Opinion
CASE NO. 8:19-cv-2911-T-24AAS
10-28-2020
The TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Jennifer GARCIA, as Personal Representative of the Estate of David R. Garcia, Defendant.
Jamie Combee Novaes, Matthew J. Lavisky, Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff. Lee Delton Gunn, IV, Scott A. Arthur, Gunn Law Group, PA, Tampa, FL, for Defendant.
Jamie Combee Novaes, Matthew J. Lavisky, Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff.
Lee Delton Gunn, IV, Scott A. Arthur, Gunn Law Group, PA, Tampa, FL, for Defendant.
ORDER
SUSAN C. BUCKLEW, United States District Judge
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Plaintiff The Travelers Indemnity Company's Motion for Final Summary Judgment with supporting exhibits (Doc. 23) and Defendant Jennifer Garcia's, as Personal Representative of the Estate of David R. Garcia, cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with supporting exhibits (Doc. 24). The parties filed responses to each other's respective motions. (Docs. 29, 30). The Court, having carefully considered the parties’ submissions, finds that Plaintiff's motion is due to be granted and Defendant's motion is due to be denied for the reasons that follow.
I. STATEMENT OF CASE AND BACKGROUND
Plaintiff The Travelers Indemnity Company ("Travelers") brought this action for declaratory judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, to resolve an insurance dispute with Defendant Jennifer Garcia ("the Estate"), as the personal representative of the estate of David R. Garcia ("Mr. Garcia"). Mr. Garcia was killed in an automobile collision on August 5, 2019. At the time, he was operating a 2019 Nissan NV 200 vehicle ("the vehicle" or "Mr. Garcia's vehicle") owned by Weintraub Inspections & Forensics, Inc. ("Weintraub"), on I-75 south in Hillsborough County, Florida. The vehicle was insured by Travelers under automobile policy BA-7344M580-18-GRP ("the Policy" or "the Travelers Policy").
The material facts of this case are not in dispute. The collision involving Mr. Garcia occurred at 2:30 p.m., near mile marker 261 on I-75 south, when he slowed his vehicle down and began to come to a stop due to a traffic backup. (See Doc. 23, Ex. A, Traffic Crash Report). The driver of a dump truck owned by S & S Site Prep, LLC that was traveling behind Mr. Garcia in the same lane failed to slow down in time and collided with Mr. Garcia's vehicle. (See id. ) The dump truck then overturned and landed on top of Mr. Garcia's vehicle, and Mr. Garcia died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the impact. (See id. ) The traffic backup that caused Mr. Garcia to slow down was the result of a collision that occurred five minutes earlier near mile marker 263 on I-75 south. (See Doc. 23, Ex. B, Traffic Crash Report). Neither Mr. Garcia nor his vehicle were "struck, contacted with, or physically impacted by" any vehicle involved in the collision that occurred near mile marker 263. (Doc. 23-4, Estate's Answer to Interrogatory #3; Doc. 23-5, Estate's Answer to Request for Admission #1).
The parties have agreed that the two traffic reports maybe used as summary judgment evidence of the facts stated therein. The parties have also agreed that two dash cam videos (front and rear) taken of the accident from Mr. Garcia's vehicle may be considered on summary judgment.
The dump truck that collided with Mr. Garcia's vehicle was covered under an automobile insurance policy that did not afford sufficient liability coverage for the death of Mr. Garcia. The vehicles involved in the earlier collision were also underinsured. Therefore, the Estate submitted a claim for Mr. Garcia's death under the Travelers’ Policy, which contained uninsured motorist ("UM") coverage up to $1,000,000 for each "accident." (Doc. 1-1, p. 19).
In relevant part, the Policy provided as follows:
For purposes of UM coverage, it defined a covered "auto" as one owned by Weintraub (id. at 8, 21), and it provided that an "insured" included anyone occupying a covered "auto." (Id. at 41.)
Travelers acknowledges that Mr. Garcia was a class II insured for purposes of UM coverage because he was operating a covered auto. "Class II insureds do not pay for UM coverage under the named insureds’ policy. Rather, Class II insureds are essentially third party beneficiaries to the named insureds’ policy." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Warren , 678 So. 2d 324, 326 (Fla. 1996).
