Opinion
No. 5927
August 19, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The issue in this case is whether the defendant's motion to dismiss should be granted on the grounds that (1) the plaintiffs have chosen an improper venue for counts three, four, seven, eight, nine, ten and eleven of the complaint, and (2) the court should apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens and decline to assert its jurisdiction over the remaining claims for which the chosen venue would be proper.
The court concludes that the Housing Session is a proper venue for all thirteen counts of the complaint and that the court should not exercise its discretion under the doctrine of forum non conveniens to dismiss any of the counts of the complaint. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is denied.
This action arises out of an alleged termination of the residency of the plaintiffs' decedent, Charles Travers, by the defendant, Waveny Care Center Health Services, Inc. The original plaintiffs, Charles Travers and Walter Travers, filed a complaint on October 16, 2003, alleging in thirteen counts that the plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of the defendant's malfeasance. Specifically, the plaintiffs seek damages for an alleged violation of General Statutes § 46a-64c (count one); breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment (count two); fraudulent inducement (count three); violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110b (count four); breach of contract (count five); breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (count six); intentional infliction of emotional distress (counts seven and eight); negligent infliction of emotional distress (counts nine and ten); promissory estoppel (count eleven); negligence (count twelve) and quantum meruit/unjust enrichment (count thirteen).
The defendant filed an appearance on November 12, 2003. On December 2, 2003, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss counts three, four, seven, eight, nine, ten and eleven on the ground of improper venue and the remaining counts on the ground of forum non conveniens. With its motion, it filed a memorandum of law in support as required by Practice Book § 11-10. The plaintiffs filed an objection to the defendant's motion to dismiss on December 12, 2003, with a memorandum of law in support as required by Practice Book § 10-31. On April 14, 2004, the plaintiffs filed a motion to substitute William Travers and Walter Travers, sons and co-executors of the estate of Charles Travers, as party plaintiffs, which the court, Cocco, J., granted on April 22, 2004. On May 28, 2004, the defendant reclaimed its motion to dismiss.
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blumenthal v. Barnes, 261 Conn. 434, 442, 804 A.2d 152 (2002). Improper venue is one of the grounds that may be asserted in a motion to dismiss. Practice Book § 10-31. "Venue is not a jurisdictional question but a procedural one . . . Statutory venue requirements simply [confer] a privilege not to be required to attend court at a particular location . . . Accordingly it may be waived by the parties, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, which cannot be conferred by consent." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Savage v. Aronson, 214 Conn. 256, 263, 571 A.2d 696 (1990). The doctrine of forum non conveniens is also a ground that may be asserted in a motion to dismiss. See Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., 258 Conn. 454, 457, 782 A.2d 103 (2001).
A. Improper Venue
The defendant argues that counts three, four, seven, eight, nine, ten and eleven should be dismissed because the plaintiffs' chosen venue, the Housing Session of the Superior Court, is not the proper venue in which these claims should be heard. The defendant argues that these causes of action primarily relate to alleged agreements to provide healthcare services and to alleged fraudulent business practices and are not "housing matters" as defined by General Statutes § 47a-68. The defendant contends that because these are not "housing matters," they have been brought to an improper venue and should be dismissed.
The plaintiffs argue that all thirteen counts are in the proper venue. They argue that the definitions of "housing matters" provided under subsections (h) and (i) of General Statutes § 47a-68 are applicable to these counts. They further contend that because the courts of this state apply the statutory language in § 47a-68 liberally and because each count arises from the defendant's alleged breach of the "February 2002 residency agreement," these claims are "housing matters," and as such, they should not be dismissed for improper venue.
General Statutes § 47a-68 defines "housing matters," inter alia, as, "(h) [a]ll actions for back rent, damages, return of security deposits and other relief arising out of the parties' relationship as landlord and tenant or owner and occupant . . ." and as "(i) [a]ll other actions of any nature concerning the health, safety or welfare of any occupant of any place used or intended for use as a place of human habitation if any such action arises from or is related to its occupancy or right of occupancy." (Emphasis added.) The plain and unambiguous text of General Statutes § 47a-68(h) and (i) encompasses all of the claims brought by the plaintiffs. See Public Acts 2003, No. 03-154, § 1. All thirteen counts arise from the relationship between the plaintiffs' decedent and the defendant "as landlord and tenant or owner and occupant" or concern the "health, safety or welfare" of the plaintiffs' decedent. See General Statutes § 47a-68(h) and (i). The Housing Session, therefore, is a proper venue in which these claims may be heard.
Number 03-154 of the 2003 public acts provides in relevant part: "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered."
Count three, which alleges that the defendant fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to pay for health care services, also alleges that the defendant fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to enter into the "residency agreement." This claim, therefore, is a "housing matter" within the definition under § 47a-68(h) and (i) because it asserts a cause of action based on the document that allegedly gave rise to the landlord-tenant relationship and because it relates to the health, safety and welfare of the plaintiffs' decedent. Similarly, count four, alleging violations of CUTPA, contains allegations of deceptive business practices relating to the residency agreement, specifically that the defendant forged the plaintiffs' initials on the residency agreement indicating that they had received a copy of a "residency handbook." That count further alleges that the defendant produced a false document entitled, "Notice Requirements and Termination of Rental Agreement," which it purports to be the plaintiffs' notification to the defendant that the plaintiffs' decedent voluntarily terminated his residency. Further, it has been held that CUTPA claims arising out of a landlord-tenant relationship are within the jurisdiction of the Housing Session. Francois v. Roebuck, Superior Court, judicial district of Norwalk, Docket No. HCNO 9409-025 (March 29, 1995, Tierney, J.) ( 14 Conn. L. Rptr. 55), citing Conaway v. Prestia, 191 Conn. 484, 464 A.2d 847 (1983). The allegations in each of these counts are directly related to the landlord-tenant relationship, and therefore are "housing matters" within the definitions of § 47a-68.
