Opinion
No. CV03-0082436
May 13, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This proceeding is a summary process case that has, as a result of the efforts of persons who are not parties to this action, attempted to develop into something that it is not. The prologue to this case begins back in the early days of World War II with Mr. Ennenking Long answering his country's call to duty to go and fight against the Nazis in Europe. Mr. Long's first wife had passed away, leaving him with a six-year-old child that he was raising by himself in Springfield, Massachusetts. In 1942, Mr. Long married Evelyn Pay Long and thereafter deeded her some land in Stafford Springs, Connecticut that is the property at issue here. Fortunately, Mr. Long survived his wartime experience, returned to Connecticut and raised his family that ultimately grew to include several additional children with his second wife, Evelyn. Mr. Long passed away in 1989. In 1995, Evelyn Pay Long issued a quitclaim deed to the Connecticut property in favor of the Trinity United Methodist Church (hereafter "Trinity"), the plaintiff in the instant action. Although she gave Trinity a fee simple deed, she reserved a life estate for herself. Matters were slightly complicated when in 1997, shortly before her death, Mrs. Long deeded an interest to the property to her grandson, Mr. Brett Cleaver. Later in 1997, Mrs. Long died, leaving Trinity in full possession of the fee for the property.
Of course, since at the time she executed this deed, Mrs. Long owned only a Life interest in the property. As such, she was free to convey that interest to anyone else; however, the grantee could only take an interest as expansive as that of Mrs. Long. Consequently, when Mrs. Long died, several months after executing the deed, the interest of Brett Cleaver was automatically extinguished.
In February 1997, Mrs. Long's daughters, Jane Long Smith and Jennifer Long Cleaver, filed an action against Trinity challenging Trinity's ownership of the property. This case was tried before the Court, Klaczak, J. and resulted in a judgment for the defendant, Trinity. Judge Klaczak's well reasoned memorandum of decision is reported as Smith v. Trinity United Methodist, 47 Conn. Sup. 618 (2002), 32 Conn. L. Rptr. 140, affirmed, 263 Conn. 135 (2003). When Trinity thereafter went to take possession of the property, it found that there were tenants living in the two houses on the property. These are the named defendants in the instant case. Ultimately, this summary process action was initiated and the matter came to trial on April 6, 2004.
There are two cases that were consolidated for trial. Although there are different defendants involved in each case, the plaintiff is the same and the issues and proof are identical. This Memorandum of Decision shall constitute the Court's decision in both cases.
The plaintiff in the instant action initially filed a four-count complaint seeking ejectment of the defendants and possession of the property. At the trial, the plaintiff unilaterally withdrew Counts 1, 2, and 4. Given that the matter was in trial, the Court, in accordance with CGS § 52-80, granted leave to withdraw, provided such withdrawal was with prejudice. The remaining count alleges that the defendants have no right to occupy the property and the plaintiff seeks possession of the property. The Court makes the following specific findings of fact.
The Court notes that the Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss Count Four of the complaint on April 29, 2004. Given the withdrawal with prejudice of this Count at trial, the Motion to Dismiss is moot and will not be addressed further.
Findings of Fact
1. The plaintiff, Trinity United Methodist Church of Springfield, Massachusetts, hereafter "Trinity," is the record owner of certain premises located within the town of Stafford, Connecticut.
2. Parcel #1, upon which sits a building hereafter known as the "Main House," is situated at 337 Old Springfield Road, Stafford, Connecticut.
3. Parcel #2, upon which sits a building hereafter known as the "Pond Cottage," is situated at 329 Old Springfield Road, Stafford, Connecticut.
4. Trinity acquired title to both of these parcels by virtue of a Quitclaim deed executed by Evelyn Pay Long on February 28th, 1995. This deed is recorded on the land records of the town of Stafford, Connecticut at Volume 326, pages 324-25. The date upon which the deed was recorded was March 16, 1995.
5. The property was conveyed to Trinity in Fee Simple with Evelyn Pay Long reserving for herself a life estate in the property.