The Policy provided for UM coverage as follows:
A. Coverage
1. We will pay all sums the "insured" is legally entitled to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an "uninsured motor vehicle." The damages must result from "bodily injury" sustained by the "insured" caused by an "accident." The owner's or driver's liability for these damages must result from the ownership, maintenance or use of the "uninsured motor vehicle."
( Id. ). The Policy provided "Limits of Insurance" for each "Coverage." It specified that the amount listed is "the most we will pay for any one accident or loss." (Id. at 8). The Policy also provided:
D. Limit of Insurance
1. Regardless of the number of covered "autos", "insureds", premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the "accident", the most we will pay for all damages resulting from any one "accident" is the limit of Uninsured Motorists Coverage shown in the Schedule or Declarations.
(Id. at 42).
Travelers paid the Estate $1,000,000 in UM benefits based upon a single "accident" having caused Mr. Garcia's death—the dump truck's collision with Mr. Garcia's vehicle. The Estate, however, contends that it is entitled to twice that amount of benefits because there were actually two "accidents" covered by the Policy. More specifically, the Estate takes the position that the collision that caused traffic to slow before the dump truck's collision with Mr. Garcia's vehicle was a separate "accident" and, thus, the Estate has demanded that Travelers pay it an additional $1,000,0000 (for a total of $2,000,000) in UM benefits for the death of Mr. Garcia. Travelers denied the claim for additional UM benefits under the Policy and brought this one-count lawsuit against the Estate, seeking a declaratory judgment that there was only one "accident" that caused the death of Mr. Garcia and, thus, it has paid to the Estate the entirety of its obligation for UM benefits for a single "accident."
Both parties seek the entry of summary judgment in their favor, essentially asking the Court to decide whether Mr. Garcia's death was caused by one "accident," subject to a limit of $1,000,000, or by two "accidents," for which Travelers would be liable for $1,000,000 per accident.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.56(a). The Court must draw all inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and resolve all reasonable doubts in that party's favor. See Porter v. Ray , 461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the Court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial. See id. (citation omitted). When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. (citation omitted). If the non-movant's response consists of nothing "more than a repetition of his conclusory allegations," summary judgment is not only proper, but required. Morris v. Ross , 663 F.2d 1032, 1034 (11th Cir. 1981).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Plain Meaning of the Policy
The issue before the Court is whether the death of Mr. Garcia was caused by one or two "accidents" for purposes of UM coverage under the Policy. To resolve this issue, the Court must first turn to the language in the Policy. Under Florida law, insurance contracts must be construed according to their plain meaning. Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528, 532 (Fla. 2005). And, "like other contracts, contracts of insurance should receive a construction that is reasonable, practical, sensible, and just." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mashburn , 15 So. 3d 701, 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). "[I]n construing insurance policies, courts should read each policy as a whole, endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and operative effect." Id. "In other words, a single policy provision should not be read in isolation and out of context, for the contract is to be construed according to its entire terms, as set forth in the policy and amplified by the policy application, endorsements, or riders." Id. "The terms of an insurance policy should be taken and understood in their ordinary sense and the policy should receive a reasonable, practical and sensible interpretation consistent with the intent of the parties—not a strained, forced or unrealistic construction." Ducksbury v. Progressive Express Ins. Co. , 211 So. 3d 73, 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017). "If one interpretation, viewed with the other provisions of the contract and its general object and scope, would lead to an absurd conclusion, that interpretation must be abandoned and one more consistent with reason and probability adopted." Travelers Indem. Co. v. Milgen Dev., Inc. , 297 So. 2d 845, 847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) ; accord AAA Life Ins. Co. v. Nicolas , 603 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). However, if the policy language is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations—one providing coverage, the other limiting coverage—the policy is ambiguous. Flores v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 819 So. 2d 740, 744 (Fla. 2002). Ambiguous policy provisions are construed in favor of coverage and against the insurer. Id.
