Opinion
No. SC08-1254.
April 30, 2009.
Lower Tribunal No(s). 86-CF-1225.
Melvin Trotter, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals from the circuit court's summary denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief, raising two issues. See Fla. R. Crim P. 3.851. We previously affirmed Trotter's convictions and sentence of death. See Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1990); Trotter v. State, 690 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1996). We also affirmed the denial of his initial motion for postconviction relief, affirmed the denial of his postconviction motion that alleged that he is mentally retarded, and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Trotter v. State, 932 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 2006).
In his first claim in this appeal, Trotter contends that Florida's lethal injection procedures violate the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; art. I § 17, Fla. Const. We have repeatedly upheld these procedures against such constitutional challenges. See Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1081 (Fla. 2008), cert. denied, No. 08-8614 (U.S. Feb. 11, 2009); Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d 318, 321-25 (Fla. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2486 (2008); Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 349-53 (Fla. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2485 (2008). We also have held the procedures constitutional under the requirements of Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008). See Ventura v. State, 2 So. 3d 194, 200 (Fla. 2009) ("Florida's current lethal-injection protocol passes muster under any of the risk-based standards considered by the Baze Court (and would easily satisfy the intent-based standard advocated by Justices Thomas and Scalia)."); Henyard v. State, 992 So. 2d 120, 130 (Fla. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 28 (2008).
In his second claim, Trotter challenges the constitutionality of section 945.10, Florida Statutes (2006), which exempts from disclosure as public record the identity of the members of the execution team and the executioners. This claim is procedurally barred because it could have been raised in a prior proceeding. Additionally, the claim is without merit. See Henyard, 992 So. 2d at 130.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's order summarily denying relief on Trotter's successive postconviction motion.
PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
QUINCE, C.J., recused.