6. Evelyn Pay Long became the record owner of the property by virtue of a Quitclaim deed executed by Enneking Waldron Long on March 30, 1943. This deed was recorded upon the land records of the town of Stafford, Connecticut on April 6, 1943 and recorded at Volume 79, pages 146-47 of the land records of that town.
7. Evelyn Pay Long died in 1997, thereby extinguishing her life estate and reuniting the entire fee interest in Trinity as sole owner of the premises.
The Court notes that there is a May 19, 1997 Quitclaim deed executed by Evelyn Pay Long and recorded on May 27, 1997 on the town of Stafford, Connecticut land records at Volume 347, Page 523-24 that purports to transfer Mrs. Long's interest in the premises to Brett Cleaver. However, as of the date of this date, Mrs. Long owned only a life estate interest in the property and while clearly she could deed all or part of that interest to another, the estate automatically upon the demise of Mrs. Long later in 1997. Consequently, this Court finds that there is currently no valid interest in any of the property held by Brett Cleaver.
8. Subsequent to the death of Evelyn Pay Long, the defendant Geraldine St. Marie was found by Trinity to be residing in the Pond Cottage and the defendants, Daniel Levesque, Joan Levesque, and Brian Kelly, were found by Trinity to be residing in the Main House.
9. Trinity served all of the defendants with a properly served Notice to Quit on September 4, 2003 demanding that the defendants vacate the property on or before September 11, 2003.
10. The rightful owner of the property, Trinity, has never entered into a lease with any of these tenants for possession of the premises.
11. The defendants have therefore never had a right or privilege to occupy the premises.
12. The defendants did not quit possession of the premises.
There was a statement made by counsel for the defendant Geraldine St. Marie to the effect that she had vacated the premises, however, no evidence to that effect was introduced into the trial. Moreover, Counsel for the defendants made another statement, again not supported by the introduction of any evidence that there is another unidentified tenant living in the premises who moved in after Ms. St. Marie is alleged to have vacated.
Discussion
This relatively simple summary process action has been made unduly complicated by the efforts of counsel for the defendants and the family of Evelyn Pay Long. It is clear that the actual named defendants are not involved in this attempt but are instead caught in the middle of crossfire between the plaintiff in this action and the plaintiffs in a previous action, Smith v. Trinity United Methodist, 47 Conn. Sup. 618 (2002), affirmed, 263 Conn. 135 (2003). The plaintiffs in the Smith case are the daughters of Evelyn Pay Long who, understandably perhaps, feel that they should have become the owners of the property upon the death of their mother. Unfortunately, for reasons unknown to this Court and irrelevant to this instant action, Evelyn Pay Long elected to deed her property to the Trinity United Methodist Church. That was the focus of the action in the Smith v. Trinity United Methodist Church case. The plaintiffs in that case lost and judgment was awarded to the defendant Trinity. It is of note that Attorney James W. Sherman was counsel for the plaintiffs in that case. It is of significance that the same Attorney James W. Sherman is counsel for the defendants in the instant case. The primary argument of the defense in this case has been that Trinity cannot evict the defendants because Trinity is not the legitimate owner of the property. If true, this would strike a fatal blow to the plaintiff's right to seek possession of the property.
There are some allegations raised by plaintiffs in the case at bar to the effect that Attorney Sherman entered his appearance without the permission of the defendants in this action. See Plaintiff's Trial Brief dated April 2, 2004. However, since this Court has not received any evidence along those lines, the Court cannot, and will not make any findings in that regard. To the extent that there are any improprieties known to parties or counsel, they are free to pursue such issues in a different forum.
It is therefore necessary to consider the issue raised by the defendants as it does pertain to the right of Trinity to maintain the action in the first place. The defendants assert that the daughters of Evelyn Pay Long (hereafter "family") are the true owners of the property. They argue that Mrs. Long was the trustee of the Long family trust that was to hold the property for the benefit of the children of Ennenking Waldron Long. As such, the argument is that she never really held title to the property in her own right and could therefore never have conveyed it to Trinity without breaching her fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of the trust. Consequently if Mrs. Long did hold the property in trust for the children, that would make the family the true owners of the property, not Trinity. The fatal problem with this theory, however, is that it is wholly unsupported by any evidence. It is indisputable that there is nothing in writing to memorialize this "Long family trust." All of the written deeds that were introduced into evidence clearly show that Evelyn Pay Long was the owner in fee simple of the property and not as a trustee for the "Long Family Trust." Consequently, the defendants have attempted to advance the theory that this was not an express trust, but a constructive trust.