"When a term in an insurance policy is undefined, it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and courts may look to legal and non-legal dictionary definitions to determine such a meaning." Botee v. S. Fid. Ins. Co. , 162 So. 3d 183, 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). "A provision is not ambiguous simply because it is complex or requires analysis." Garcia v. Fed. Ins. Co. , 969 So. 2d 288, 291 (Fla. 2007). "[C]ourts construe undefined policy terms according to the meaning a person of ordinary intelligence would reasonably give it." Owners Ins. Co. v. Berke , 6:17-cv11505-Orl-37TBS, 2018 WL 3850005, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2018).
An examination of the Policy at issue in this case reveals that it limited the amount that Travelers would pay under the UM coverage in four ways. First, it included a UM coverage limit of $1,000,000 for each "accident." (Doc. 1-1, p. 19). Second, the Policy specified that its "limits of insurance," across every coverage, was "[t]he most we will pay for any one accident or loss." (Id. at 8). Third, the UM coverage provision states that:
We will pay all sums the "insured" is legally entitled to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an "uninsured motor vehicle." The damages must result from "bodily injury" sustained by the "insured" caused by an "accident." The owner's or driver's liability for these damages must result from the ownership, maintenance or use of the "uninsured motor vehicle."
(Id. at 41.) Therefore, damages must have been "caused by an accident."
Fourth, the Policy provided that for UM coverage:
Regardless of the number of covered "autos", "insureds", premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the "accident", the most we will pay for all damages resulting from any one "accident" is the limit of Uninsured Motorists Coverage shown in the Schedule or Declarations.
(Id. at 42.)
The Policy did not, however, define the key term "accident." Nevertheless, this omission does not render the Policy language ambiguous inasmuch as the Court is able to look to legal and non-legal dictionary definitions for the term. As Travelers asserts, Couch on Insurance provides a comprehensive review of the definition of "accident," including in insurance policies, developed by looking to legal and non-legal dictionary definitions. Generally ; Dictionary definitions , 10 Couch on Ins. § 139:13. Couch on Insurance notes that Black's Law Dictionary defines "accident" as "[a]n unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence" and "[a]n unforeseen and injurious occurrence not attributable to the victim's mistake, negligence, neglect, or misconduct; an unanticipated and untoward event that causes harm." Id. (emphasis added). Here, the Policy provides $1,000,000 in UM coverage for injuries resulting from an "accident" and this is true regardless of other vehicles or insureds involved in the "accident." (Doc. 1-1, p. 42). An "accident," in this context, is therefore defined as the event causing injury or harm.
The Policy also specifies that the applicable coverage limit is the most Travelers will pay "for any one accident or loss." (Doc. 1-1 at 8.) In the context of insurance, a "loss" is "[t]he amount of financial detriment caused by an insured person's death or an insured property's damage, for which the insurer becomes liable." LOSS, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); accord Century Indem. Co. v. Marine Group, LLC , 131 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1057 n.19 (D. Or. 2015) ; Postell v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. , 823 N.W.2d 35, 44 (Iowa 2012) ; Estate of Townsend v. Protective Life Ins. Co. , 1:10 CV 2365, 2011 WL 2784599, at *3 (N.D. Ohio July 15, 2011).
Turning to the facts of this case, two vehicle collisions occurred on August 5, 2019. The first occurred at 2:25 p.m. on I-75 south, near mile marker 263, causing a traffic backup ("the first collision"). The second occurred at 2:30 p.m. on I-75 south, near mile marker 261, when Mr. Garcia slowed his vehicle down, began to come to a stop due to the traffic backup, and the driver of the dump truck traveling behind Mr. Garcia in the same lane failed to slow down in time and collided with Mr. Garcia's vehicle. Neither Mr. Garcia nor his vehicle were struck by any vehicle involved in the first collision. The parties agree that the second collision constitutes an "accident" for purposes of UM coverage under the Policy. The parties disagree as to whether the first collision also constitutes an "accident."
