Opinion
Case No. 03-10323-BC.
November 2, 2004
OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1 that the complaint should be dismissed. The plaintiff, Gregory Trotter, is a state prisoner currently incarcerated by the Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC") at its Cotton Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan. On April 9, 2003, he filed a pro se civil rights complaint in this Court against various employees of the MDOC alleging that these employees violated his constitutional rights by treating his serious medical needs with deliberate indifference. That case, Trotter v. Gonzalez, et al., was docketed under case number 03-10096. Subsequently, he filed a pro se civil rights complaint in the Southern Division of this Court against employees of the MDOC alleging that his serious medical needs again were treated with deliberate indifference. That case, Trotter v. Engelsgjerd, et al., was assigned to the Honorable Denise Page Hood and docketed under case number 03-72304. On August 8, 2004, Judge Hood entered an order reassigning this case to this Court as a companion case to case number 03-10096. See E.D. Mich. LR 83.11. The case has now been docketed as case number 03-10323.
On July 9, 2004, the Court dismissed case number 03-10096 for failure to state a claim. That dismissal is presently under review in this Court to determine the impact, if any, that the recent decision of Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004), may have on the Court's dismissal order. Operating under an order of reference to conduct all pretrial proceedings, the magistrate judge issued his report on August 30, 2004, recommending that this Court sua sponte dismiss case number 03-10323. After conducting a de novo review of the motion papers, the report and recommendation, and the plaintiff's objections, the Court finds that the plaintiff's complaint fails to allege all of the material elements of a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, the Court will adopt the report and recommendation and dismiss the complaint sua sponte for failure to set forth a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The Court is required to undertake a sua sponte review of the plaintiff's complaint to determine whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted. See Baxter v. Rose, 305 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)). When conducting this review, a pro se litigant's complaint is to be construed liberally, Middleton v. McGinnis, 860 F. Supp. 391, 392 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); that is, it is held to a "less stringent standard" than those drafted by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Such complaints, however, must plead facts sufficient to show a cognizable legal wrong has been committed from which plaintiff may be granted relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b).
A federal court must dismiss a civil rights action against a governmental entity, officer, or employee if the prisoner's complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir. 2001). A complaint is frivolous if it contains factual allegations that are "fantastic or delusional" or if it is based on legal theories that are "indisputably meritless." Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 866 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989)). "Dismissal of a complaint for the failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted is appropriate only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Id. at 867.
The essential elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are that the conduct complained of: (1) was committed by a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). "Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie." Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991). An inmate's Eighth Amendment rights are violated when a prison official's deliberate indifference subjects him to serious harm. Street v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Thus, the plaintiff must sufficiently allege the that each defendant acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference. See id. at 817, 818 (affirming sua sponte dismissal of claim against prison official where inmate failed to allege that prison official knew the inmate was subjected to substantial risk of harm).
The magistrate judge suggested that the plaintiff failed to allege that any defendant acted against him. The body of the complaint sets forth these allegations:
Dr. Engelsgjerd and (4-30-03) 3:30 Nurse Michelle Whitney (4-30-03) 3:30 [and] S. Teed, Health Unit Manager (4-30-03) 3:30. I have kited [sic] and sent letters to all defendants including the warden, Paul H. Renico, and Health Services to help with my medical condition of internal/external bleeding and I'm still bleeding. I'm also suffering great pain in my legs and cannot walk. My legs gave out on me at St. Louis and the facility would not provide a wheelchair. I was forced to crawl to places that I had to go for 6 months. There are video tapes of me being dragged on the ground by officers while handcuffed because I couldn't walk.
The magistrate judge noted that the plaintiff provided insufficient information to associate the defendants with the allegation that "the facility" would not provide him with a wheelchair or medical attention. The magistrate judge recommended that the Court sua sponte dismiss the complaint because, even with a generous construction, the plaintiff's legal theory failed to allege all material elements required for the claim. The magistrate judge then suggested as alternative grounds for dismissal that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust all available state administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998). The plaintiff attached sixty pates of documents to the complaint, including letters of complaint sent to prison officials and grievances, but none of the grievance forms mentions any of the defendants and there are no Step III grievances included with the complaint.
The plaintiff filed timely objections arguing that dismissal is inappropriate because "Defendants in this case took actions which were in violation of the constitution by beating the plaintiff and refusing him medical treatment." Pl.'s Objections at 2. However, none of these claims is alleged in the complaint. The plaintiff also contends that his complaint should survive so that he can articulate the differences between this case and case number 03-10096, Trotter v. Gonzalez. Last, construing the report and recommendation as based solely on the failure to exhaust, the plaintiff argues that the Court should excuse his failure to exhaust because he filed some grievances related to the incidents giving rise to the suit, his pursuit of grievances has been futile, the prison system cannot determine the constitutional issue that the claim presents, and studying and attending classes for his GED has absorbed his time. None of the objections relating to the failure to exhaust remedies has merit, see Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740 (2001) (holding that internal administrative procedures must be followed even if they do not offer the precise relief that the prisoner seeks); Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that the exhaustion rule provides the state prison system with an opportunity "to deal with claims against prison personnel before those complaints reach federal court"), but the Court's dismissal is not based on the failure to exhaust.
The plaintiff's objections fail to confront or overcome the magistrate judge's reasoning in support of the recommendation to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment imposes upon prison officials the duty to "provide humane conditions of confinement," and that among the obligations attendant to the discharge of that duty is to "ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). This obligation, however, is not unqualified. To the contrary, it is tightly circumscribed by rules requiring certain levels of proof when a prisoner argues that his conditions of confinement have crossed the boundary established by "contemporary standards of decency" incorporated into Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment `must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'" (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion))). Thus, although under the Eighth Amendment, prisoners have a limited constitutional right to proper medical care, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976), that right is violated only when corrections officials are deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs. Id. at 104.
A claim that the Eighth Amendment has been violated by a prison official's deliberate indifference to a prisoner's adequate medical care has both an objective and a subjective component. To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need asserted is "sufficiently serious." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. "To satisfy the subjective component, the plaintiff must allege facts which, if true, would show that the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk." Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
The complaint in this case states only that the plaintiff was suffering from a "medical condition of internal/external bleeding" and that he experienced "great pain in [his] legs." He also alleged that he sent letters about his condition to the defendants and that he is still bleeding and cannot walk. In effect, the plaintiff alleges that he has not been cured. He makes no allegation as to the nature of his condition or provides facts from which one might infer that it is objectively "serious." See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992) (stating that "[b]ecause society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those needs are `serious'"). Nor does the plaintiff allege that the defendants ignored his pleas or deprived him of medical treatment.
The plaintiff has not pleaded facts from which the Court can infer either the objective or the subjective component of a claim under Section 1983 based on the Eighth Amendment.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED.
It is further ORDERED that the plaintiff's complaint will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
It is further ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel [dkt # 10] is DENIED AS MOOT.