Travers v. District of Columbia

36 Citing cases

  1. Burton v. U.S.

    668 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2009)   Cited 17 times
    Finding exhaustion of remedies in FTCA case consisting of Survival Act and Wrongful Death Act claims

    At the outset, the plaintiffs bear the "burden of establishing, through expert testimony, 'the applicable standard of care.'" Nwaneri, 931 A.2d at 470 (quoting Travers v. District of Columbia, 672 A.2d 566, 568 (D.C. 1996)). "In the District of Columbia, the applicable standard of care in a medical malpractice action is 'a national standard, not just a local custom.'" Id. (quoting Travers, 672 A.2d at 568).

  2. Cárdenas v. Muangman

    998 A.2d 303 (D.C. 2010)   Cited 8 times

    Therefore, the principal issue for our review is whether, in deciding appellees' motion for judgment, the trial court properly determined that the testimony of appellants' expert was unqualified and insufficient to prove the applicable national standard of care. "In a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff carries the burden of establishing . . . `the applicable standard of care, deviation from that standard, and a causal relationship between the deviation and the injury.'" Nwaneri v. Sandidge, 931 A.2d 466, 470 (D.C. 2007) (quoting Travers v. District of Columbia, 672 A.2d 566, 568 (D.C. 1996)). "Because these issues are `distinctly related to some science, profession, or occupation,' expert testimony is usually required to establish each of the elements, except where the proof is so obvious as to lie within the ken of the average lay juror."

  3. Nwaneri v. Sandidge

    931 A.2d 466 (D.C. 2007)   Cited 14 times
    Listing "discussion with other knowledgeable professionals" in a list of credentials " any of which would have been legally sufficient to establish a basis for [expert's] discussion of the national standard of care" (quoting Strickland, 899 A.2d at 774)

    In a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff carries the burden of establishing, through expert testimony, "the applicable standard of care, deviation from that standard, and a causal relationship between the deviation and the injury." Travers v. District of Columbia, 672 A.2d 566, 568 (D.C. 1996). In the District of Columbia, the applicable standard of care in a medical malpractice action is "a national standard, not just a local custom."

  4. Providence Hosp., Inc. v. Willis

    103 A.3d 533 (D.C. 2014)   Cited 2 times

    To establish proximate cause, “the expert need only state an opinion, based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the defendant's negligence is more likely than anything else to have been the cause (or a cause) of the plaintiff's injuries.” Travers v. District of Columbia, 672 A.2d 566, 573 (D.C.1996); see also Perkins v. Hansen, 79 A.3d 342, 344 (D.C.2013).On appeal, the Hospital disputes this conclusion but does so, in our view, chiefly by overstating the plaintiff's burden of proof. It contends that the judge wrongly “shifted the burden of proof on the issue of causation” to the defense (Br. for Appellant at 16) by not recognizing that “[i]t was incumbent on Mr. Willis to prove that the DVT had not yet become ‘well-established’ by September 10th when [the surgeon] entered the order for SCDs” ( id. at 6; italics added).

  5. Strickland v. Pinder

    899 A.2d 770 (D.C. 2006)   Cited 27 times
    Addressing expert opinion's insufficiency

    "The personal opinion of the testifying expert as to what he or she would do in a particular case, without reference to a standard of care, is insufficient to prove the applicable standard of care." Travers v. District of Columbia, 672 A.2d 566, 568 (D.C. 1996). "[I]t is insufficient for an expert's standard of care testimony to merely recite the words `national standard of care.'" Hawes v. Chua, 769 A.2d 797, 806 (D.C. 2001) (citations omitted).

  6. Drevenak v. Abendschein

    773 A.2d 396 (D.C. 2001)   Cited 14 times

    " Furthermore, she faults the trial court for failing to evaluate the defense expert testimony under the standards announced in Frye or Daubert, supra. Although she recognizes that Frye, supra, "addresses the admissibility of expert testimony" (emphasis supplied in original), she contends that the "[ Frye standard] should be used by a trial court sitting without a jury in evaluating expert testimony." In essence, Dr. Abendschein argues that the educational backgrounds and experience of his experts met the requirements of a national standard of care, as explained in Travers v. District of Columbia, 672 A.2d 566 (D.C. 1996). He maintains that Travers does not require "[r]eference to a published standard, if indeed one exists. . . ."

  7. HAWES v. CHUA

    769 A.2d 797 (D.C. 2001)   Cited 20 times
    In Hawes we summarized the minimum requirements for expert testimony on the national standard of care as follows: "(1) it is insufficient for an expert's standard of care testimony to merely recite the words `national standard of care';[] (2) such testimony may not be based upon the expert's personal opinion, nor mere speculation or conjecture; and (3) such testimony must reflect some evidence of a national standard."

    He must testify to a national standard of care to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, and he — moreover, must state the basis for his opinions. . . . In support of his argument, counsel referenced Travers v. District of Columbia, 672 A.2d 566 (D.C. 1996). The trial judge disagreed, saying:

  8. National Tel. Co-op. Ass'n v. Exxon Mobil

    244 F.3d 153 (D.C. Cir. 2001)   Cited 19 times

    To similar effect, "[t]he personal opinion of the testifying expert as to what he or she would do in a particular case, without reference to a standard of care, is insufficient to prove the applicable standard of care." Travers v. District of Columbia, 672 A.2d 566, 568 (D.C. 1996). No one doubts that the standard of care in this case is beyond the ken of the average layperson.

  9. Williams v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs

    No. 16-cv-2062 (EGS) (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2020)

    "In the District of Columbia, the applicable standard of care in a medical malpractice action is 'a national standard, not just a local custom.'" Nwaneri v. Sandidge, 931 A.2d 466, 470 (D.C. 2007) (quoting Travers v. District of Columbia, 672 A.2d 566, 568 (D.C. 1996)). And "the testifying expert must establish that the relevant standard of care is followed nationally, 'either through reference to a published standard, discussion of the described course of treatment with practitioners outside the District at seminars or conventions, or through presentation of relevant data.'"

  10. Pauline v. United States

    83 F. Supp. 3d 13 (D.D.C. 2015)

    As noted already, District of Columbia law governs this case. “In a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff carries the burden of establishing, through expert testimony, ‘the applicable standard of care, deviation from that standard, and a causal relationship between the deviation and the injury.’ ” Nwaneri v. Sandidge, 931 A.2d 466, 470 (D.C.2007) (quoting Travers v. Dist. of Columbia, 672 A.2d 566, 568 (D.C.1996)); seeCárdenas v. Muangman, 998 A.2d 303, 306 (D.C.2010) (“Because these issues are distinctly related to some science, profession, or occupation, expert testimony is usually required to establish each of the elements, except where the proof is so obvious as to lie within the ken of the average lay juror.”) (quoting Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 181 (D.C.1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).