Under the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that there was a single "accident" (and a single "loss") for purposes of the Policy's UM coverage provisions. To determine the number of "accidents," the Court must look at the events from the perspective of Mr. Garcia. See Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co. , 849 So.2d 263, 271 (Fla. 2003) ; see also, IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pickens , C15-5125 BHS, 2015 WL 6160228, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 20, 2015). Here, the injury and harm to Mr. Garcia only occurred when the dump truck struck Mr. Garcia's vehicle. At that moment, there was an "accident" and "loss" under the Policy, but not before. The Court agrees with Travelers that this singular event did not become two based on a collision involving other vehicles two miles away. Despite the Estate's assertion, the non-injurious and non-harmful first collision—from Mr. Garcia's perspective—did not become a separate "accident" and "loss" under the Policy based on a causal connection between that event, the resulting traffic backup, and the second collision that resulted in Mr. Garcia's death.
This Court must give the Policy a "reasonable, practical and sensible interpretation" and avoid "a strained, forced or unrealistic construction." Ducksbury , 211 So. 3d at 75. As Travelers asserts, the inquiry is not what a creative lawyer can make an insurance policy mean. See Hrynkiw v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co. , 844 So. 2d 739, 742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). The Court agrees with Travelers’ reasoning that an ordinary person applying everyday meaning to the Policy would not conclude that Mr. Garcia was killed in an event involving vehicles that did not strike him or his vehicle that occurred five minutes prior to his death and two miles away. Nor would an ordinary person conclude that Mr. Garcia was involved in two "accidents." Such interpretations of the Policy, albeit creative, lead to an absurd conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that under the plain meaning of the Policy, Mr. Garcia's death was caused by a single "accident" for purposes of UM coverage.
The Estate also argues that Florida public policy favors UM coverage, but it does not argue that the Policy violates any statutory provision. In the absence of a statutory prohibition, a "public policy" argument cannot be used to rewrite an insurance policy. Cf Sterling v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. , 936 So. 2d 43, 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
B. The Cause Theory
The Estate argues that the Court should apply the "cause theory" under Florida law to find that Mr. Garcia's death was caused by two "accidents" for purposes of UM coverage under the Policy. The Florida Supreme Court has adopted the "cause theory" to determine the number of "occurrences" (as opposed to "accidents") under a liability "occurrence" insurance policy. Koikos v. Travelers Ins. Co. , 849 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2003). "[T]he cause theory answers a question that presupposes there are several discrete events." Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Munroe , 614 F.3d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 2010). The focus of the "cause theory," as applied in Florida, is "the independent immediate acts that gave rise to the injuries." Koikos , 849 So. 2d at 273. As interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court, " ‘occurrence’ is defined by the immediate injury-producing act and not by the underlying tortious omission." Id. at 271.
Here, the immediate injury-producing act was the impact by the dump truck with Mr. Garcia's vehicle and, thus, the Court agrees with Travelers that this was the "accident." The Estate's attempt to create a second "accident" based on an alleged negligent act that occurred five minutes prior and two miles away incorrectly focuses on "the [alleged] underlying tortious omission." Id.
A review of the central cases on which the Estate relies for its argument that the first collision was a legal cause of Mr. Garcia's death reveals that that three of those cases do not involve an insurance coverage issue at all: Cho v. Mackey , 567 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) ; Truck & Trailer Sales Corp. v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. , 500 So. 2d 177, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) ; Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. , 386 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1980). (See Doc. 24, pp. 6–9). And, while the fourth case, Cooke v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. , 14 So. 3d 1192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009), involved a UM insurer as a defendant, the case had nothing to do with the number of accidents under the insurance policy. Rather, it addressed whether the negligence of the insured was an intervening and superseding cause such that certain tortfeasors (including the driver of a phantom vehicle, for which the UM carrier stood in the shoes), were entitled to summary judgment on the issue of causation.
The Court finds Citizens Property. Insurance Corp. v. Cook , 93 So. 3d 479 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) to be instructive. In Cook , a group of minors attended a party at a home that was insured by Citizens insurance. The homeowners served alcoholic beverages to minors. Three minors became intoxicated, drove from the party, and were involved in a car crash. Two of the minors died and the third was injured. The Citizens insurance policy provided liability coverage in the amount of $100,000 per occurrence. The estates of the minors filed a declaratory judgment action requesting a decree that the per occurrence limit "applied to each drink consumed by each of the deceased minors in addition to a separate occurrence for the negligence of the homeowners for ‘allowing the minors to become intoxicated, and then to leave the [homeowners’] residence operating a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated state.’ " Id. at 480. The trial court ruled in favor of the estates. Citizens appealed.
