Trenkler v. U.S.

110 Citing cases

  1. Jones v. U.S.

    304 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2002)   Cited 386 times
    Holding that the petitioner “has the burden of proving entitlement to equitable tolling”

    The petitioner has the burden of proving entitlement to equitable tolling by showing that "extraordinary circumstances that were both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence" prevented filing the petition on time. Akins, 204 F.3d at 1090; see Trenkler v. United States, 268 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that the § 2255 petitioner "bears the burden of establishing the basis for" equitable tolling); Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 618-19 (3d Cir. 1998) (recognizing "that equitable tolling is proper only when the `principles of equity would make [the] rigid application [of a limitation period] unfair'. . . . [and that a] petitioner must show that he or she `exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and bringing [the] claims'" (third alteration added) (internal citations omitted)). Federal courts "must examine each case on its facts" and apply statutory law and controlling precedent to determine if a particular request qualifies for equitable tolling of the unequivocal, one-year limitation period.

  2. Barreto-Barreto v. U.S.

    551 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 2008)   Cited 196 times
    Holding that jurisdictional claims under § 2255 are subject to one-year limit

    We have yet to decide whether the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to § 2255 petitions. See Lattimore v. Dubois, 311 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2002); Trenkler v. United States, 268 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2001); cf. Neverson v. Farquharson, 366 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that equitable tolling applies to § 2244 petitions from convictions in state courts in rare and extraordinary cases). Other circuits addressing this question have held that if equitable tolling is applicable, it is available only in "rare and exceptional circumstances."

  3. Gibson v. U.S.

    CR. No. 04-084-ML (D.R.I. Dec. 11, 2009)

    The First Circuit has, without expressly accepting the doctrine in the postconviction context, emphasized that the equitable tolling doctrine is invoked only in rare and exceptional cases where "extraordinary circumstances beyond the claimant's control prevented timely filing, or the claimant was materially misled into missing the deadline." Trenklerv. United States, 268 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). See United States v. Barreto-Barreto, 551 F.3d 95, 100-101 (1st Cir. 2008) (same).

  4. Guzman v. U.S.

    C.A. No. 05-214-ML (D.R.I. Jan. 17, 2007)   Cited 1 times

    The First Circuit has, without expressly accepting the doctrine in the postconviction context, emphasized that the equitable tolling doctrine is invoked only in rare and exceptional cases where "extraordinary circumstances beyond the claimant's control prevented timely filing, or the claimant was materially misled into missing the deadline." Trenkler v. United States, 268 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Fradella v. Petricca, 183 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1999) [citations omitted]).See Donovan v. Maine, 276 F.3d 87, 93 (1st Cir. 2002) (same). It is well settled that "[e]quitable tolling is not warranted where the claimant simply "failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights.

  5. United States v. Williamson

    706 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2013)   Cited 146 times
    Concluding that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel for a Rule 33 motion filed more than fourteen days after the district court enters the judgment of conviction, because such a motion is collateral

    (citing Finley, 481 U.S. at 557, 107 S.Ct. 1990)). In applying these principles, circuit courts have held that a new-trial motion filed after the trial but before the appeal is a critical stage with the attendant Sixth Amendment right to counsel, McAfee v. Thaler, 630 F.3d 383, 391 (5th Cir.2011) (“Every federal circuit court to address the question of whether the post-trial, pre-appeal time period for making a motion for new trial is a critical stage has concluded that it is.”), and that a new-trial motion filed after the direct appeal is not a critical stage, but rather a collateral proceeding with no attendant Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir.2004); Trenkler v. United States, 268 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir.2001) (noting that post-appeal Rule 33 motions are collateral and that a criminal defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to an attorney in such proceedings); Johnson v. United States, 246 F.3d 655, 658 (6th Cir.2001) (“[A] delayed Rule 33 motion is a collateral challenge separate from the direct appeal.”); United States v. Woods, 169 F.3d 1077, 1078 (7th Cir.1999) (“When made following the outcome of a direct appeal, a Rule 33 motion plainly is collateral....”); see also United States v. Prescott, 221 F.3d 686, 687 (4th Cir.2000) (holding that the one-year limitations period for filing a § 2255 motion to vacate ran from the resolution of the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction, and not from the resolution of the Rule 33 motion made after the defendant appealed his conviction); United States v. Williams, No. 97–6517, 165 F.3d 913, 1998 WL 786200 (4th Cir. Nov. 12, 1998).

