Instead, the critical question is whether the individual has a contract of hire with the employer for wages or something of value that is like wages. See Trembath v. Riggs, 100 N.M. 615, 619, 673 P.2d 1348, 1352 (Ct.App. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743 (1987). Cf. Joyce v. Pecos Benedictine Monastery, 119 N.M. 764, 766, 895 P.2d 286, 288 (Ct.App. 1995) (stating that a religious novice is not an employee, largely because the novice does not exchange her service for wages); Jelso v. World Balloon Corp., 97 N.M. 164, 168, 637 P.2d 846, 850 (Ct.App. 1981) (explaining that an unpaid volunteer is not a worker or employee).
We granted certiorari in this case because we believe that it is time for New Mexico to join every other state in the country in its view of compensability for injuries suffered on an employer's premises. Of necessity, we must reassess Section 52-1-19, as that statute has been construed in earlier New Mexico decisions, see, e.g., Trembath v. Riggs, 100 N.M. 615, 673 P.2d 1348 (Ct.App. 1983), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 11, 677 P.2d 624 (1984); Gonzales v. New Mexico State Highway Department; Romero v. S.S. Kresge Co., 95 N.M. 484, 623 P.2d 998 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 95 N.M. 593, 624 P.2d 535 (1981); Hayes v. Ampex Corp.; McDonald v. Artesia General Hospital, 73 N.M. 188, 386 P.2d 708 (1963); Caviness v. Driscoll Const. Co., 39 N.M. 441, 49 P.2d 251 (1935); Cuellar v. American Employer's Ins. Co., 36 N.M. 141, 9 P.2d 685 (1932), which cases denied compensation for on-premises injuries occurring while the employee is "on his way to assume the duties of his employment or after leaving such duties," not proximately caused by the employer's negligence. NMSA 1978, § 52-1-19.
As for subsection (a) of that statute, the record does not suggest that they performed their errand pursuant to any election or contract of hire. See Watson v. Indus. Comm'n, 100 Ariz. 327, 332, 414 P.2d 144, 148 (1966) ("contract of hire" implies voluntary relation between the parties); Posey v. Indus. Comm'n, 87 Ariz. 245, 251, 350 P.2d 659, 663 (1960) (petitioner not entitled to workers' compensation because "he was not under a contract of hire, either express or implied," at time of injury); Ferrell, 79 Ariz. at 281, 288 P.2d at 494 ("[A] contract of hire . . . connotes payment of some kind."); Trembath v. Riggs, 673 P.2d 1348, 1352 (N.M.Ct.App. 1983), overruled in part on other grounds by Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 734 P.2d 743 (N.M. 1987) ("no `contract of hire'" existed between school and student who was performing errand during school hours at teacher's request). ¶ 24 For the first time at oral argument, however, appellees contended they qualified as "employees" under § 23-901(6)(a) because, at the time of the accident, they were performing the errand "in the service" of the school pursuant to their teacher's "appointment" of them for that task.
Because we do not consider the evidence undisputed and susceptible to only one logical inference, the issue is more appropriately whether the court's conclusion was supported by substantial evidence. Cf. Trembath v. Riggs, 100 N.M. 615, 673 P.2d 1348 (Ct.App. 1983). Lunchtime injuries may be compensable, provided the worker's accident occurred in the course and scope of the worker's employment.