Opinion
Index 17-602185
10-25-2019
SEBASTIAN TRINIDAD, Plaintiff, v. CAROLINE MAURA CARRION, COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN SUFFOLK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS and TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, Defendants. CAL. No. 18-01654MV
SCHWARTZAPFEL LAWYERS, P.C Attorney for Plaintiff BURATTI, ROTHENBERG & BURNS Attorney for Defendant Carrion DENNIS M. BROWN ESQ SUFFOLK COUNTY ATTORNEY Attorney for Defendant Suffolk County H. Lee Dennison Building
Unpublished Opinion
MOTION DATE 1-23-19
ADJ. DATE 5-9-19
SCHWARTZAPFEL LAWYERS, P.C
Attorney for Plaintiff
BURATTI, ROTHENBERG & BURNS
Attorney for Defendant Carrion
DENNIS M. BROWN ESQ
SUFFOLK COUNTY ATTORNEY
Attorney for Defendant Suffolk County H. Lee Dennison Building
PRESENT: Hon. JOSEPH A. SANTORELLI Justice
SHORT FORM ORDER
HON. JOSEPH A. SANTORELLI, J.S.C.
Upon the following papers read on this motion for summary judgment; Notice of Motion/Order to show Cause and supporting papers by defendants County of Suffolk and Suffolk County Department of Public Works ("Suffolk County") dated January 2, 2019; Notice of Cross Motion and supporting papers __; Answering Affidavits and supporting papers by plaintiff dated February 28, 2019; Replying Affidavits and supporting papers by Suffolk County, dated March 14, 2019; Other __; (and after hearing counsel in support and apposed to the motion) it is.
ORDERED that the motion by defendants County of Suffolk and Suffolk County Department of Public Works for summary judgment dismissing all claims against them is denied. ORDERED that the motion by defendants County of Suffolk and Suffolk County Department of Public Works for summary judgment dismissing all claims against them is denied.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for injuries that he allegedly sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred at the intersection of County Road 101 (CRI0I) and Harrison Avenue in Suffolk County. The plaintiff was on his motorcycle traveling northbound on CR101 when the vehicle operated by defendant Caroline Carrion, which was traveling southbound on CR101 attempted to make a left turn onto Harrison Avenue. Carrion's vehicle struck the left side of the plaintiffs motorcycle In addition to his allegations against Carrion, the plaintiff brought suit against the Town of Brookhaven, the Town of Brookhaven Highway Department, Suffolk County, and the Suffolk County Department of Public Works, alleging that these defendants, inter alia, designed the roadway and had prior written notice of the hazardous condition thereon yet failed to conduct an adequate study to remedy the hazardous condition. The plaintiff further alleges that Carrion made an improper turn because of the defendants' lack of an adequate roadway safety plan, the defendants' failure to implement a safety plan, and the lack of a proper traffic control device at the intersection.
By stipulation of the parties, the action has been discontinued as to the Town of Brookhaven and the Brookhaven Highway Department. Suffolk County and the Suffolk County Department of Public Works (collectively, "Suffolk County" or the "County") now move for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and the crossclaims against it, arguing that neither its acts or omissions proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries.
The plaintiff testified similarly at his deposition and at a hearing pursuant to Municipal Law S 50-h with regard to how the accident happened. He testified that on December 3, 2015, at approximately 3:30 p.m., he was traveling on his motorcycle northbound on CR101 in the far right lane when it was struck on the left by a car. It was a clear day, his view was not obstructed, he was not speeding, and there were no vehicles traveling ahead of him. He further testified that there was no traffic control device at the intersection, and that he did not observe Carrion's vehicle until "a second or two" before the impact. The plaintiff had obtained a permit to ride his motorcycle six months prior to the accident, and had approximately six months of riding experience before the accident. Sometime after the accident, he was issued a summons for operating the motorcycle without the proper license.