On appeal, "Citizens argue[d] that there was only one occurrence for coverage purposes—the car crash." Id. at 481. The appellate court agreed with Citizens and reversed, holding that:
[T]he "immediate cause" of [the two minors’] deaths was the car crash, not the [the homeowners’] "underlying activity" of allowing alcohol to be consumed by the minors at the party, although that was, no doubt, a factor.
The trial court's ruling misinterprets Koikos and McQuaig by concluding that each drink provided to each deceased minor constituted a separate occurrence under the Citizens homeowners’ insurance policy. Instead, we conclude that
there was only one occurrence causing the tragic deaths, i.e. , the car crash.
Id. at 482 (emphasis added).
In light of the Koikos and Cook decisions, the Court finds that the Estate's analysis in arguing that two "accidents" caused Mr. Garcia's death for purposes of UM coverage under the Policy is flawed because it focuses on each "underlying activity" or alleged tortious act, i.e. the alleged acts of the drivers of the vehicles involved in the collision at mile marker 263, to argue that there were two "accidents." The Estate contends that the collision at mile marker 263 may be causally connected to the collision involving Mr. Garcia, but the court, in Cook , made clear that each event that could be causally connected to the event causing an injury is not a separate "accident" or "occurrence." The court, in Cook , held that the immediate cause of the deaths was the car crash, not the underlying activity of allowing alcohol to be consumed by minors, "although that was, no doubt, a factor." Id.
Courts in other jurisdictions have also rejected arguments like the one the Estate raises here. For example, in Pickens , the Western District of Washington court was, like this Court, presented with an argument that conflated causation with insurance coverage. 2015 WL 6160228, at *4. The issue before the court was whether the insured was entitled to recover one per accident UM limit or two per accident UM limits. Id. The insured was injured when two vehicles collided. Id. at *1-2. After the collision, one of the vehicles traveled onto a sidewalk where the insured was walking and struck him. Id. The insured argued that he was injured as a result of two accidents because the negligence of the two drivers caused two collisions that resulted in injuries. Id. at *5. The court, however, held that case law "does not establish that two per accident [UM] limits apply when an insured is involved in one collision that has two proximate causes." Id. at 6. The court determined that the proper analysis looks at the events "from the perspective of the insured." Id. at 5. The court concluded that, like here, the insured had been involved only in one of two collisions. Id. at *6. The court did not rest its decision on a proximate causation analysis, finding instead that this analysis would be more appropriate where the "insured was personally involved in more than one collision." Id. at *5. See also, Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Munroe , 614 F.3d 322, 326 (7th Cir. 2010) ; Sentry Ins. Co. v. Romano , C-3-88-407, 1990 WL 1016525, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 1990) ; United States Auto. Ass'n. v. Baggett , 209 Cal. App. 3d 1387, 1396, 258 Cal.Rptr. 52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) ; Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Simmons , 642 F. Supp. 305, 308 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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The court, in Cook , emphasized that the focus of the court in applying the cause theory should be on "immediacy." In fact, the court used the word "immediate" seven times in two paragraphs. See id. In doing so, the court made it abundantly clear that the "occurrence" was the "immediate cause of injuries" and the "the immediate injury-producing act." Id. Here, the act or event that the Estate labels as the "first accident" was not the "immediate cause of injuries" or the "the immediate injury-producing act." Travelers asserts that Mr. Garcia would have suffered no harm, except, perhaps, a slight delay in his commute, if the driver of the dump truck had not negligently crashed into Mr. Garcia's vehicle. The Court agrees with Travelers. And, for the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Mr. Garcia's death was caused by a single "accident" for purposes of UM coverage under an application of the cause theory.
ACCORDINGLY , it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED :
1. Plaintiff The Travelers Indemnity Company's Motion for Final Summary Judgment (Doc. 23) is GRANTED .
2. Defendant Jennifer Garcia's, as Personal Representative of the Estate of David R. Garcia, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 24) is DENIED . 3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff The Travelers Indemnity Company and to close this case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, this 28th day of October, 2020.