There are several problems inherent with this approach. First, "[i]n order for a constructive trust to be imposed, the plaintiff must allege fraud, misrepresentation, imposition, circumvention, artifice or concealment, or abuse of confidential relations. Worobey v. Sibieth, 136 Conn. 352, 356, 71 A.2d 80 (1949)." Wing v. White, 14 Conn. App. 642, 644, 542 A.2d 748 (1988). "Courts may use the equitable device of a constructive trust to remedy the unjust enrichment which results from not disposing of property as promised after the promise induced someone with whom the promisor shared a confidential relationship to transfer the property to the promisor." Starzec v. Kida, 183 Conn. 41, 49. Here, when the Court examines the pleadings in this case, it is clear that there are no such allegations either in the defenses raised or in the counterclaim. Consequently, the issue of a constructive trust has never been properly pled or placed before this court in the first place.
At trial, the defendants attempted to introduce testimony of a daughter of Ennenking Long, Ms. Jacalyn Durfee to the effect that Mr. Long had often expressed his hope that the property would be kept in the family. There was an objection to this testimony as constituting hearsay and the Court sustained that objection. Given the failure to properly plead the issue of constructive trust, this testimony would have been irrelevant as well.
More importantly, however, to the extent that the defendants can raise this constructive trust issue at all, they can only do so through attempting to advance the ownership interest of the Family. Keeping in mind that the instant action is a summary process action, to the extent that the constructive trust issue has any viability, it can be used by the defendants only in an effort to attack the right of Trinity to be the plaintiff in this action. By alleging that the Family, and not Trinity, is the rightful owner of the property, the defendants in this case would have to stand in the place of the family in raising this issue. However, it is clear that as between the family and Trinity, this issue of ownership of the property is now res judicata. See Dowling v. Finley Associates, Inc., 248 Conn. 364 (1999). It is clear that Trinity, as per Judge Klaczak's well reasoned opinion in Smith v. Trinity United Methodist, 47 Conn. Sup. 618 (2002), affirmed, 263 Conn. 135 (2003), that Trinity is the rightful owner of the property. That claim has been fully litigated before and may not be re-litigated here.
It is not altogether clear as to who, if anyone, authorized the defendants to move onto the property. The only evidence that was adduced at the trial was to the effect that Trinity, the lawful owner of the property, did not lease the premises to the defendants. As the record owner of the property, Trinity was the only entity with authority to lease the property to the defendants. Consequently given this evidence, this Court can conclude that the defendants did not have any legitimate right or privilege to occupy the property. It was intimated, although certainly not proved, that it was the family that leased the premises to the defendants.
Since the claim of the family to ownership of the property may not be re-litigated, this then leads this Court to conclude that the defendants in the instant action, since they stand in privity with the family, are collaterally estopped from raising the issue of ownership interests of the Family. "Collateral estoppel precludes a party from re-litigating issues and facts actually and necessarily determined in an earlier proceeding between the same parties or those in privity with them upon a different claim. DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 239 (1991)." Weiss v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 227 Court 802, 818 (1993). This issue of ownership of the property has been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided. As noted by State v. Ellis, 197 Conn. 436 (1985), it comes to rest.
It is clear that the plaintiff, Trinity, has proved its ownership interest and its right to possession. It is equally clear that the defendants have failed to introduce any evidence pertaining to their counterclaims. Consequently, the Court will order:
The defendants have failed to introduce any evidence on its counterclaims. Consequently, the counterclaims are resolved in the favor of the Plaintiff without further comment.
Judgment of Possession in favor of the Plaintiff in both cases. Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff on the counterclaim in both cases.
S.T. Fuger, Jr., Judge