Carrion testified that she was traveling southbound on CR101 and entered into the turning lane to prepare to make a left turn onto Harrison Avenue. There was no stop sign or other traffic control device at the intersection; however, she stopped prior to making the left turn because cars were approaching in the northbound lane of CR101. She testified that she proceeded through the intersection when traffic was clear, and that she did not observe the motorcycle before impact. She recalled that she purchased the vehicle that she was driving approximately two weeks prior to the accident, and that she was driving the vehicle with a learner's permit and no other person was in the vehicle.
Alexander Prego testified on behalf of Suffolk County Department of Public Works (DPW). In 2006, the County received at least one written request from a resident asking that a traffic light be placed at the intersection of CR101 and Harrison Avenue due to "poor visibility," and because several accidents had occurred at the intersection. Thereafter, Suffolk County conducted an internal traffic study of the intersection, and determined that a traffic signal was not warranted. The County instead found that certain warning signs were necessary and would be installed. In early 2010, DPW received a letter from a County Legislator stating that her constituents made multiple requests for a traffic signal at the subject intersection, and requesting a traffic study for the area. The County acknowledged receipt of the letter and responded that a traffic study would be conducted. In April 2010, DPW received a letter from a resident who had written to the County concerning the intersection on prior occasions, indicating that there was a fatal car accident at the intersection. Before the date of the plaintiffs accident, several additional letters were sent or forwarded to DPW detailing accidents that had occurred at the intersection and requesting that the County take some action to address safety concerns. According to Prego, at the time that DPW received those letters, a case study for the intersection was not given priority because a study had been conducted in 2007.
In 2013, the County requested proposals from engineering firms outlining a safety study for the intersection where the plaintiffs accident occurred and for other intersections along CR101. A firm was awarded a contract to conduct the study in 2013 or 2014. In 2016, while the study was ongoing, the County held a public meeting and advised residents that a traffic signal was not warranted at the intersection of CR101 and Harrison Avenue because the nine elements under the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law governing traffic signals, including "volume[], crash history, ACA, [and] pedestrian crossing" were not met. Residents were presented with alternative options to control traffic, such as warning signs and increased lighting. In May 2017, the Suffolk County Legislature approved a resolution (IR1200-17) to fund the installation of a traffic signal at the intersection, stating that there was a long history of accidents in the area and that residents had advocated for a traffic signal for decades. Prego testified that despite the resolution directing the DPW to install the traffic signal, DPW did not install the same because the area did "not meet warrants as required by State law." As of the date of Prego's testimony in December 2017, only portions of the traffic study had been completed and he did not know whether warning signs had been installed at the intersection. He further testified that the Town of Brookhaven had installed additional lighting in the area.
William Hillman testified that he was in charge of the administrative processes for highway engineering in Suffolk County. The County owned CR101 and made design decisions concerning the roadway He recalled that a traffic study was completed with regard to the intersection of CR011 and Harrison Avenue, and that the firm that conducted the study found that a traffic signal was not warranted He testified that in 2007, a work order was issued to install intersection warning signs on the north and southbound lanes of CR001, and that he was not aware whether those signs were in place at the time of the accident in 2015. Concerning the Suffolk County Legislature resolution, Hillman testified that the legislature did not have the authority to direct DPW to install a traffic signal.
Salvatore Prisco a DPW employee, testified that intersection warning signs were installed on CR101 as per a 2007 work order. Jeff Berkowski testified that he was a highway zone supervisor for the County that he had driven on CR101, and that in 2015 he did not observe any intersection warning signs in the area where the accident occurred.
