Opinion
No. 05-04-00145-CR
Opinion Filed April 13, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F02-73904-QV.
Affirm.
Before Justices BRIDGES, O'NEILL, and MAZZANT.
OPINION
Appellant appeals his conviction for forgery. After finding appellant guilty, the jury assessed punishment at nine years' confinement. In three points of error, appellant generally contends (1) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the trial court erred in denying him a hearing on impeachment evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment. The grand jury indicted appellant for passing a forged writing with the intent to defraud. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 32.21(a)(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). At trial, the State presented evidence that on August 23, 2002, appellant entered a "Money Mart," a check cashing company, and attempted to cash a check made out to David Beck. Appellant claimed to be Beck and presented identification to that effect. Katrina Stewart was working at the Money Mart that day. She became suspicious when she saw the check because it was not computer generated and the signature "didn't look right." Because of her suspicions, Stewart decided to verify the check. The check was drawn off the account of "Dallas Professional Security, Incorporated." Consequently, Stewart called Dallas Professional Security and spoke to Rosie Ann DeLeon. DeLeon told Stewart the check was not genuine, and Stewart called police. Before police arrived, appellant left the Money Mart, leaving his identification and the check behind. The State presented evidence from Dallas Professional Security that the check was "totally counterfeit." The jury found appellant guilty of forgery. In his first and second points of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). The inquiry is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Turner, 805 S.W.2d at 427. The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). As such, the jury may choose to believe or disbelieve all or any part of any witness's testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986); McCray v. State, 861 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.). When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence, but not in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). The question is whether, considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, the trier of fact was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484-85 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). Evidence can be factually insufficient if (1) the evidence is too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, or (2) contrary evidence exists that is strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 484-85. Appellant asserts the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to show he had the intent to defraud because there is no evidence appellant knew the check was forged. However, the jury could easily infer appellant knew the check was forged and had the intent to defraud from evidence he entered the "Money Mart" and, using false identification, pretended to be a David Beck and attempted to cash a counterfeit check made out to Beck. See Williams v. State, 688 S.W.2d 486, 490 (Tex.Crim. App 1985). Consequently, the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction. See id. Further, after reviewing all the evidence in a neutral light, we cannot conclude (1) the evidence is too weak to support the jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, or (2) contrary evidence exists that is strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. See Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 484-85. We overrule appellant's first and second points of error. In his third point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his requested hearing on impeachment evidence. Appellant's "argument" under this point consists of two sentences. According to appellant, he was entitled to a hearing to determine what impeachment evidence the State would use if he testified. He maintains the trial court's failure to conduct such a hearing harmed him because he was "totally prevented" from taking the witness stand "knowing that the State would be totally unfettered in its cross examination" as to any and all prior convictions. The only authority appellant cites is Theus v. State, 863 S.W.2d 489 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). We have reviewed the cited authority, which has nothing to do with appellant's complaint. Moreover, appellant provides no substantive argument to support his contention. Rule 38.1(h) of the rules of appellate procedure requires an appellant to include in his brief "a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record." See Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h). We conclude this contention is inadequately briefed and presents nothing to review. See Stahle v. State, 970 S.W.2d 682, 692 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, pet. ref'd). We overrule appellant's third point of error. In a cross-point of error, the State requests we reform the trial court's judgment to reflect the trial court's oral pronouncement regarding consecutive sentences. After a punishment hearing, the jury assessed punishment at nine years' confinement and a $10,000 fine. The trial court then orally pronounced that appellant's sentence would run consecutively with appellant's sentence in cause number F90-47670-IT for which appellant was then on parole. The trial court's judgment does not, however, contain a cumulation order. According to the State, we should reform the trial court's judgment to reflect the sentence orally pronounced. The only authority the State cites is Coffey v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998), which allows an appellate court to reform a written judgment to reflect the sentence orally pronounced. The issue in this case concerns an oral cumulation order. The oral pronouncement in this case does not, however, contain all the information required for it to be a valid cumulation order. For example, the oral pronouncement does not mention the date of the prior conviction or the correct name of the court where the prior conviction was taken. See, e.g., Ward v. State, 523 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex.Crim.App. 1975). Thus, we cannot merely reform the judgment to reflect the trial court's oral pronouncement. Under these circumstances, we conclude Coffey does not require reformation. The State directs us to no authority that would otherwise allow or require reformation in this case. We will not make the State's arguments for it. We resolve the cross-point against the State.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Presumably, appellant intended to cite Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). However, even the earlier Theus case does not concern a defendant's right to a pretrial hearing, but rather when prior convictions are admissible for impeachment.