Opinion
No. CV 09 4021403S
April 30, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff, Roger Traversa, appeals from a decision, served on him on July 2, 2009, issued by the defendant statewide grievance committee (SGC), finding that he engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
The record shows as follows. On November 13, 2008, an attorney for the Connecticut judicial branch forwarded correspondence to the office of disciplinary counsel that was sent from the plaintiff to a law librarian at a state courthouse in which the plaintiff had referred to his title as "esq." (Return of Record, ROR, Item #2.) On December 19, 2008, the disciplinary counsel directed the statewide bar counsel to schedule the issue of the plaintiff's use of "esq" for a hearing before the SGC. (ROR, Item #1.)
The chief disciplinary counsel and staff are established by Practice Book § 2-34A. According to subsection (8), the disciplinary counsel shall "investigate and prosecute complaints involving the violation by any person of General Statutes § 51-88 [unauthorized practice of law]." Section 51-88 read together with Practice Book § 2-47(c) also authorizes the disciplinary counsel, in lieu of criminal prosecution, to undertake civil sanctions against a person engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Statewide Grievance Committee v. Zadora, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham at Putnam, Docket No. CR 98-0058137 (August 20, 1998, Schuman, J.) [ 23 Conn. L. Rptr. 59].
The Practice Book establishes this office pursuant to Practice Book § 2-34 to assist the SGC in the performance of its duties.
The matter came before a panel of the SGC for a hearing on March 3, 2009. Subsequently, this panel issued a decision in which it found that the plaintiff was admitted as an attorney in Pennsylvania, but not in Connecticut. He had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in Connecticut by using the suffix "esq" in his letter to the law librarian on October 10, 2008 and to the disciplinary counsel in an e-mail dated December 15, 2008. He made no attempt in this correspondence to indicate that he was only admitted in Pennsylvania, thus holding himself out as a Connecticut attorney. The decision concluded: "Having found that the Respondent [Traversa] engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, we leave it to the Chief Disciplinary Counsel's discretion to take whatever action is deemed appropriate." (ROR, Item #21.)
On July 8, 2009, the plaintiff filed an appeal from this decision pursuant to § 4-183, naming the SGC as a defendant. After a hearing, the court on December 1, 2009, requested articulation of the SGC on the following: "Discuss the mechanism of appeal from a determination under Practice Book § 2-34A(b)(8), that a party is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Both § 4-183 and Practice Book § 2-38 do not specifically allow for an appeal to court. Is there an inherent right to appeal?" The SGC replied on March 13, 2010 that its decision is only interim and was not appealable. The plaintiff's right to contest the conclusions of the SGC would become available if, and only if, the disciplinary counsel decided to follow up on its conclusions in Superior Court under Practice Book § 2-47(c).
Section 4-183 does not apply to decisions of the SGC, Sobocinski v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 215 Conn. 517, 576 A.2d 532 (1990). Practice Book § 2-38, authorizing an appeal to the Superior Court, refers to discipline imposed under § 2-37, and does not include an SGC finding of the unauthorized practice of law.
On a constitutional right to appeal, beyond the appellate rights set forth in the statutes or the Practice Book, the SGC stated that "there is an inherent right to appeal a decision that violates the constitutional rights of the Plaintiff/Appellant . . . The burden is on the Plaintiff/Appellant to demonstrate that the finding of the SGC has adversely affected a property right or in some other way violated his constitutional rights. The Plaintiff/Appellant's failure to do so in this case deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal."
The court agrees with the SGC that the plaintiff has appealed from an interim decision over which this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Should the disciplinary counsel seek injunctive relief against the plaintiff, he would have available procedures to contest the conclusions of the SGC. In addition, the plaintiff would have available an appeal to the Appellate Court from any adverse relief that the disciplinary counsel might obtain in Superior Court.
The Connecticut judicial branch's established procedures for regulating attorneys are not criminal or civil, but are sui generis. See Burton v. Mottolese, 267 Conn. 1, 26, 835 A.2d 998 (2003). Connecticut has established a "comprehensive administrative mechanism for the investigation and resolution of attorney grievance complaints . . . Allowing parties to circumvent the established grievance procedures, at least in the absence of a compelling justification for doing so, would so undermine the process as to render it ineffectual. Such a result reasonably could not have been contemplated by the framers of the administrative scheme, who created the committee and its subcommittees to as act as an arm of the court in safeguarding the administration of justice, preserving public confidence in the system, and protecting the public and the court from unfit practitioners." Johnson v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 248 Conn. 87, 99-100, 726 A.2d 1154 (1999).
As pointed out above, there is no statutory or Practice Book avenue of appeal for the plaintiff from the decision that merely turns this matter over to the disciplinary counsel for further action in his discretion. The only possible ground of appeal would be based upon a constitutional right, either to protect a liberty or property interest.
One must make at least a colorable claim that some recognized constitutional right is at risk. See State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 34, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). Looking at the complaint, the plaintiff has claimed erroneously that he has rights (right to counsel, right to be free from self-incrimination, right to subpoena witnesses) arising from a criminal prosecution, which has not taken place here. He also claims that at the hearing, he did not receive a bill of particulars, or a requested continuance, and that the SGC reached an erroneous conclusion on the merits. He does not allege that any other liberty or property interests are affected. The plaintiff also made no additional constitutional claims at his hearing before the SGC.
Since there is no avenue for appeal, the court dismisses this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Sastrom v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, 105 Conn.App. 477, 483, 938 A.2d 1233 (2008) (in the absence of statutory authority, there is no right of appeal from any agency's decision).