Opinion
19-P-362
08-12-2020
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The board of assessors of Newtown (assessors) appeals from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board (board), which granted charitable tax exemptions to The Trimount Foundation, Inc. (Trimount) for a Victorian house located at 80 Claremont Street (property) for fiscal years 2015-2017. The assessors contend that a portion of the property resided in by Numeraries of Opus Dei is ineligible for the charitable tax exemption because that portion of the property is not occupied for a charitable purpose. Because we discern no error in the board's decision, we affirm.
Background. The board found the following facts, which are supported by substantial evidence. See Bridgewater State Univ. Found. v. Assessors of Bridgewater, 463 Mass. 154, 156 (2012). Trimount owns the property and leases it to Cedar Wood Foundation, Inc. (Cedar Wood). Both Trimount and Cedar Wood are charitable organizations that serve the mission of Opus Dei, which is to promote the practice of Christian values in daily work and life through a broad spectrum of programs.
Much of the work of Opus Dei is accomplished through laity who make lifelong commitments to serve Opus Dei and are known as Numeraries. The path to becoming a Numerary takes approximately five to six years and culminates in a lifelong commitment to the vocation. Numeraries are expected to have outside employment, to be self-supporting, and to donate much of their income to Opus Dei organizations. They also agree not to marry, to take a vow of celibacy, and to live with other Numeraries. Living as a Numerary involves considerable time dedicated to worship with other Numeraries, for example by having communal meals during which they pray together and plan programs that serve the mission of Opus Dei. Numeraries are assigned where to live and may be reassigned at any time. Because Numeraries may be reassigned on a day's notice, they bring only a few personal belongings with them.
During the 2015-2017 fiscal years, seven Numeraries were assigned to live at the property. The property is a 9,000 square-foot Victorian house that was also used to host numerous programs that served the mission of Opus Dei. These programs included faith and vocational classes and lectures that catered to a variety of age groups and interests. The Numeraries who lived at the property also used the property to mentor prospective Numeraries. Lastly, the property was used to plan offsite programs and as a place of departure and return for youth group visits to places such as nursing homes and soup kitchens. The Numeraries staggered their schedules so that at least one of them was nearly always present to facilitate these programs.
As found by the board, the property was "very much a shared space, and the Numeraries [had] virtually no expectation of exclusivity in it, even in their assigned bedrooms." For example, the Numeraries were not given locks to their bedroom doors and were expected to make their bedrooms available for mentees and program participants if they left for a weekend. The board further found that the Numeraries did not live at the property as a matter of convenience but instead to facilitate programs that served the mission of Opus Dei.
Discussion. Trimount sought charitable tax exemptions pursuant to G. L. c. 59, § 5, Third. This statute provides an exemption, in relevant part, for "real estate owned by or held in trust for a charitable organization and occupied by it or its officers for the purposes for which it is organized or by another charitable organization or organizations or its or their officers for the purposes of such other charitable organization or organizations." G. L. c. 59, § 5, Third. In the context of the exemption, "occupancy means something more than that which results from simple ownership and possession. It signifies an active appropriation to the immediate uses of the charitable cause for which the owner was organized." Assessors of Boston v. Vincent Club, 351 Mass. 10, 14 (1966), quoting Babcock v. Leopold Morse Home for Infirm Hebrews & Orphanage, 225 Mass. 418, 421 (1917). "The dominant use of the property must be 'such as to contribute immediately to the promotion of the charity and to participate physically in the forwarding of its beneficent objects.'" New England Forestry Found., Inc. v. Assessors of Hawley, 468 Mass. 138, 155 (2014), quoting Vincent Club, supra. The burden lies with the charitable organization seeking the exemption to demonstrate that the express terms of the statute, which are strictly construed, apply. See Animal Rescue League of Boston v. Assessors of Bourne, 310 Mass. 330, 332 (1941).
The assessors do not dispute that Trimount and Cedar Wood are charitable organizations within the meaning of G. L. c. 59, § 5, Third, or that Trimount owns the property. The assessors moreover do not dispute that some of the property was being occupied by Cedar Wood for its charitable purposes. Rather, the assessors argue that the board erred in concluding that the dominant use of a portion of the property -- the Numeraries' bedrooms and other residential areas -- furthered Cedar Wood's charitable purposes. We review this conclusion of law de novo. See Bridgewater State Univ. Found., 463 Mass. at 156.
