Id. Further, in Traverse City v. Consumers Power Co., 340 Mich. 85, 64 N.W.2d 894 (1954), the Michigan Supreme Court held that the geographical limits of a corporation organized under Act 264 were not limited solely to the area serviced by the corporation as of January 1, 1909, the effective date of the 1908 Constitution. The Court stated:

. 516; New York Elec. Lines v. Empire Subway Co., 235 U.S. 179, 59 L.Ed. 184; Ohio Public Service Co. v. Ohio, 274 U.S. 12, 71 L.Ed. 898; Owensboro v. Cumberland Tel. Tel. Co., 230 U.S. 58, 57 L.Ed. 1389, 33 S.Ct. 988; Pacific Tel. Tel. Co. v. City County of San Francisco (Cal.), 336 P.2d 514; Pacific Tel. Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles (Cal.), 282 P.2d 36; Petaluma, City of v. The Pacific Tel. Tel. Co. (Cal.), 282 P.2d 43; Port of Mobile v. Louisville N.R. Co. (Ala.), 4 So. 106; Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Cal., 254 P. 258; Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U.S. 195, 58 L.Ed. 912; Seattle, City of v. Western Union Tel. Co. (Wash.), 153 P.2d 859; Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co. v. City of Mobile, 162 Fed. 523, 174 Fed. 1020; Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co. v. City of Nashville (Tenn.), 243 S.W.2d 617; Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 266 S.W.2d 308; State of Indiana ex rel. v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 82 L.Ed. 685; Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 45 L.Ed. 162; Traverse City v. Consumers Power Co., 340 Mich. 85, 64 N.W.2d 894; United States Mtg. Co. v. Matthews, 293 U.S. 232, 79 L.Ed. 299; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 43 L.Ed. 341; Amend. XIV, Art. I, Sec. 10, U.S. Constitution; Secs. 14, 16, Constitution 1890; Sec. 300, Code 1857; Secs. 1065, 1066, 1067, Code 1880; Secs. 854, 855, 856, Code 1892; Sec. 905, Code 1906; Secs. 7716-05(e), 7837, Code 1942; Chap. 38, Laws 1886; Secs. 1D(1), 1D(2) 1D(3), 5(e), 39, Chap. 372, Laws 1956; Sec. 536, California Civil Code; 12 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, Sec. 34.06.

[Lansing, 183 Mich. at 410-411.] See also Traverse City v Consumers Power Co, 340 Mich. 85, 103; 64 N.W.2d 894 (1954) ("This Court has held that rights acquired under the 1905 act are vested rights ....")

In the proceedings before the PSC, Consumers moved to dismiss the city's complaint, arguing that it was not required to obtain a CPCN pursuant to Act 69 because it had a Foote act franchise, which predated Act 69, to provide electric service to any customer located within the City of Marshall. Consumers relied on Traverse City v Consumers Power Co, 340 Mich. 85; 64 N.W.2d 894 (1954), in which the Supreme Court held that a Foote act franchise constituted a vested contractual right that could not be impaired by abrogation of the Foote act by a subsequently adopted constitutional provision, Const 1908, art 8, § 28. In response to the motion, the city argued that the provisions of Act 69 applied to activities undertaken by utilities after April 23, 1929, the effective date of the act.

The power to do so must be expressly granted in the state constitution, statutes, or municipal charter in order for a municipality to be able to exercise such power. Traverse City v Consumers Power Co, 340 Mich. 85; 64 N.W.2d 894 (1954), Public Utilities Comm, supra. As a general proposition, regulation of a public utility by a local government is valid and constitutional if it is authorized, reasonable, and related to public health, safety, or general welfare.

See, e.g., Callais Cablevision v. Houma Cablevision, Inc., 451 So.2d 6, 9 (La.App. 1 Cir.1984) (cable); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 270 P.2d 903, 914 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.1954) (telephones); Traverse City v. Consumers Power Co., 340 Mich. 85, 64 N.W.2d 894, 900 (1954) (electricity). In all of the cases in which cities have enacted legislation requiring upgrades to taxicabs, no court has held the laws unconstitutional based on the Contracts Clause.

There is no inconsistency in operating under the grant that is given to it by the State and any grant that it might receive from the municipality. Traverse City v. Consumers Power Company, 340 Mich. 85, 64 N.W.2d 894; Northwestern Telephone Exchange Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 81 Minn. 140, 83 N.W. 527, 53 L.R.A. 175, and in the later opinion in 86 N.W. 69; City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Company, 177 U.S. 558, 20 S.Ct. 736, 44 L.Ed. 886; City of Minneapolis v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co., 215 U.S. 417, 30 S.Ct. 118, 125, 54 L.Ed. 259, wherein the Supreme Court of the United States said, "Acquiescence in a regulation which may not have been deemed injurious, and may have been deemed wise and expedient, does not preclude a contest against the enforcement of regulations which are injurious and violative of contract rights." The contention that the plaintiff is estopped by accepting benefits under the constitution of Section 179 of 1890 cannot be upheld.

In Baker it was held that a Denver City Ordinance extending a franchise previously granted by the city to Denver Tramway Company was void as the question had not been submitted to a vote of the people pursuant to Article XX, § 4. There this court took great care to distinguish that situation from the one presented in McPhee on the basis that in McPhee the railroad company had held a franchise from the state and therefore the city was powerless to require a further franchise. In Baker there was, however, no state franchise by statute or otherwise and the court properly held that the City of Denver had the power to require one. Also see Traverse City v. Consumers Power Co., 340 Mich. 85, 64 N.W.2d 894 (1954). Hence defendant has a franchise from the state by virtue of C.R.S. 1963, 50-5-1.

The District may not be ousted from the use of the public ways once having accepted by acting on the grant of the state. City of Seattle v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 21 Wn.2d 838, 153 P.2d 859; cf. Traverse City v. Consumers Power Co., 340 Mich. 85, 64 N.W.2d 894; Southern Bell Telephone Tel. Co. v. City of Meridian, 241 Miss. 678, 131 So.2d 666." 92 Ariz. at 99, 373 P.2d at 728.

The District may not be ousted from the use of the public ways once having accepted by acting on the grant of the state. City of Seattle v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 21 Wn.2d 838, 153 P.2d 859; cf. Traverse City v. Consumers Power Co., 340 Mich. 85, 64 N.W.2d 894; Southern Bell Telephone Tel. Co. v. City of Meridian, 241 Miss. 678, 131 So.2d 666. If the District has been using private rights of way or a claimed easement, the use is permissive and property within the meaning of Art. 2, § 17, Constitution of Arizona forbidding the taking or damaging thereof without just compensation.