Opinion
2002-06071.
Argued March 17, 2003.
April 7, 2003.
In an action for a judgment declaring that the plaintiff is not obligated to defend or indemnify the defendant Igor Yaskin in any action arising out of an automobile accident which occurred on December 7, 1998, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Franco, J.), dated May 7, 2002, which, after a nonjury trial, declared that it is obligated to defend and indemnify the defendant Igor Yaskin against any and all claims arising out of the incident.
Murray Lemonik, Jericho, N.Y. (Kathleen M. Geiger and Charles M. Geiger of counsel), for appellant.
Pariser Vogelman, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Daniel W. Pariser and Candice Pluchino of counsel), for respondent.
Before: DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., NANCY E. SMITH, GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, REINALDO E. RIVERA, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The defendant Igor Yaskin was involved in an automobile accident on December 7, 1998. He did not notify his insurer, the plaintiff, Tri-State Consumer Insurance Company (hereinafter Tri-State), of the accident until early May of 1999, when he was presented with a claim for property damage to the vehicle owned by the defendant William Brand. Tri-State disclaimed coverage on the ground that Yaskin failed to comply with the policy provision requiring prompt notice of an accident, and it commenced this action for a judgment declaring that it is not obligated to defend or indemnify Yaskin in any action. Following a nonjury trial, the Supreme Court determined that Yaskin had a reasonable, good-faith excuse for failing to immediately report the accident to his insurer and declared that Tri-State was obligated to defend and indemnify him against any and all claims arising out of the accident.
The determination of a fact-finding court should not be set aside unless the court's conclusion could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence, especially when the findings of fact rest in large measure on the credibility of the witnesses (see Thoreson v. Penthouse Intl., 80 N.Y.2d 490, 495; Matter of Tri-State Consumer Ins. Co. v. Dabush, 264 A.D.2d 848). An insured's reasonable, good-faith belief in nonliability may excuse a delay in notifying the insurer of an accident (see Argentina v. Otsego Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 86 N.Y.2d 748; Abbey Richmond Ambulance Serv. v. Northbrook Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 281 A.D.2d 501). The evidence presented by Yaskin, if credited by the Supreme Court, established that he had a good-faith belief in his nonliability for any personal injuries or property damage arising out of the subject accident, which was reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, Yaskin's delay in providing notice of the accident until he was presented with a claim for property damage was excused. As the disclaimer was based solely on the ground that Yaskin failed to provide prompt notice of the accident, the Supreme Court properly issued a judgment declaring that Tri-State was obligated to defend and indemnify him.
Contrary to Tri-State's contention, the Supreme Court properly permitted Yaskin to testify to the statements of a police officer at the scene of the accident. The evidence was not offered for its truth, but to establish Yaskin's state of mind, that is, whether he reasonably relied on those statements to form a good-faith belief in his nonliablility (see Arch-Bilt Container Corp. v. Interboro Mut. Indem. Ins. Co., 119 A.D.2d 713).
Tri-State's remaining contentions are without merit.
RITTER, J.P., SMITH, KRAUSMAN and RIVERA, JJ., concur.