Opinion
Case No. 02-4016-CV-C-5
June 12, 2002
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count III [Doc. #6]. For the reasons stated below, the motion will be granted.
I. Motion to Dismiss Standard
It is well established that in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court assumes that the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are true. Breedlove v. Earth grains Baking Cos., Inc., 140 F.3d 797, 798 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 921 (1998). In considering a motion to dismiss on the pleadings for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the "complaint must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Coleman v. Watt, 40 F.3d 255, 258 (8th Cir. 1994). A motion to dismiss should not be granted "unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief." Id. (citing Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986)).
II. Factual Background
The following allegations are set forth in the Complaint and are accepted as true only for the purpose of ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff Samuel Trapp ("Trapp") was employed by Defendant from August 12, 2000 to March 23, 2001, as a Human Resources Manager for Defendant's plants in Jefferson City and Owensville, Missouri. When Plaintiff became concerned about disparate pay at the Owensville plant, he notified several of Defendant's employees by e-mail, including one of his supervisors, Vice President of Human Resources Craig Nelson ("Nelson"). Nelson contacted Trapp in response to the concerns raised about disparate pay and instructed him to "delete that file" and get the information off of the company's computer system because "we can't know about that." Trapp followed Nelson's instructions and deleted the e-mail memorandum on his own computer. He also informed two other employees of Nelson's instructions to delete the file.
On or about March 23, 2001, Trapp was contacted by Ron Garrison, Vice President of Manufacturing, and informed that he was fired because he had made some "errors in judgment." Garrison told Trapp that he took too long to discipline two female employees. However, Trapp had been instructed by Nelson not to discipline the two female employees in question.
Trapp flied this action against the Defendant on February 1, 2002. In his Complaint, Trapp alleges claims for unlawful discrimination by retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Count I), unlawful discrimination by retaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act, Chapter 213 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (Count II), and wrongful termination pursuant to the common law of the State of Missouri (Count III). Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and compensatory and punitive damages against the Defendant, in addition to attorneys' fees and costs and a letter of apology.
III. Discussion
The Defendant argues that the Count III common law wrongful termination claim should be dismissed because it is wholly duplicative of the Chapter 213 statutory claim in Count II. The Defendant asserts that the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine does not establish a cause of action for a plaintiff employee where a statutory remedy exists to protect the employee. Trapp responds that he need not prove that there is no other remedy available to protect his interests before he seeks to recover on a common law wrongful discharge theory. In addition, he argues that the action for retaliation pursuant to Chapter 213 and the common law wrongful discharge action provide different remedies because an action pursuant to Chapter 213 is heard by a judge rather than a jury.
In Count II, Trapp claims that he was retaliated against by his employer for his alleged protected activity and that such retaliation violated Chapter 213. See §§ 213.055; 213.070. In Count III, Trapp alleges that because Chapter 213 articulates the public policy of the State of Missouri and his employer's actions violated Chapter 213, his termination is wrongful pursuant to the common law of the State of Missouri. Count III must be dismissed because Chapter 213 offers a statutory remedy that "fully comprehends and envelopes [sic] the remedies provided by common law." Prewitt v. Factory Motor Parts, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 560, 565 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (citing Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 S.W.2d 265, 271-72 (Mo. banc 1984)).
