Opinion
NUMBER 13-14-00747-CR
01-28-2016
RAFAEL TREVINO, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 379th District Court of Bexar County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza, and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez
A jury convicted appellant Rafael Trevino of the murder of his infant daughter ("the baby").See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.01 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). The jury assessed Trevino's punishment at twenty-seven years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division. By one issue, Trevino contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress and admitted his videotaped statement to police into evidence. We affirm.
This case is before the Court on transfer from the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio pursuant to an order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.).
I. BACKGROUND
Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court's decision and the basic reasons for it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
On the evening of November 3, 2010, Trevino went to sleep in the same room as the baby. The baby's mother, Andrea Hernandez, slept in the adjacent room. On the morning of November 4, the baby was found cold and unresponsive in her bassinet. When paramedics arrived, they found that they could not revive the baby. An autopsy revealed no fewer than five points of blunt trauma to the child's skull that caused bleeding in the brain and shearing of brain tissue. Medical evidence indicated that these injuries could only have occurred on the night of the baby's death.
At trial, Detective Greg Garvelli of the San Antonio Police Department testified that, upon learning of the circumstances surrounding the baby's death, he contacted Trevino and Hernandez and asked them to come down to the homicide department. They did so willingly on November 5. The detectives interviewed Trevino and Hernandez separately. This appeal arises out of a recording of the interview with Trevino—specifically, the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress a video recording of the interview.
During the interview, Trevino at first claimed that he had no knowledge of how the baby died. However, aggressive questioning by the detectives led Trevino to change his story. He claimed that he had accidentally dropped the baby that night and that she landed on her shoulder. The detectives pressed further, and eventually Trevino changed his story once more, stating that, out of frustration, he had shaken the baby. Video of the interview shows Trevino demonstrating his actions by vigorously shaking a water bottle in a front-to-back motion.
At the beginning of the interview, Trevino was told that he was not under arrest. Thereafter, detectives repeatedly told Trevino that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave. By the time he ultimately confessed to shaking the baby, Trevino had been reminded of his right to leave no fewer than nine times. Trevino did in fact leave at the conclusion of the interview. He was arrested just over an hour later and was subsequently charged with the baby's murder.
Before trial, the State offered a recording of the interview into evidence, and Trevino made proper objections and moved to suppress the recording. Trevino's primary argument then, and on appeal, was that while the interview began as a voluntary statement, it became a custodial interrogation when the police began using more aggressive questioning techniques. Trevino contends that the statement was therefore inadmissible because he was never provided with Miranda warnings. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). At the suppression hearing, the trial court reviewed the twenty-minute segment of the recording which, Trevino contended, showed that the interview had become custodial. No other evidence was offered. After review, the trial court denied Trevino's motion. The trial court allowed the recording as evidence in the trial that ultimately led to Trevino's conviction. This appeal followed.
Pursuant to Trevino's request, we remanded the matter to allow the trial court to make express findings of fact regarding the court's denial of the motion to suppress. See State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 698-700 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (holding that when the losing side at a suppression hearing requests findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court is required to make such findings); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 44.4; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 6. On December 21, 2015, the Bexar County District Clerk filed a supplemental record that contained the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. We are now asked to determine whether Trevino's interview should properly be considered custodial.
The trial court entered the following relevant findings of fact:
1. The Court finds that the defendant drove himself to the police station and asked to speak to detectives.
2. The defendant was questioned for approximately three hours and was told by the detectives that he could leave the station at any time.
3. The defendant never asked to leave nor at any time did he indicate he wished to terminate the interview.
4. The Court finds that the defendant was free to leave and that the interview was not the result of custodial interrogation.
. . . .
8. While an admission of guilt combined with other factors may lead to custodial interrogation, the court finds that such other factors were not present in this case. The defendant was told he was free to leave at any time, the length of the interview was not extensive, he was not physically deprived of his liberty, and he arrived at the station and left the station in his own vehicle.
9. The Court concludes that the interview was not the result of custodial interrogation nor at any point did the interview escalate into custodial interrogation and therefore DENIES the Motion to Suppress.
