Trautman v. State

19 Citing cases

  1. Trautman v. State of New York

    79 N.Y.2d 758 (N.Y. 1992)

    Decided April 30, 1992 Appeal from (2d Dept: 179 A.D.2d 635) MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL GRANTED OR DENIED

  2. Guan v. State

    55 A.D.3d 782 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)   Cited 25 times
    In Guan v State (55 AD3d 782, 784 [2nd Dept 2008]), cited by both plaintiff and the City, the Appellate Division, Second Department, stated, citing, inter alia, Preston, "Compliance with design standards adopted after the construction of a highway is not required unless the municipality undertakes significant repair or reconstruction that would provide an opportunity for compliance with the new standards" (emphasis added)(citations omitted).

    The replacement of the median, the repaving of the road surface, and the improvements made to the drainage system did not materially alter the roadway itself and did not constitute significant repair or reconstruction such that compliance with modern highway design standards was required ( see Vizzini v State of New York, 278 AD2d 562; Benjamin v State of New York, 203 AD2d 629, 630; cf. Guzov v State of New York, 48 AD3d at 752). Additionally, the State was not on constructive notice of a dangerous condition as the evidence produced at trial indicated that the daily traffic volume at the site of the accident was roughly 65,000 to 70,000 vehicles per day, and there were only 11 collisions with trees within the vicinity of the accident site from the years 1991 to 2000 ( see Racalbuto v Redmond, 46 AD3d 1051, 1052; Trautman v State of New York, 179 AD2d 635, 636; Rittenhouse v State of New York, 134 AD2d 774, 776; Van Be Bogart v State of New York, 133 AD2d 974). The claimant's remaining contentions either are without merit or have been rendered academic.

  3. Palloni v. Town of Attica

    278 A.D.2d 788 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 10 times

    Plaintiffs failed to sustain their burden of raising a triable question of fact on the issue whether the road and bridge were reasonably safe for their lawful, intended and foreseeable use ( see, Shevalier v. Bentley, supra, at 623-624). In any event, it is well established that municipalities may not be held liable for their discretionary judgments in the area of highway planning, design or safety absent proof that the plan evolved without adequate study or lacked a reasonable basis ( see, Friedman v. State of New York, 67 N.Y.2d 271, 283-284; Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 585-586, rearg denied 8 N.Y.2d 934). The allocation of finite budgetary resources according to fiscal realities provides a rational basis for a municipality's discretionary judgment with respect to highway safety ( see, Edouard v. Bonner , 224 A.D.2d 575, 577, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 811; Trautman v. State of New York, 179 A.D.2d 635, 636, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 758; Van De Bogart v. State of New York, 133 A.D.2d 974; Puliatti v. State of New York, 91 A.D.2d 1192, lv denied 59 N.Y.2d 603). Here, the municipalities sustained their burden of demonstrating that they undertook an adequate study and reached a reasoned determination ( see, Affleck v. Buckley, 276 A.D.2d 507 [decided Oct. 10, 2000]; Cangemi v. Pickard, 270 A.D.2d 802, 803, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 767 [decided Nov. 21, 2000]; Schuster v McDonald, 263 A.D.2d 473, 474).

  4. Merino v.New York City Transit Authority

    218 A.D.2d 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)   Cited 86 times

    Plaintiff's reliance on the Guide, however, was flawed. The law is settled that a party is under no legal duty to upgrade a structure, which was originally built in compliance with the law, by reason of subsequent changes in specifications ( Holscher v. State of New York, 59 A.D.2d 224, 227, affd 46 N.Y.2d 792; see also, Schwartz v. New York State Thruway Auth., 61 N.Y.2d 955; Benjamin v. State of New York, 203 A.D.2d 629; Mason v. State of New York, 180 A.D.2d 63; Trautman v. State of New York, 179 A.D.2d 635, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 758; Rittenhouse v. State of New York, 134 A.D.2d 774; Van De Bogart v. State of New York, 133 A.D.2d 974). In Benjamin v. State of New York ( supra, at 629-630), plaintiff was injured when his car veered off a State road and struck a railroad rail marker that had been in place since the 1940's.

  5. Edouard v. Bonner

    224 A.D.2d 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)   Cited 3 times

    In light of the determination of how limited funds should be allocated to safety improvement projects, the City produced sufficient evidence to establish that it made a legitimate ordering of priorities based on available funding. The Supreme Court, therefore, erred by not granting judgment as a matter of law to the City ( see, Friedman v. State of New York, supra, at 287; Trautman v. State of New York, 179 A.D.2d 635). We find that the damages for past and future pain and suffering awarded to the plaintiff Jocelyn Dimanche were excessive to the degree indicated in that they materially deviate from what would be reasonable compensation under the facts and circumstances of this case ( see, CPLR 5501 [c]).

