Opinion
C23-5691JLR
11-01-2023
ANDERS TRON-HAUKEBO, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
JAMES L. ROBART UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the court are two motions: (1) Defendants the Washington State Department of Transportation (“DOT”) and Washington State Ferries' (“WSF”, and together, “Defendants”) motion to dismiss and (2) Plaintiff Anders Tron-Haukebo's motion requesting a ruling. (MTD (Dkt. # 12); MRR (Dkt. # 13).) Defendants oppose Mr. Tron-Haukebo's motion requesting a ruling. (MRR Resp. (Dkt. # 14).) Mr. Tron-Haukebo, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), did not respond to Defendants' motion to dismiss. (See generally Dkt.) Neither party filed a reply. (See generally id.) The court has reviewed the motions, the parties' submissions, the relevant portions of the record, and the governing law. Being fully advised,the court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss and DENIES Mr. Tron-Haukebo's motion requesting a ruling.
No party requests oral argument (see MTD at 1; MRR at 1; MRR Resp. at 1) and the court concludes that oral argument would not be helpful to its disposition of the motion, see Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(4).
II. BACKGROUND
This case arises from Mr. Tron-Haukebo's efforts to obtain employment with WSF. (See generally Compl. (Dkt. # 6).) Mr. Tron-Haukebo lives in Clallam County, Washington; is 77 years old; and has a hearing disability. (Id. at 1, 4-5.) He alleges that he applied for a position as a WSF terminal attendant and was offered employment beginning on March 28, 2023. (Id. at 2.) WSF terminal attendants may be given one of two assignments: ticket seller or traffic guide. (Id. at 3-4 (describing the two roles).) Mr. Tron-Haukebo asserts that he “diligently applied himself to learning and practicing the training activities for becoming a ticket[]seller.” (Id. at 5.)
Mr. Tron-Haukebo attended orientation and training sessions provided by WSF in Seattle. (Id. at 2.) On his first day of classes, Mr. Tron-Haukebo asked to be seated in the first row of seats because he has a hearing disability. (Id. at 4.) He also asked for materials that he could take home to study, but his request was denied. (Id. at 5.) Mr. Tron-Haukebo asserts that he attended all his classroom training sessions in Seattle, “was never told that classes were delayed because of his tardiness,” and never received any notice of complaints or reprimands. (Id. at 4.)
On or around April 3, 2023, Mr. Tron-Haukebo was told that he did not get a passing score on the classroom portion of the ticket-seller training and that his employment was terminated for that reason. (See id. at 2, 5.) His request to be reassigned to traffic guide duties was denied. (Id. at 5.) When he asked if he could be scheduled for the next classroom training session, he was told that he must re-apply for employment before he could attend the training again. (Id. at 5.)
Mr. Tron-Haukebo filed his proposed complaint and an application to proceed IFP on July 31, 2023. (IFP App. (Dkt. # 1).) On August 16, 2023, the court granted Mr. Tron-Haukebo leave to proceed IFP and docketed his complaint. (IFP Order (Dkt. # 5); Compl.) Mr. Tron-Haukebo alleges that Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., by failing to accommodate his hearing disability. (Compl. at 5.) The court also liberally construes his complaint as raising a claim for violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (See id. (alleging that “older learners often require adaptive measures to learn material,” that Defendants “should have adjusted the manner and mode of [Mr. Tron-Haukebo's] training” due to his “learning style,” and that he “is a member of a protected class” “due to his age”)); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that the court must liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings). Mr. Tron-Haukebo seeks back pay, reinstatement, exemplary damages, and compensation for lost benefits. (Compl. at 5.)
III. ANALYSIS
The court begins by discussing Defendants' motion to dismiss, then considers Mr. Tron-Haukebo's motion requesting a ruling.
A. Motion to Dismiss
Defendants urge the court to dismiss this case because Mr. Tron-Haukebo's claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. (See generally MTD.) They argue that Washington has not consented to be sued for violations of the ADA and ADEA and that Congress has not abrogated the states' sovereign immunity for such violations. The court agrees.
The Eleventh Amendment bars a citizen from bringing a suit against their own state in federal court. Micomonaco v. Washington, 45 F.3d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)). “Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state departments, agencies, boards, and commissions, and to state employees acting in their official capacity because a suit against them is regarded as a suit against the State itself.” Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Brnovich, 172 F.Supp.3d 1075, 1086 (D. Ariz. 2016) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). Accordingly, Defendants-which are Washington state agencies-are arms of the state ordinarily immune from suit in federal court.
A plaintiff can overcome the Eleventh Amendment bar only if the state has consented to waive its immunity or if Congress has abrogated the state's immunity. See Micomonaco, 45 F.3d at 319. Washington has not consented to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity to claims brought in federal court. See Rains v. State, 674 P.2d 165, 170 (Wash. 1983) (“[T]he State cannot be sued in federal court because of the Eleventh Amendment.”); see also Minnis v. Washington, 675 Fed.Appx. 728, 730 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming grant of summary judgment on ADA claims against state of Washington based on Eleventh Amendment immunity); Del Castillo v. Wash. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., No. C05-1122JLR, 2007 WL 2713035, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 14, 2007) (concluding that Washington has not waived Eleventh Amendment immunity for ADEA claims). And the Supreme Court has made clear that neither Title I of the ADA, which governs employment, nor the ADEA abrogates Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims against a state. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360-61 (2001) (holding that Title I does not abrogate suits for money damages against the states); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66 (2000) (holding that the ADEA does not validly abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity).
Thus, because Defendants are immune from suit, the court GRANTS their motion to dismiss and DISMISSES Mr. Tron-Haukebo's claims without prejudice. See Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that dismissals under the Eleventh Amendment should be without prejudice so that the plaintiff “may reassert his claims in a competent court”); see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91 (“State employees are protected by state age discrimination statutes, and may recover money damages from their state employers, in almost every State of the Union.”). The court denies leave to amend because no amendment can overcome Defendants' Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Lucas v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that when a court dismisses a pro se plaintiff's complaint, it must give the plaintiff leave to amend “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect” in the complaint).
B. Motion Requesting a Ruling
In his motion, Mr. Tron-Haukebo states that he “recently read information that ‘permission' from the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)] is necessary prior to filing a lawsuit alleging violation of the ADA” and that he has since attempted to contact the EEOC, to no avail. (MRR at 1.) He asks the court, therefore, either to (1) allow this lawsuit to proceed because he has made a “good-faith effort to comply” with his “administrative legal duties,” or (2) grant him leave to “file a new action regarding nearly identical information and allegations against the Defendants and consider all requirements to obtain EEOC permission” waived or fulfilled. (Id. at 2.) As Defendants correctly point out, however, even if there were a legal basis for the court to waive the administrative prerequisites for filing suit, that relief would be futile because the Eleventh Amendment nevertheless bars Mr. Tron-Haukebo from suing them for ADA Title I and ADEA violations in federal court. (See MRR Resp. at 2-4.) Therefore, the court DENIES Mr. Tron-Haukebo's motion requesting a ruling.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 12) and DENIES Mr. Tron-Haukebo's motion requesting a ruling (Dkt. # 13). This matter is DISMISSED without prejudice.