  6. Barnes v. U.S.

    437 F.3d 1074 (11th Cir. 2006)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that a Rule 33 motion does not toll the one-year limitations period

    Id. at 660. The First Circuit considered a nearly identical issue as in Johnson, and, like the Sixth Circuit, the court rejected the argument that a Rule 33 motion for a new trial was part of the "direct appeal" process, unless it was incorporated under Rule 4(b), and explicitly held that the petitioner's one-year limitation period began to run on either the date the court's mandate in his original appeal issued or when the time for filing his petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court expired.Trenkler v. United States, 268 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 2001). Secondly, the Trenkler court, like the Sixth Circuit in Johnson, rejected the notion that the tolling provisions for state habeas petitions implied a similar exhaustion requirement or tolling provision for federal motions to vacate under § 2255.

  7. Brackett v. U.S.

    270 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2001)   Cited 65 times
    Holding that "the operative date under § 2255 is not the date the state conviction was vacated, but rather the date on which the defendant learned, or with due diligence should have learned, the facts supporting his claim to vacate the state conviction"

    We review de novo the issue of statutory interpretation. Trenkler v. United States, 268 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2001). The government's brief also argues at great length that the claim presented here is not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

  8. Torres–Santiago v. United States

    865 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D.P.R. 2012)   Cited 16 times
    Finding that petitioner failed to show reasonable diligence because he did not establish that he had requested the assistance of a fellow inmate or previous counsel within the one-year statute of limitations

    Further, “[e]quitable tolling of the limitations period for filing a motion to vacate sentence is not applicable if the petitioners simply failed to exercise due diligence in preserving their legal rights.” See Barreto–Barreto v. U.S., 551 F.3d 95, 101 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting Trenkler v. U.S., 268 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir.2001) (internal quotations omitted)). 1. Reasonable Diligence

  9. Holley v. U.S.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 07-CV-12164-RGS (D. Mass. Aug. 8, 2008)

    The statute begins to run on a § 2255 petition when the time for seeking certiorari from the Supreme Court expires (even if certiorari is not sought). See Trenkler v. United States, 268 F.3d 16, 22 n. 5 (1st Cir. 2001);Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 525, 532 (2003); In re Smith, 436 F.3d 9, 10 n. 1 (1st Cir. 2006). The certiorari deadline in a criminal case expires 90 days from date of the entry of the judgment or order for which review is sought, except "if a petition for rehearing is timely filed in the lower court . . ., or if the lower court appropriately entertains an untimely petition for rehearing or sua sponte considers rehearing, the time to file the petition . . . runs from the date of the denial of the rehearing or, if the rehearing is granted, the subsequent entry of judgment."

  10. Mclain v. City of Somerville

    424 F. Supp. 2d 329 (D. Mass. 2006)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that a three-year delay in filing was not so unreasonable as to justify applying the doctrine of laches because the city had not demonstrated prejudice due to the delay

    The lack of the five-year limitation in § 4311 does not indicate that § 4311 does not apply to active duty personnel, in view of that section's plain terms. Furthermore, even if such a five-year limitation were read into § 4311 — contrary to the familiar canon of statutory interpretation that, under these circumstances, the court should presume that Congress' exclusion was intentional, see Trenkler v. United States, 268 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2001) — McLain would be well within the five-year limit. Somerville cites Carney v. Cummins Engine Co., which in interpreting VRRA finds that "it is not `inconceivable' that Congress could have intended to grant reservists greater protection than veterans returning from active duty."