II. DISCUSSION
By his sole issue, Trevino contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting his videotaped statement into evidence. Trevino argues that the circumstances of his interview qualify as a form of police custody, because the interviewing officers created a situation that would have made a reasonable person believe that his freedom of movement was restricted. The State asserts that the circumstances of the interview did not cross the line into a form of police custody. We agree with the State.
A. Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews a trial court's . . . suppression ruling under a bifurcated standard. Almost total deference is afforded to the trial court's determination of fact. Determinations of fact include "who did what, when, where, how, or why" and "credibility determinations." Because trial judges are uniquely situated to observe firsthand the demeanor and appearance of a witness, this Court has long recognized that they are the sole arbiter of questions of fact and of the weight and credibility to give testimony. In that capacity, a trial judge is free to believe or disbelieve any part of the testimony as he sees fit. When a trial judge makes written findings of fact, as he did in the instant case, a reviewing court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the ruling and uphold those fact findings so long as they are supported by the record. The reviewing court then proceeds to a de novo determination of the legal significance of the facts as found by the trial court.Baird v. State, 398 S.W.3d 220, 226 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (internal footnotes and citations omitted). In the case at hand, we are asked solely to evaluate the legal character of undisputed facts. Thus, our review is de novo. See id.
Our review is not confined to the evidence considered at the suppression hearing; rather, we consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. See Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994)). We must uphold the trial court's ruling if it is supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
B. Applicable Law
Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that an oral custodial statement is inadmissible as evidence unless, among other things, the accused is properly warned of his or her rights prior to the statement and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives those rights. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 3(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). It is undisputed that Trevino was not warned of his rights. Therefore, his statement will be inadmissible if it is custodial. See id.
The court of criminal appeals has held that there are at least four general situations which may constitute custody for purposes of Miranda and article 38.22:
(1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way,Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). For any of the Dowthitt situations to constitute custody, "the restriction upon freedom of movement must amount to the degree associated with an arrest . . . ." Id. (citing Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322).
(2) when a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he cannot leave,
(3) when law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted, and
(4) when there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he is free to leave.
Only the third Dowthitt scenario has potential applicability to the facts of this case, and both parties to this appeal confine their analysis to the third Dowthitt scenario. We do the same.
C. Analysis
We find that a reasonable person in Trevino's situation would not have believed that his freedom of movement had been significantly restricted. See id. This case is similar to Estrada v. State and presents many of the same factors that the Estrada Court relied upon in holding that a suspect was not in custody at the time of his incriminating statement. See 313 S.W.3d at 294-95. Here as in Estrada, Trevino gave his incriminating statement to police (1) after voluntarily going to the police station in response to a request by police, (2) after the police immediately and repeatedly informed him that he was not under arrest and was free to leave the station at any time, and (3) Trevino did in fact leave the station freely at the conclusion of the interview and was only arrested later. See id. at 294 (citing the factors articulated in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 493-96 (1977)). In fact, this case compares favorably to Estrada on certain points: this interview was two hours shorter than the five hours that the Estrada Court found to be an acceptable duration, and police offered many more reminders that Trevino was free to leave than in Estrada. See id. at 295. Considering the totality of the surrounding circumstances, we find that the interrogation lacked the critical element which defines custody: physical restraint or a situational equivalent. See id. at 294.
Nonetheless, Trevino contends that his interview became custodial because the interview took on a harsh tone, when questioning became "rougher and more ominous." But harsh questioning does not turn freedom into arrest. As the Estrada Court noted:
That the interrogation may have taken place in what appellant characterizes as a "coercive environment" does not require a [finding of custodial interrogation]. See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 ("Any interview of one suspected of a crime will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the
fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime.").Id. at 294-95. Police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question, even when the questioning is sharp. See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495.
When faced with these coercive techniques, a reasonable person may have felt that it was prudent to stay and talk with police in order to benefit his chances of less severe punishment. Trevino clearly acted based upon such a belief. However, the circumstances carried no suggestion of physical restraint and no hallmarks of the sort of commands and spoken boundaries that readily substitute for physical restraint. See Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255. Just the opposite: Trevino was repeatedly reminded of his freedom to leave—freedom that he voluntarily exercised when continuing to speak with the investigators, despite his alternatives.
Absent any signs of physical restraint or a situational equivalent, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Trevino's motion to suppress. We overrule Trevino's sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm.
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ
Justice Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed the 28th day of January, 2016.