The assessors primarily contend that the board erred in considering the property as a whole and should have considered the dominant use of the residential portion of the property separately from the rest of the property. We do not think the board was required to do so. In certain circumstances, it may be appropriate for the board to consider different portions of a parcel separately. This typically occurs when a charitable organization sets off and uses a portion of a parcel in a wholly different manner than the rest of the parcel, such as by renting it to others for private business. See, e.g., Milton Hosp. & Convalescent Home v. Assessors of Milton, 360 Mass. 63, 68-70 (1971); Assessors of Worcester v. Knights of Columbus Religious Educ. Charitable & Benevolent Ass'n of Worcester, 329 Mass. 532, 533-535 (1952). Such occupancy for private business simply does not constitute occupancy by an organization for its charitable purposes. See Milton Hosp. & Convalescent Home, supra. That is not what occurred here, however. As found by the board, the Numeraries' bedrooms and other residential areas were part of the property's shared space and were used for programs that served the mission of Opus Dei. In these circumstances, where Cedar Wood accessed and used the entire property in a similar manner, we discern no error in the board's decision to consider the property as a whole.
The assessors largely rely on a line of cases involving a different clause, G. L. c. 59, § 5, Eleventh, which provides a tax exemption for houses of religious worship and specifically states that the exemption shall not "extend to any portion of any such house of religious worship appropriated for purposes other than religious worship or instruction." We note that similar exclusionary language is absent from the charitable tax exemption. See G. L. c. 59, § 5, Third.
These findings are supported by the manner in which the Numeraries were assigned to live at the property and the few personal belongings that they brought with them, the Numeraries' inability to lock their bedroom doors, and the fact that the Numeraries had to make their bedrooms available for mentees and program participants if they left for a weekend.
Moreover, even if we were to conclude that the board should have considered the dominant use of the residential portion of the property separately from the rest of the property, we would still affirm the board's decision. By living together at the property, the Numeraries were able to have communal meals during which they planned the programs that were offered there and were also able to be present when those programs occurred. As found by the board, the Numeraries did not live at the property as a matter of convenience but instead to facilitate programs that served the mission of Opus Dei. Where having the Numeraries live at the property allowed Cedar Wood to serve the mission of Opus Dei, the dominant use of the residential portion of the property furthered Cedar Wood's charitable purposes. See, e.g., Assessors of New Braintree v. Pioneer Valley Academy, Inc., 355 Mass. 610, 615 (1969) (board could have found that "faculty housing was essential to the success of a well planned scheme of secondary education"); South Lancaster Academy v. Lancaster, 242 Mass. 553, 559 (1922) (board could have found that principal's use of cottage as primary residence "was essential to the orderly and efficient management of the school")
While the assessors place much emphasis on the fact that the bedrooms were the Numeraries' primary residences and on the fact that the Numeraries had outside employment, those facts do not contradict the board's findings. Nor are we persuaded by the assessors' argument that the board impermissibly extended the charitable tax exemption to primary residences of volunteers. Assuming that the requirements of G. L. c. 59, § 5, Third, are met, nothing in that statute makes the primary residences of volunteers otherwise ineligible for the charitable tax exemption.
The assessors' argument regarding private inurement fails for the same reason. The charitable tax exemption "is not available even to ostensibly charitable organizations if 'any of the income or profits of the business of the charitable organization . . . is used . . . for other than . . . charitable . . . purposes.'" Harvard Community Health Plan, Inc. v. Assessors of Cambridge, 384 Mass. 536, 541 (1981), quoting G. L. c. 59, § 5, Third. This prohibition against private inurement seeks to prevent a charitable organization from being used as a device to divert income to private individuals. See id. That is not what occurred here. The Numeraries did not live at the property for their own financial gain but instead to further Cedar Wood's charitable purposes and were, moreover, expected to "contribute substantially all of their income over-and-above that required for immediate personal expenses to an Opus Dei organization."
Decision of Appellate Tax Board affirmed.
By the Court (Maldonado, Singh & Englander, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
/s/
Clerk Entered: August 12, 2020.