; 211 S.C. 370, 45 S.E.2d 591; 223 S.C. 217, 74 S.E.2d 918; 224 S.C. 353, 79 S.E.2d 374; 224 S.C. 429, 82 S.E.2d 794; 188 S.C. 233, 198 S.E. 385; 205 S.C. 433, 32 S.E.2d 365; 7 S.C.L.Q. 206; 237 F.2d 145; 194 Wis. 190, 215 N.W. 911; 163 Wis. 31, 157 N.W. 556; Larson's Law of Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 15.43; 222 N.C. 724, 24 S.E.2d 751; 318 P.2d 991; 139 A.2d 219; 101 So.2d 361; Larson's Law of Workmen's Compensation, par. 17.40. Messrs. McLeod Singletary, of Columbia, for Respondent, cite: As to claimant's injuries arising out of and in thecourse of his employment within the purview of the Workmen'sCompensation Act: 198 S.C. 373, 17 S.E.2d 695; 210 S.C. 490, 43 S.E.2d 353; 205 S.C. 423, 32 S.E.2d 240; Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law. Sec. 15.22, Vol. 1, p. 203; 225 Ala. 462, 143 So. 813, 85 A.L.R. 85; 224 App. Div. 319, 230 N.Y.S. 647; 122 N.Y.S.2d 768; 182 App. Div. 139, 169 N.Y.S. 781. 227 N.Y. 634, 126 N.E. 915; 276 U.S. 154, 48 S.Ct. 221, 72 L.Ed. 507, 66 A.L.R. 1402; 188 S.C. 233, 198 S.E. 385; 205 S.C. 433, 32 S.E.2d 368; 150 Va. 260, 142 S.E. 400; 58 Am. J

  2. Sylvan v. Sylvan Bros., Inc., et al

    82 S.E.2d 794 (S.C. 1954)   Cited 20 times
    Denying compensation because there was no causal connection between employment and injury

    Manifestly, there was no causal connection between the employment and the injury. The judgment will have to be reversed upon the authority of Gallman v. Springs Mills, 201 S.C. 257, 22 S.E.2d 715; Dicks v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 208 S.C. 139, 37 S.E.2d 286; Hinton v. North Georgia WarehouseCorp., 211 S.C. 370, 45 S.E.2d 591, from which the writer hereof dissented but of course is bound by the decision; McDonald v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 223 S.C. 217, 74 S.E.2d 918; and Troutman v. WilliamsFurniture Co., 224 S.C. 353, 79 S.E.2d 374. The Gallman case, supra [ 201 S.C. 257, 22 S.E.2d 716], is especially in point and, therefore, controlling; the injured employee there was en route to work, carrying his tools, when he slipped and fell on the employer-owned icy street.

  3. Martin v. United States

    566 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1977)   Cited 13 times
    In Martin, although the district court found a substantial question as to FECA coverage and dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the Fifth Circuit reversed finding that since plaintiff's accident was not within the scope of her employment, FECA was inapplicable.

    By contrast, the court, in Wetzel v. Britton, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 327, 170 F.2d 285 (1948), upheld a finding that an employee who was struck by a bus on her way to lunch was not injured within the scope of her employment where the facts showed that the employer exercised no control over her activities during the lunch-break. To the same effect are Walker v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 769 (D.Alas. 1971); and Troutman v. Williams Furniture Corp., 224 S.C. 353, 79 S.E.2d 374, 376 (1953). Viewed together, these cases refute any suggestion that lunchtime injuries receive uniform dispositions; the outcome in each case depends on its facts.

  4. Halpern v. De Jay Stores, Inc.

    115 S.E.2d 297 (S.C. 1960)   Cited 10 times

    Messrs. William Elliott and Norbert A. Theodore, of Columbia, for Appellants, cite: As to when the facts areadmitted or established, the question of whether or not anaccident is compensable becomes a question of law: 61 S.E.2d 654, 218 S.C. 73; 82 S.E.2d 794, 225 S.C. 429. As to the claimant not sustaining the burden of provingfacts sufficient to render the injury compensable: 40 S.E.2d 626, 209 S.C. 411; 63 S.E.2d 305, 218 S.C. 513; 102 S.E.2d 373, 232 S.C. 392; 218 S.C. 73, 61 S.E.2d 654; 32 S.E.2d 240, 205 S.C. 423; 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697. As to the accident not arisingout of and in the course of employment: 82 S.E.2d 794, 225 S.C. 429; 79 S.E.2d 374, 224 S.C. 353; 201 S.C. 257, 22 S.E.2d 715; 64 S.E.2d 152, 219 S.C. 50; 74 S.E.2d 918, 223 S.C. 217; 62 S.E.2d 469, 218 S.C. 287; 99 S.E.2d 398, 231 S.C. 601. Asto where employee deviates from the duties of his employmentand has an accident, the injuries sustained are notcompensable: 54 S.E.2d 904, 215 S.C. 321; 63 S.E.2d 305, 218 S.C. 513; 85 S.E.2d 290; 201 S.C. 257, 22 S.E.2d 715. Messrs. Edens Hammer and Terrell L. Glenn, of Columbia, for Respondent, cite: As to rule that where there isany testimony to support the findings of the Industrial CommissionAward the Court of Common Pleas and the SupremeCourt are without the power to review the findings of factwhich are conclusive on appeal: 196 S.C. 97, 12 S.E.2d 839; 197 S.C. 157, 14 S.E.2d 889; 71 C.J. 185-186.

  5. Prince v. C.Y. Thomason Co.

    113 S.E.2d 742 (S.C. 1960)   Cited 5 times

    Messrs. Rainey, Fant, Traxler Horton, of Greenville, for Appellants, cite: As to employee's death not resultingproximately from an injury by accident arising out of andin the course of his employment: 208 S.C. 139, 37 S.E.2d 286; 201 S.C. 257, 22 S.E.2d 715; 225 S.C. 429, 82 S.E.2d 794; 224 S.C. 353, 79 S.E.2d 374; 223 S.C. 217, 74 S.E.2d 918; 211 S.C. 370, 45 S.E.2d 591; (Ga.App.) 7 S.E.2d 85; (Mich.) 61 N.W.2d 31. As to the awards of benefits for injuriesand death being erroneously predicated upon inadmissibleand incompetent testimony: 206 S.C. 41, 32 S.E.2d 877. As to there being no presumption that an accident arose outof and in the course of employment where the accident occurredafter working hours off the employer's premises: 218 S.C. 513, 63 S.E.2d 305. As to there being nobasis in fact or law for an award of medical benefits beyonda period of ten (10) weeks from the date of injury: 206 S.C. 381, 34 S.E.2d 802; 225 S.C. 389, 82 S.E.2d 520; 232 S.C. 392, 102 S.E.2d 373; 215 N.C. 519, 2 S.E.2d 560; 226 S.C. 561, 86 S.E.2d 253; 230 S.C. 412, 96 S.E.2d 61; 207 S.C. 1, 35 S.E.2d 42; 221 S.C. 52, 68 S.E.2d 878; 220 S.C. 363, 67 S.E.2d 680. As to the interests of the minor dependentsbeing prejudiced by the lack of independent legal representation: 216 S.C. 114, 57 S.E.2d 29; 211 S.C. 68, 44 S.E