The County contends that it was not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries, and that it is entitled to qualified immunity from liability arising out of a highway planning decision. It is a well established principal that a municipality has a duty to maintain its roads and highways in a reasonably safe condition and liability will flow for injuries resulting from a breach of that duty (see Wittorf v City of New York, 23 N.Y.3d 473, 991 N.Y.S.2d 578 [2014]; Friedman v State of New York, 67 N.Y.2d 271, 502 N.Y.S.2d 669 [1986]; Fan Guan v State of New York, 55 A.D.3d 782, 866 N.Y.S.2d 697 [2d Dept 2008]). However, "in the field of traffic design engineering, the State is accorded a qualified immunity from liability arising out of a highway planning decision" (Friedman v State, 67 N.Y.2d 271, 283, 502 N.Y.S.2d 669; Turturro v City of New York, 28 N.Y.3d 469, 477-478, 45 N.Y.S.3d 874 [2016]). With regard to road safety, a municipality is afforded qualified immunity from liability where it is aware of the dangerous traffic condition and undertakes reasonable study with the aim of alleviating the danger (Kuhland v City of New York, 81 A.D.3d 786, 916 N.Y.S.2d 637 [2d Dept 2011]; Turturro v City of New York, 28 N.Y.3d 469, 477-478, 45 N.Y.S.3d 874). Nevertheless, a governmental body may be held liable "when its study of a traffic condition is plainly inadequate or there is no reasonable basis for its traffic plan" (Friedman v State, 67 N.Y.2d 271, 283, 502 N.Y.S.2d 669; see Kelley v State, 133 A.D.3d 1337, 1338, 20 N.Y.S.3d 289 [4th Dept 2015]). Further, a municipality may be held liable if after being made aware of a dangerous traffic condition it finds that certain reasonable measures are necessary, and it "unjustifiably delays" implemeniing those measures (Bresciani v County of Dutches,, N Y, 62 A.D.3d 639, 640, 878 N.Y.S.2d 410 [2d Dept 2009]).
Here, the County has failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. A municipality is under a continuing duty to review its traffic plan (Weiss v Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 587, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 [1960]), and the County has failed to establish that it did not breach that duty. The County's submissions fail to establish that it did not unjustifiably delay implementing remedial measures to address the traffic safety issues at the intersection. Although it is undisputed that the County conducted a traffic study in 2007, between 2007 and 2013 the County received multiple complaints from residents and elected officials concerning the roadway. For a period of almost seven years, the County took no action to address the safety concerns of its residents with regard to the intersection, and as of the date of the plaintiffs accident in 2015, it had not completed a subsequent traffic study of the area. Furthermore, a DPW employee testified that after the 2007 internal study, the County determined that certain warning signs were necessary at the intersection, and although such warning signs were installed at some point, there is a dispute whether the signs were present on the date of the accident. A DPW employee testified that he did not observe any warning sign at or near the intersection in 2015 prior to the plaintiffs accident.
The County also fails to establish that it was not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries as a matter of law. "[T]here may be more than one proximate cause of an injury .. . [and] [a] defendant's negligence qualifies as a proximate cause where it is a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury" (Turturro v City of New York, NY3d 469, 477-478, 45 N.Y.S.3d 874 [2016]). It is undisputed that there was a history of accidents at the intersection, including accidents resulting from left turns from CR101 onto Harrison Avenue similar to the turn made by Carrion. Because it had received complaints from residents, the County conducted an internal study in 2007 and it determined that although a traffic signal was not warranted, certain remedial measures were' necessary to improve safety. As a result, the County installed certain warning signs at the intersection. After several additional years of receiving complaints and notifications about accidents at the intersection, the County commenced another study in 2013. Despite the complains it received between 2007 and 2013, there is no indication in the record that the County took action to address the safety concerns. In fact, one County employee testified that a study regarding the intersection was not a priority for the County because an internal study was conducted in 2007. "The most significant inquiry in the proximate cause analysis is often that of foreseeability .. [and] [w]here, as here, the risk of harm created by the [County] corresponds to the harm that actually resulted, [the Court] cannot say that proximate cause is lacking as a matter of law" (Brown v State of New York, 31 N.Y.3d 514, 520, 80 N.Y.S.3d 665 [2018]).
Accordingly, the County's failure to satisfy its prima facie burden requires denial of its motion without regard to the sufficiency of the plaintiff s papers in opposition.