Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cason

4 Citing cases

  1. Travelers Ins. Co. v. E. Cason

    132 Tex. 393 (Tex. 1939)   Cited 10 times

    The defendant answered that plaintiff was not a Texas employee at the time of his injury and not subject to the Texas workmen's compensation law. A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals ( 122 S.W.2d 694), and the insurance company has brought error to the Supreme Court. Application for writ of error is refused.

  2. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. ex rel. Bank One, N.A. v. Texas Contract Carpet, Inc.

    302 S.W.3d 515 (Tex. App. 2009)   Cited 43 times
    Holding a contractual agreement did not create a legal duty to a third party when the contractual benefit to the third party was not clearly intended by the contract and was merely incidental to the agreement

    Under either standard of review, we must be mindful that the trial court as finder of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 122 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986); Raymond v. Rahme, 78 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, no pet.). The trial court may choose to believe one witness and disbelieve another, and we must not impose our own opinion to the contrary.

  3. Oaic Commercial Assets, L.L.C. v. Stonegate Village, L.P.

    234 S.W.3d 726 (Tex. App. 2007)   Cited 146 times
    Holding that plaintiff must show privity of contract or status as third-party beneficiary under contract to maintain breach of contract action

    Unchallenged findings of fact are conclusive on appeal unless the contrary is established as a matter or law or there is no evidence to support the findings. Toles v. Toles, 45 S.W.3d 252, 265 n. 6 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied) (citing McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 122 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986)). Where an appellant attacks the trial court's findings of fact on legal or factual sufficiency grounds, the applicable standard of review is the same as that to be applied in the review of jury findings.

  4. Employers Mut. Liab. Co. v. Evins

    211 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948)   Cited 6 times

    4 and authorities. Since there had been no termination or novation of the Texas agreements theretofore entered into between Bowman and appellant on the one hand or between Bowman and Evins on the other hand, we have concluded under the entire record before us that Evins occupied the status of a Texas employee at the time when he sustained his fatal injuries and as such he had been only incidentally or temporarily sent out of Texas and into the state of West Virginia there to perform labor, within the purview and meaning of the Texas Workmen's Compensation Law. Schneider's Workmen's Compensation Text, Third Edition, Vol. I, Chap. 5; Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Volek, Tex. Civ. App. 44 S.W.2d 795; Id., Tex.Com.App., 69 S.W.2d 33, certiorari denied 293 U.S. 598, 55 S.Ct. 116, 79 L.Ed. 691; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cason, Tex. Civ. App. 122 S.W.2d 694, error refused 132 Tex. 393, 124 S.W.2d 321; Fidelity Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. McLaughlin, Tex. Civ. App. 106 S.W.2d 815, affirmed 134 Tex. 613, 135 S.W.2d 955; Gulf Casualty Co. v. Fields, Tex. Civ. App. 107 S.W.2d 661, pt. 5, error dismissed; Aetna Casualty Surety Co. v. Dixon, Tex. Civ. App. 145 S.W.2d 620, error refused; Texas Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Henson, Tex. Civ. App. 172 S.W.2d 113, pt. 1, error refused. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.