Summary
In Trippodo, supra, the defendant was charged with first degree murder, was adjudged to be insane and incapable of standing trial, was committed to the state hospital for treatment and safekeeping, and the indictment against him was unconditionally nol prossed.
Summary of this case from Powell v. GenungOpinion
August 17, 1951.
Harold E. Bergman, Chattahoochee, and Dewey M. Johnson, Quincy, for petitioner.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen. and Reeves Bowen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
This is a habeas corpus proceeding in which the petitioner seeks release from the Florida State Hospital.
The record discloses that on May 5, 1949 the Grand Jury of Dade County returned an indictment against the petitioner charging him with murder in the first degree. Prior to trial on the indictment the Circuit Court of Dade County entered an order which adjudged the petitioner to be insane and incapable of standing trial; committed him "permanently to the Florida State Hospital * * * for treatment and safe keeping, not to be released therefrom without the consent of this Court"; and ordered "that the charge against him for murder in the first degree shall remain standing against the defendant, and the said defendant shall be tried thereon if his condition ever permits during the course of his lifetime."
Thereafter, on February 24, 1950, the Circuit Court, on motion of the State Attorney, entered another order in the cause, in which it ordered "that the said cause be and it is hereby nolle prosequed, provided, however, that this nolle prosequi shall be without prejudice to the State of Florida and if the defendant should ever be released from the Florida State Hospital or his mental condition ever permit him to stand trial, then this nolle prosequi shall be null and void and of no further force and effect, and said defendant shall remain confined in said State Hospital."
Subsequently, on June 23, 1950, the Circuit Court, on motion of the State Attorney for Dade County, entered a third order in the cause, in which it ordered "that the defendant be and he is hereby declared insane and incapable of standing trial at this time and that the said cause be and it is hereby nolle prosequed * * * that the defendant shall remain confined in the Florida State Hospital until such time as he shall be declared sane by a board of competent physicians * * * that the Order heretofore entered in this cause dated February 24, 1950, be, and the same is hereby, set aside and shall have no effect, and be declared to be null and void."
The petition for writ of habeas corpus alleged the facts which have been set out, and the further facts, that on at least three separate occasions subsequent to the entry of the order of June 23, 1950, the petitioner had been found and declared by the Superintendent of the Florida State Hospital and the general staff of physicians at the Hospital to be sane, but that the Superintendent had not released the petitioner from custody because of a certain provision in section 917.01, Florida Statutes 1949, F.S.A., which prescribes: "* * * No defendant committed by a court to an institution, by reason of the examination referred to in this paragraph, shall be released therefrom, without the consent of the court committing him"; and because of the fact that the Circuit Court of Dade County, although notified of the findings of the Superintendent of the Hospital, and the general staff of physicians, had failed either to give or to deny its consent to the release of the petitioner from the Hospital.
The return to the writ, filed on behalf of the respondent, admits all facts alleged in the petition to be true.
Section 917.01, Florida Statutes 1949, F.S.A., provides a method by which a trial court having jurisdiction of the defendant in criminal proceedings, may, where the accused is thought to be insane, conduct a hearing in the pending cause, without the necessity for a separate independent proceeding before the county judge, as contemplated by sections 394.20-22, Florida Statutes 1949, F.S.A. If the trial court, after a hearing on the issue, decides that the defendant is sane, it may proceed with the trial; but if it decides that the defendant is insane, it has the power to commit him to an institution for the insane until he has regained his sanity. In order to insure the return of the defendant to the court in which the criminal proceeding is pending, so that he may be available to answer the pending criminal charge, the statute provides that no defendant committed by a trial court to an institution for the insane shall be released from such institution until the proper officer of such institution has reached the opinion that he is sane and has secured the consent of the committing court for his release.
In the instant case it is conceded by the State that the petitioner is sane and has been found to be such by the Superintendent and the medical staff of the Florida State Hospital. The criminal charge upon which the insanity proceedings were predicated is not now pending against the petitioner; the indictment having been unconditionally nol prossed by the Circuit Court upon motion of the State Attorney. So far as we are advised, the State Attorney does not contemplate filing any other charges against the petitioner. Under such circumstances it is our view that the provisions of section 917.01, supra, requiring the consent of the committing court as a condition precedent to the release of the petitioner are not applicable, and that consequently the petitioner is entitled to his release even though consent by the committing court has not been given.
The petitioner is remanded to the custody of the respondent to be by him held for a period not to exceed 5 days from the entry of this order, at which time he shall be released from custody under the order of commitment; unless in the meantime the Superintendent of the Florida State Hospital shall have been duly notified by the Attorney General of Florida of the pendency or institution of criminal proceedings against the petitioner based upon the transaction which formed the basis for the indictment originally found against the petitioner. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall furnish a copy of this order to the Attorney General of Florida, so that the Attorney General may be advised in the premises.
It is so ordered.
TERRELL, THOMAS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.