Opinion
14-20-00555-CV
04-19-2022
TRINI J. REALTY CORP. AND TRINH NGUYEN, Appellants v. NATIONAL FUNDING, INC., Appellee
On Appeal from the 55th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2020-34172
Panel consists of Justices Wise, Spain, and Hassan.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Charles A. Spain Justice
Appellants Trini J. Realty Corp. and Trinh Nguyen appeal the district court's order denying their motion to vacate a domesticated foreign default judgment rendered in California superior court in favor of appellee National Funding, Inc. In one issue, Trini and Nguyen argue the judgment is void because they were not served in accordance with California law. We affirm.
As explained further below, an appeal from the denial of a motion to vacate a domesticated foreign judgment is treated as an appeal from the denial of a motion for new trial.
I. Background
National sued Trini and Nguyen in California superior court, alleging breach of a loan agreement by Trini and breach of a related guaranty by Nguyen. The superior court clerk entered a default judgment against Trini and Nguyen. National Funding, Inc. v. Trini J. Realty Corp. & Trinh Nguyen, No. 30-2019-01066120-CU-BC-CJC (Super. Ct., Orange Cty., Cal. Aug. 26, 2019). National domesticated the judgment in Harris County district court. Trini and Nguyen moved to vacate the California judgment, contending, among other things, that National had not properly served either Trini, a corporation, or Nguyen, an individual, under California law. The district court denied the motion.
II. Analysis
The United States Constitution requires that full faith and credit be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. Accordingly, an authenticated foreign judgment filed in a court of this state is treated as a final judgment of that court, and "is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, staying, enforcing, or satisfying a judgment as a judgment of the court in which it is filed." Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 35.003(c); see International Armament Corp. v. Stocker & Lancaster LLP, 565 S.W.3d 823, 826 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). A motion arguing that a Texas trial court should not afford full faith and credit to a foreign judgment is frequently referred to as a motion to "vacate" and is subject to the procedural rules governing motions for new trials. See UEFJA, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 35.003(c); International Armament, 565 S.W.3d at 826 (motion to vacate foreign judgment "is treated in many ways as a motion for new trial"); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b.
By filing an authenticated copy of a foreign judgment, the judgment creditor presents a prima facie case for the enforcement of the judgment in Texas. See UEFJA, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 35.003(a), (b); Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Oilfield Motor & Control, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 477, 484-85 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 2004, pet. denied). This is true even if the foreign judgment is taken by default. Enviropower, L.L.C. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 265 S.W.3d 16, 19 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.). The burden then shifts to the judgment debtor to prove the foreign judgment should not be given full faith and credit. Mindis Metals, 132 S.W.3d at 484. The presumption of validity can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Id. The laws of the state rendering judgment determine the judgment's validity. Id.
Here, Trini and Nguyen challenge the validity of the California default judgment on grounds that the California superior court lacked jurisdiction to enter a default judgment. Specifically, Trini and Nguyen contend that the California superior court did not have personal jurisdiction over them because they were not properly served with process under California's substituted-service statute. Trini and Nguyen attached to their motion to vacate unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury from the process server concerning the means of service, which were filed as proof of service in the California superior court, as well as an unsworn declaration under penalty of perjury by Nguyen. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 132.001(a) (unsworn declaration).
The supreme court has held that affidavits attached to a motion for new trial "do not have to be offered into evidence in order to be considered by the trial court." Director, State Employees Workers' Comp. Div. v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. 1994). At least one of our sister courts has considered unsworn declarations attached to a motion for new trial when reviewing the trial court's ruling on the motion. See Roman v. Ramirez, 573 S.W.3d 341, 346 n.2, 352 (Tex. App-El Paso 2019, pet. denied).
A. Trini
As to Trini, a corporation, California law provides that a summons may be served on a corporation by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the person designated as agent for service of process. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 416.10(a). The designated agent may be served by substituted service as follows:
In lieu of personal delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint to the person to be served . . . a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint during usual office hours in his or her office . . . with the person who is apparently in charge thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left.Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 415.20(a).
The declaration of the process server indicates that the process server served the lawsuit on Nguyen as the designated agent for Trini by substituted service, specifically by leaving the summons and complaint with Yen Huynh in Nguyen's office, who is described as the "Person In Charge."
Trini first argues that service was ineffective as to Trini because Huynh was not Trini's designated agent for service. However, California law provides that a corporation's designated agent may be served by substituted service by leaving the summons and complaint with "the person who is apparently in charge" of the agent's office. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 415.20(a), 416.10. Accordingly, the fact that Huynh was not Trini's designated agent did not prevent her from accepting service on behalf of Nguyen, the designated agent, as the person apparently in charge of Nguyen's office.
Trini next argues that service was not effective as to Trini because there was no evidence that the process server attempted to serve Nguyen personally, in her capacity as Trini's designated agent, before serving the lawsuit by substituted service. However, the requirement that the process server exercise "reasonable diligence" to serve an individual defendant personally before attempting substituted service does not apply to corporations such as Trini. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 415.20(a), (b), 416.10(a), .90.
We hold that Trini has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that service was ineffective as to Trini. See Mindis Metals, 132 S.W.3d at 484.
B. Nguyen
As to Nguyen, an individual, the relevant California substituted-service statute provides, in relevant part:
If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, . . . a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person's . . . usual place of business . . . in the presence of . . . a person apparently in charge of his or her office[ or] place of business, . . . and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left.Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.20(b); see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 416.90.
The declarations of the process server indicate that the process server attempted to serve Nguyen personally twice at her office and once at her home before leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at Nguyen's office with Huynh, who is described as the "Person In Charge" and "Person In Charge-apparently."
Nguyen argues service was ineffective as to her because, according to Nguyen's declaration, "Huynh is not a person in charge of my office or business, " but instead "was a receptionist." California law, however, does not require that the summons and complaint be left with someone actually in charge of an office or business, but instead with someone apparently in charge of an office or business. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.20(b). Moreover, the process server's declarations include a description of a receptionist who denied the process server access to Nguyen by saying that Nguyen was on the phone, had left the office, and had not returned to the office; that description is consistent with a person "apparently in charge" of the office. See, e.g., Bein v. Brechtel-Jochim Group, Inc., 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 351, 354 (Cal.App. 4th 1992) (gate guard was person "apparently in charge" because defendants "authorized the guard to control access to them and their residence") (collecting cases); see also Pasadena Medi-Ctr. Assocs. v. Superior Court, 511 P.2d 1180, 1184 (Cal. 1973) (instructing that statutes concerning service of process "be liberally construed"). Accordingly, Nguyen's declaration does not show by clear and convincing evidence that Huynh was not apparently in charge of the office as averred by the process server.
We hold that Trini and Nguyen have not shown by clear and convincing evidence that service was ineffective as to them. See Mindis Metals, 132 S.W.3d at 484. We overrule the sole issue.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment as challenged on appeal.