Counts seven, eight, nine and ten allege intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Housing Session is a proper venue for claims of intentional or negligent infliction of emotion distress that arise in the context of a housing matter. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Delisa, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Housing Session, Docket No. CVN-009-1831-FA (January 10, 2002, Crawford, J.); Gerardo v. Laraia, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Housing Session, Docket No. CVN-9809-1696-BU (January 31, 2001, Tanzer, J.); Forbotnick v. Kalinowski, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Housing Session, Docket No. CV H 5967 (January 11, 2000, Tanzer, J.) ( 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 517). Further, each of these allegations arises from, inter alia, alleged violations of the residency agreement. Count eleven, asserting promissory estoppel, alleges that the defendant violated at oral agreement concerning rental payments in the amount of $200 per day and "residency promises in regards to Charles Travers' tenancy . . ." (Complaint, Count 11, ¶¶ 44, 45 and 46.) As these claims arise from agreements relating to the plaintiffs' decedent's tenancy, it would be inappropriate to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss as to any of them because they are "housing matters" within the definitions of § 47a-68 and, therefore, are in a proper venue.
As all thirteen counts of the complaint allege causes of action pertaining to a housing matter as defined by § 47a-68, it is clear that the Housing Session is an appropriate venue in which to hear this matter. Therefore the defendant's motion to dismiss is not granted on the basis of improper venue.
Under General Statutes § 47a-70, the court may transfer a housing matter to the regular docket for a geographical area or judicial district if it determines that such docket is more suitable for the disposition of the case. See, e.g., Lewis v. Bunnell, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury. Docket No. CV 99-9416 (March 15, 2000, Resha, J.) ( 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 601). Nevertheless, as the defendant did not seek transfer in its motion, and because the Housing Session of the Superior Court is vested with a broad scope of authority; see Fellows v. Martin, 217 Conn. 57, 62 n. 8, 584 A.2d 458 (1991); Southland Corp. v. Vernon, 1 Conn.App. 439, 447, 473 A.2d 318 (1984); it is submitted that transfer to another venue is neither necessary nor appropriate in this case.
B. Forum Non Conveniens
The defendant argues that if the court decides to grant its motion to dismiss as to counts three, four, seven, eight, nine, ten and eleven for the reasons discussed above, the remaining counts should be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The plaintiffs do not object to the defendant's request for the court to exercise its discretion under forum non conveniens. Since counts three, four, seven, eight, nine, ten and eleven are not dismissed for improper venue, the court will not dismiss the other counts on the basis of forum non conveniens.
The defendant argues that the remaining counts should be dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens in order to keep all of the claims together in one action in a single forum. The defendant has not asserted any other grounds for its motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens. As all of the causes of action asserted therein have been brought in a proper venue, there would be no need to dismiss the remaining claims to keep all of them together in one action, as the court will not exercise its discretion under the doctrine of forum non conveniens to dismiss these claims.
"As a common law matter, the doctrine of forum non conveniens vests discretion in the trial court to decide where trial will best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., 258 Conn. 454, 463-64, 782 A.2d 103 (2001).
"Emphasis on the trial court's discretion does not, however, overshadow the central principle of the forum non conveniens doctrine that unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant[s], the [plaintiffs'] choice of forum should rarely be disturbed . . . Although it would be inappropriate to invoke [a] rigid rule to govern discretion . . . it bears emphasis that invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is a drastic remedy . . . which the trial court must approach with caution and restraint. The trial court does not have unchecked discretion to dismiss cases from [the plaintiffs'] chosen forum simply because another forum, in the court's view, may be superior to that chosen by the plaintiff[s] . . . Although a trial court applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens must walk a delicate line to avoid implicitly sanctioning forum-shopping by either litigant at the expense of the other . . . it cannot exercise its discretion in order to level the playing field between the parties. The [plaintiffs'] choice of forum, which may well have been chosen precisely because it provides the plaintiff[s] with certain procedural or substantive advantages, should be respected unless equity weighs strongly in favor of the defendant[s] . . .
"[T]he overriding inquiry in a forum non conveniens motion is not whether some other forum might be a good one, or even a better one than the [plaintiffs'] chosen forum. The question to be answered is whether [the plaintiffs'] chosen forum is itself inappropriate or unfair because of the various private and public interest considerations involved. Accordingly, the trial court, in exercising its structured discretion, should place its thumb firmly on the [plaintiffs'] side of the scale, as a representation of the strong presumption in favor of the [plaintiffs'] chosen forum, before attempting to balance the private and public interest factors relevant to a forum non conveniens motion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 464-65.
The defendant does not argue that the Housing Session is an inconvenient forum for any reason other than to have all of the claims heard in a single forum. Because counts three, four, seven, eight, nine, ten and eleven will not be dismissed on the basis of improper venue, and because of the strong presumption in favor of the plaintiffs' chosen forum, the court declines to exercise its discretion under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Accordingly, the remaining counts should not be dismissed on this basis.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss on the bases of improper venue and forum non conveniens is denied.
COCCO, J.