Opinion
01 Civ. 1237 (FM)
October 11, 2002
MEMORANDUM DECISION
I. Introduction
In this personal injury action, plaintiff Lawrence N. Traylor seeks to recover damages allegedly resulting from injuries that he sustained while performing his duties as an employee of defendant Metro-North Commuter Railroad ("Metro-North"). In his complaint, Traylor asserts claims under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq., and the Boiler Inspection Act, also commonly known as the Locomotive Inspection Act ("LIA"), 49 U.S.C. § 20701. Traylor has now moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, for partial summary judgment on the issues of liability and causation. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment is denied.
Although this case was originally assigned to Judge Koeltl, the parties subsequently agreed to proceed before me for all purposes, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73.
II. Background
Traylor alleges that on or about March 24, 1999, while working as a locomotive engineer on one of Metro-North's passenger trains, he injured himself as he attempted to open a window so that he could "spot" employees who had left the train at a special "employee stop." (See Compl. ¶ 5; Traylor Affirm. ¶¶ 1-4). According to the Metro-North Supervisor's Injury Report, "the window got stuck near the top" while Traylor was trying to open it. (See Martz Affirm. Ex. A at 1). As a result, Traylor reportedly suffered right shoulder and lower back pains. (Id. at 1, 3).III. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion" and identifying the matter that "it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2253, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is sought and . . . draw all permissible inferences in favor of that party." Fischl v. Armitage, 128 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1997). If the court concludes that "the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial,'" and summary judgment must be granted. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 569 (1986) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)). On the other hand, "disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
IV. Discussion
Under FELA, a railroad employee may recover compensatory damages when his employer's negligence played a role, no matter how slight, in producing the employee's injury. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 448, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957). Proof that the defendant railroad violated the LIA establishes such negligence per se. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 189, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 1034, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949).
The LIA was first enacted in 1911, see Oglesby v. Delaware Hudson Ry. Co., 180 F.3d 458, 460 (2d Cir. 1999), and has been amended several times. The current version provides:
A railroad carrier may use or allow to be used a locomotive or tender on its railroad line only when the locomotive or tender and its parts and appurtenances —
(1) are in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury;
(2) have been inspected as required under this chapter and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation under this chapter; and
(3) can withstand every test prescribed by the Secretary under this chapter.49 U.S.C. § 20701. Thus, to prevail on his motion, Traylor must, at a minimum, show that the locomotive was not "in proper condition" and that it could not safely be operated "without unnecessary danger of personal injury." Id.
The version of the LIA that Traylor cites in his memorandum of law, 45 U.S.C. § 23, was repealed in 1994 and replaced by the current version, 49 U.S.C. § 20701. The two statutes differ slightly. For example, the earlier version used the phrase "unnecessary peril to life or limb" rather than "unnecessary danger of personal injury."
Courts that have been confronted with such issues under both the present and prior versions of the LIA have typically concluded that they present questions of fact for the jury to decide at a trial. See, e.g., Gregory v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 32 F.3d 160, 162 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases); Palmer v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 12 F. Supp.2d 588, 590 (S.D.Tex. 1998) ("Whether the locomotive is `in proper condition and safe to operate' is an issue of fact for the jury.")
In this case, even if the window was defective, Traylor has not shown "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact" as to whether the locomotive was safe to operate without "unnecessary" danger of personal injury. In support of his motion for summary judgment, Traylor has submitted the Supervisor's Injury Report, which concludes that "the window was in need of repair" and should have been "inspected properly," "lubricated," and "repaired." (See Martz Affirm. Ex. A. at 4). While this indicates that the window was not "in proper condition," it does not establish that the window was unsafe to operate or that it presented an "unnecessary" danger of personal injury. Moreover, Traylor's affidavit, which simply alleges in conclusory terms that the window presented an "unsafe condition," does not alter this conclusion. (See Traylor Affirm. ¶ 4).
V. Conclusion
Traylor's motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of liability and causation is denied. The trial of this action will commence on Monday, November 18, 2002, at 9:30 a.m., in Courtroom 11C.