  6. Sangirardi v. State of New York

    205 A.D.2d 603 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)   Cited 9 times

    Furthermore, the Court of Claims correctly concluded that the State could not be held liable for its failure to remove or lower the median curb, even if such reconstruction could have prevented the accident. The Court of Claims properly took judicial notice of Trautman v. State of New York ( 179 A.D.2d 635), a case previously litigated before it, as evidence to support its conclusion that while the State had a duty to redesign and reconstruct the Parkway in the vicinity of the accident site by removing or lowering the median curb, the delay in doing so was not unreasonable in light of the scope of the reconstruction project, the availability of funding and other priorities (see, Friedman v. State of New York, 67 N.Y.2d 271; see also, Sam Mary Hous. Corp. v. Jo/Sal Mkt. Corp., 100 A.D.2d 901). Trautman which was decided by the same Judge in December of 1989, resolved a liability issue similar to that presented herein, primarily on the basis that the State was experiencing severe fiscal crises in the early 1970's, which prevented it from implementing numerous highway construction projects. Since the claimants in the present actions repeatedly cited to Trautman v State of New York (supra) in their post-trial brief, they cannot, now, claim surprise and prejudice as a result of the Judge

  7. Hough v. State

    203 A.D.2d 736 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)   Cited 23 times

    Claimant failed to prove that the State either had, or should have been, put on notice that accidents of the same nature had previously occurred at this intersection. We find that the study of the feasibility of building a left turn lane was thorough, reasonable and appropriate, and that the impact of fiscal considerations on the decision not to build were properly a part of the ultimate decision (see, Trautman v State of New York, 179 A.D.2d 635, 636, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 758). Nor do we find persuasive claimant's contention that an unjustified delay in the formation of a remedial plan for the intersection cast the State in liability.

  8. Cruz v. City of New York

    201 A.D.2d 606 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)   Cited 10 times

    Once a governmental entity becomes aware of a dangerous condition, undertakes a reasonable study thereof with an eye toward alleviating the danger, and formulates a remedial plan, "an unjustifiable delay in implementing the plan constitutes a breach * * * just as surely as if it had totally failed to study the known condition in the first instance" (Friedman v. State of New York, supra, at 286). The deferment of remedial action may, however, be justified by proof that "the delay stemmed from a legitimate ordering of priorities with other projects based on the availability of funding" (Friedman v. State of New York, supra, at 287; see, Trautman v. State of New York, 179 A.D.2d 635; Longo v. Tafaro, 137 A.D.2d 661; Puliatti v. State of New York, 91 A.D.2d 1192). In this case, the City acknowledged that it had notice of the defect claimed, i.e., that a number of the asphalt tiles forming the uppermost layer of the walkway were broken and missing, by way of a comprehensive study of City-maintained bridges that it had commissioned.

  9. Harford v. City of New York

    194 A.D.2d 519 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)   Cited 8 times

    It is well established that the decision as to whether to install a traffic control device is a discretionary governmental function which will not expose a municipality to liability (see, Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 586; Alexander v. Eldred, 63 N.Y.2d 460, 465-466). In Weiss, the Court of Appeals stated that "something more than a mere choice between conflicting opinions of experts is required before the State or one of its subdivisions may be charged with failure to discharge its duty to plan highways for the safety of the traveling public" (Weiss v Fote, supra, at 588; see also, Trautman v. State of New York, 179 A.D.2d 635, 636; Rittenhouse v. State of New York, 134 A.D.2d 774, 775). Once the municipality has determined that a traffic-control device is necessary to remedy a dangerous condition, it must act with some reasonable speed to correct the condition (see, Friedman v. State of New York, 67 N.Y.2d 271, 288).

  10. Madore v. State

    # 2018-015-165 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Sep. 28, 2018)

    Inasmuch as the State had specifically addressed the design defect, and placed the project on a list of capital projects, the Court found "the timing of the replacement was due to legitimate funding priorities and, thus, the delay in ultimately replacing the culvert was not unreasonable" (id.). Other cases in which the State or a municipality was found immune from suit due to legitimate funding priorities all involved traffic design cases, not highway maintenance (see Palloni v Attica, 278 AD2d 788 [4th Dept 2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 709 [2001] [defendant demonstrated that seasonal road was reasonably safe but defendant in any event was immune from suit for its determination not to install guard rails due to funding priorities]; Trautman v State of New York, 179 AD2d 635 [2d Dept 1992], lv denied 79 NY2d 758 [1992] [failure to install median barrier stemmed from a legitimate ordering of priorities with other projects]). Here, by contrast, the claim is limited to the contention that the defendant failed to maintain the roadway in a reasonably safe condition and "[t]he doctrine of qualified immunity is not applicable to those causes of action" (Selca v City of Peekskill, 78 AD3d 1160, 1161 [2d Dept 2010]).