Although employers can discharge an at-will employee for cause or without cause, the narrow public policy exception to Missouri's employment-at-will doctrine provides that "when an employer has a statutory, regulatory, or constitutional duty to refrain from discharging an employee for a specified reason and the employer breaches that duty, the at-will employee may have a cause of action for wrongful discharge." Osborn v. Professional Service Industries, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 679, 680-81 (W.D. Mo. 1994). The rationale underlying the public policy exception is the vindication or protection of certain strong policies of the community, and if these policies are preserved by other remedies, then the public policy is sufficiently served. Prewitt, 747 F. Supp. at 565. "Therefore, application of the public policy exception requires two factors: (1) that the discharge violate some well-established public policy; and (2) that there be no remedy to protect the interests of the aggrieved employee or society." Id. at 565-66. In Prewitt, where the plaintiff relied on the public policy underlying her statutory Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") claim as the basis for her state law wrongful discharge claim, the Court held that the public policy that would be furthered by the wrongful discharge claim was fully vindicated by the plaintiff's statutory claim. Prewitt, 747 F. Supp. at 566. The FLSA provided a complete range of remedies to protect the plaintiff's interests, and under those circumstances, the court concluded that the complete statutory remedy replaced the common law remedy. Id. at 565.
Similarly, in Osborn v. Professional Service Industries Inc., 872 F. Supp. 679, 680 (W.D. Mo. 1994), the Court dismissed plaintiff's state law wrongful discharge claim "[b]ecause the public policy exception cannot form the basis for a claim for wrongful discharge unless there is no remedy to protect the interests of the aggrieved employee or society, and . . . the Age Discrimination in Employment Act provides a remedy for the alleged wrongful termination." The Court explained that, "[i]n order to survive a motion to dismiss, a claim of wrongful termination based on the public policy exception must be based on a policy which has no remedy in any statute, regulation, or constitutional provision." Osborn, 872 F. Supp. at 681. A plaintiff must show that no remedy for his or her wrongful termination exists anywhere, and in this case, as in Osborn and Prewitt, a statute provides a complete remedy to fully protect Trapp's interests. Id. at 681.
Trapp argues that no Missouri state court has ever held that in order to prevail on a wrongful termination claim pursuant to state common law, the employee must show that there is no other remedy available. However, some Missouri cases suggest support for the Prewitt decision. See, e.g., Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 S.W.2d 265, 271-72 (Mo. banc 1984) (abrogated on other grounds); Dierkes v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Missouri, 991 S.W.2d 662, 668 (Mo. banc 1999); McGhee v. Dixon, 973 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Mo. banc 1998); Shawcross v. Pyro Products, Inc., 916 S.W.2d 342, 345 (Mo.Ct.App. 1995). Further, Plaintiff has given no analytical explanation for why the finding in Prewitt is wrong.
In a related argument, Trapp contends that the action for retaliation pursuant to Chapter 213 in Count II, and the wrongful discharge action pursuant to common law in Count III, provide him with different remedies and are thus both viable causes of action. An action pursuant to Chapter 213 is not triable to a jury in Missouri state court, but an action for wrongful discharge pursuant to the common law allows for a jury's determination. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.111; see generally Brenneke v. Department of Missouri, Veterans of Foreign Wars, 984 S.W.2d 134 (Mo.Ct.App. 1998). Plaintiff argues that because the statutory remedy does not allow for a jury trial, it does not fully comprehend and envelop the common law remedy. However, the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial of Chapter 213 claims in federal court as long as the plaintiff is seeking damages. Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co., 83 F.3d 225, 230-31 (8th Cir. 1996). Moreover, Missouri courts focus on the relief available under the statute, not the fact finder awarding that relief, to determine whether the statutory remedy envelops the common law remedy. See 66, Inc. v. Crestwood Commons Redevelopment Corp., 998 S.W.2d 32, 40 (Mo. banc 1999); Dierkes, 991 S.W.2d at 668; Detling, 671 S.W.2d at 272. Here, the remedy provided for in Chapter 213 fully envelops the remedy available under the common law by allowing the court to grant as relief "any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order, . . . actual and punitive damages, and . . . court costs and reasonable attorney fees." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.111(2). This statutory remedy encompasses all of the relief requested by Trapp in Count III, including compensatory and punitive damages, court costs and attorneys' fees, and a letter of apology. Because Trapp has a complete statutory remedy for his wrongful termination claim under Chapter 213, he cannot state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the common law public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count III [Doc. #6] is GRANTED.