Thus, an employer is not strictly liable for the acts of harassment perpetrated by one of its supervisors. Cf. Tretter v. Liquipak Int'l, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 713, 715 (Minn.App. 1984) (employer liable where knew or should have known of supervisor's acts of harassment but did not discipline supervisor or improve victim's work environment). Next, Fore argues that the district court erred by failing to impute knowledge of Huyink's acts with the three other women. Fore contends that if knowledge of the other acts were imputed to Health Dimensions, it had an obligation to act before Fore was harassed.
In the Wirig case, the plaintiff also obtained a judgment against its employer under the Minnesota Human Rights Act even though the offending employee was not a party thereto. The debtor also cites Tretter v. Liquipak Int'l, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 713 (Minn.Ct.App. 1984) wherein the plaintiff similarly obtained a judgment against its employer under the Minnesota Human Rights Act without naming the employee who allegedly committed the acts of harassment. Once again, while neither court addressed the issue, the cases suggest that the offending employee is not a necessary party. Although I have found no other case law on the issue, the very nature of the cause of action and the elements of proof required make it clear to me that the debtor is not a necessary party to the Minnesota Human Rights Act count.
Ebersole v. Novo Nordisk, Inc., 758 F.3d 917, 925 (8th Cir. 2014). Appellant cites to Tretter v. Liquipak Intern., Inc., 356 N.W.2d 713, 715 (Minn. App. 1984), stating that a three-month gap between the employee reporting sexual harassment and her demotion followed by an additional six-month gap between the demotion and her being laid off (for a total of nine months) is sufficient to show causation. However, it appears that in Tretter this court also considered the fact that the employee was the only person with her level of seniority terminated and that the company made no attempt to rehire her when it needed an employee in her former department as significant in inferring causation.
And in Tretter v. Liquipak Intern., Inc., this court found that an inference was established under the MHRA when employee was demoted three months after complaining about her manager and was terminated six months later. 356 N.W.2d 713, 715 (Minn. App. 1984). Appellant argues that "timing alone would provide sufficient evidence in this case to support a causal connection under a simple application of Hubbard."
The prohibition against sex discrimination in Minn.Stat. § 363-03, subd. 1(2)(c), includes sexual harassment which affects conditions of employment when the employer knows or should have known of the employee's conduct and fails to take timely and appropriate action. Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 41 (1990); Tretter v. Liquipak Int'l Inc., 356 N.W.2d 713, 715 (Minn.App. 1984). Whether knowledge of a supervisor's sexual harassment is imputed to the employer is determined on a case-by-case basis.
The court found that Cub Foods knew about the harassment because the victim had communicated her problems to her immediate supervisor, whom the court deemed to be "management" for the purpose of imputing knowledge to the corporation. Id. at 383; see also Tretter v. Liquipak Int'l, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 713, 715 (Minn.App. 1984) (imputing supervisor's knowledge of harassment to employer). We observe that the McNabb court adopted the trial court's conclusion that the victim "was not required to formally complain of sexual harassment of which the employer had knowledge."
Although the alleged retaliation at Morris Park came some time after he reported wrongdoing at Four Winds, that fact does not necessarily entitle an employer to summary judgment as a matter of law. Minnesota Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Unity Hosp., 59 F.3d 80, 83 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Tretter v. Liquipak Int'l, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 713, 715 (Minn.Ct.App. 1984) (involving retaliation six months after a complaint); Thompson v. Campbell, 845 F. Supp. 665, 675 (D. Minn. 1994) (involving a four month interval). There is also evidence that Calvit had reported wrongdoing at Morris Park and his problems there closely followed those reports.
The cases King cites in support rely on more than just temporal proximity in finding a causal connection. E.g., Tretter v. Liquipak Int'l, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 713, 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that the plaintiff was the only employee of her seniority to be laid off and that the employer did not hire her back several months later when it needed another employee in her department); Thompson v. Campbell, 845 F. Supp. 665, 675 (D. Minn. 1994) (explaining that circumstantial evidence in addition to temporal proximity supported a causal connection); Sprenger v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 253 F.3d 1106, 1113-14 (8th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (finding a causal connection based on temporal proximity and other circumstantial evidence). King has not identified a case where a court has found a causal connection when there was a six-week or longer gap and no other circumstantial evidence supporting a causal connection.
Id. However, evidence of causal connection has been found even in cases where an employee was demoted or terminated months after reporting unlawful conduct. See Tretter v. Liquipak Int'l, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 713, 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (finding inference of causal connection established under Minnesota Human Rights Act when employee was demoted three months after making a report about her manager and was terminated six months later). In the present case, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Cerna waited to fire Yanez until another employee was available to replace her. (Doc. No. 137 at 11.)
In Hubbard v. United Press International, Inc., the court found that a genuine issue of fact existed with respect to causation where the plaintiff was terminated two days after service of his complaint alleging retaliation under the MHRA. 330 N.W.2d 428, 445 (Minn. 1983); see also Tretter v. Liquipak Int'l, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 713, 715 (Minn.Ct.App. 1984) (finding inference of causal connection established under the MHRA when an employee was demoted 3 months after complaining about her manager and was terminated 6 months later). The relevant time period to consider in this case is not the time between Krutchen's 2003 report and his 2008 termination.