Tri-State Rubbish v. New Gloucester

8 Citing cases

  1. Town of Baldwin v. Carter

    2002 Me. 52 (Me. 2002)   Cited 38 times
    Finding the term "continued or repeated" not impermissibly vague

    Maine Milk Producers, Inc. v. Comm'r of Agric., 483 A.2d 1213, 1221 (Me. 1984). See, e.g., Town of Pownal v. Emerson, 639 A.2d 619, 621 (Me. 1994) (refusing vagueness challenge for failure of statute to define term "unserviceable"); Tri-State Rubbish, Inc., v. Town of New Gloucester, 634 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Me. 1993) (refusing to find provision in ordinance requiring "reasonable compliance" as unconstitutionally vague); Gorham v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 625 A.2d 898, 900-01 (Me. 1993) (ordinance that allowed conditional use permit as long as proposed use did not "adversely affect" value of adjacent properties was not unconstitutionally vague); Maine Real Estate Comm'n v. Kelby, 360 A.2d 528, 532 (Me. 1976) (holding regulation of standards of conduct for real estate professionals not unconstitutionally vague for lack of delineation of precise instances of proscribed conduct). Given the nature of the subject matter, formulating a specific and precise ordinance regulating annoying dog barking is a difficult task. So long as the ordinance notifies the public of the conduct it proscribes, an ordinance regulating this nuisance may utilize general language.

  2. State v. Rupert

    2017 Me. 181 (Me. 2017)

    Therefore, contrary to Rupert's contention, no fundamental right was affected by the court's denial of his request to be represented by his father, and consequently the application of the statutory provision allowing the law enforcement officer, who was not a licensed attorney, to represent the State did not rise to the level of an equal protection violation. See 4 M.R.S. § 807(3)(M) ; Tri – State Rubbish, Inc. v. Town of New Gloucester , 634 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Me. 1993). [¶ 8] Because Rupert has not identified any federal or State constitutional provision, statute, or common law authority contravened by the court when it denied his request to be represented by a person not authorized to practice law in Maine, we affirm the judgment.

  3. DALEY v. COM'R, DEPT. OF MARINE RESOURCES

    1997 Me. 183 (Me. 1997)   Cited 3 times

    The United States Supreme Court also has indicated that "[w]here the government merely regulates the use of property, compensation is required only if considerations such as the purpose of the regulation or the extent to which it deprives the owner of the economic use of the property suggest that the regulation has unfairly singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be borne by the public as a whole." Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522-23, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 1526, 118 L.Ed.2d 153 (1992) (cited in Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Town of New Gloucester, 634 A.2d 1284, 1288 (Me. 1993)); Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 646-47, 113 S.Ct. at 2291-92; Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227-28, 106 S.Ct. at 1027-28. Daley has not shown that either the purpose of the Amendments or the extent of the burden they place on the plaintiffs suggests that they unfairly single out the lobster industry to bear a burden "which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."

  4. School Administrative District No. 1 v. Commissioner, Department of Education

    659 A.2d 854 (Me. 1995)   Cited 18 times
    Rejecting challenge to reductions in state education funding

    If a challenged statute infringes a fundamental constitutional right or involves an inherently suspect classification such as race or religion, it is subject to analysis under the strict scrutiny standard. Tri-State Rubbish v. New Gloucester, 634 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Me. 1993). That standard requires that the challenged action be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.

  5. Musk v. Nelson

    647 A.2d 1198 (Me. 1994)   Cited 30 times

    For the same reason, the statute also satisfies the requirements of due process. Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Town of New Gloucester, 634 A.2d 1284 (Me. 1993) (citing Town of Boothbay v. National Advertising Co., 347 A.2d 419, 422 (Me. 1975)). Musk's other contentions are without merit.

  6. Choroszy v. Tso

    647 A.2d 803 (Me. 1994)   Cited 33 times
    Upholding three-year medical-malpractice statute of repose against open-courts challenge, finding that “although we recognize that the three-year period of repose may cause some hardship for the [plaintiffs], that hardship was contemplated by the Legislature when it made its policy choice”

    The equal protection clause of the Maine Constitution guarantees rights equivalent to those in the federal Equal Protection Clause. Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Town of New Gloucester, 634 A.2d 1284, 1287 n. 3 (Me. 1993). "Equal protection analysis hinges on the standard of review.

  7. S. Me. Landlord Ass'n v. City of Portland

    No. CV-21-40 (Me. Super. Dec. 15, 2021)

    Indeed, the Law Court has held that an ordinance survives a void for vagueness challenge if that ordinance "can be construed to be constitutional by importing a reasonable person standard into its language." Town of Baldwin, 2002 ME 52 ¶ 12, 794 A.2d 62; see also Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Town of New Gloucester, 634 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Me. 1993)("Reasonable compliance is not an unconstitutionally vague concept. If it were, most tort law doctrines and a host of other legal standards would be invalid.").

  8. S. Me. Landlord Ass'n v. City of Portland

    Civil Action CV-21-40 (Me. Super. Jul. 2, 2021)

    Indeed, the Law Court has held that an ordinance survives a void for vagueness challenge if that ordinance "can be construed to be constitutional by importing a reasonable person standard into its language." Town of Baldwin, 2002 ME 52 ¶ 12, 794 A.2d 62; see also Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Town of New Gloucester, 634 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Me. 1993)("Reasonable compliance is not an unconstitutionally vague concept. If it were, most tort law doctrines and a host of other legal standards would be invalid.").