Opinion
November 22, 1961
Present — Bergan, P.J., Coon, Gibson, Herlihy and Reynolds, JJ.
Appeal from an order of a Special Term, Supreme Court, Albany County. These actions in tort against a village have been dismissed because they were not commenced, as the Village Law (§ 341) requires, within one year "after the cause of action therefor shall have accrued". The accident occurred June 12, 1956; the notices of claim required by section 341 were served August 16, 1956; but the actions were not commenced until July 23, 1957. If the causes "accrued" when the accident occurred, the actions were commenced too late; but if they "accrued", as pleaded, when the notices of claim were filed, the commencement was timely. Plaintiffs make a logical argument that the causes did not accrue until actions could have been commenced, i.e., until after the service of the notices, and cite Bucklin v. Ford (5 Barb. 393); Bergen v. Ward ( 190 Misc. 566, affd. 272 App. Div. 1025). We feel precluded, however, by our decision in Sullivan v. City of Watervliet ( 285 App. Div. 179) and by Christian v. Village of Herkimer ( 5 A.D.2d 62 [4th Dept.], affd. 5 N.Y.2d 818) to hold that the causes accrued when the accident occurred. Thus the Special Term was right in dismissing the complaint. Order unanimously affirmed, with $10 costs.