Thus, although section 380.07(2) provides for an "appeal" of a development order in any area of critical state concern or for any development of regional impact, this term must be interpreted in its "broadest, non-technical sense . . . to mean merely an application to a higher authority." Transgulf Pipeline Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 438 So.2d 876, 878 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (interpreting word "appeals" in section 380.07(3)), review denied, 449 So.2d 264 (Fla. 1984). We agree with the reasoning of the First District Court of Appeal in Transgulf Pipeline that to interpret "appeal" as used in this statute in its most narrow technical sense would render the statute illogical, as chapter 120 makes no provision for an "appeal" in the technical sense and section 380.07(3) specifically requires the Commission to hold a hearing pursuant to the provisions of chapter 120 prior to issuing any order.
The court recognized instances in which statutes provide for “appeals” of administrative decisions but observed that the term “appeal” would be interpreted in its “broadest, non-technical sense ... to mean merely an application to a higher authority.” Transgulf Pipeline Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Gadsden County, 438 So.2d 876, 878 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The City contends that “appeals” in which new evidence is presented are a “regular feature of local government.”
Given the nature of these proceedings, we can only conclude that they fall squarely within the parameters of a constitutionally authorized quasi-judicial proceeding. Michael D. Jones, P.A. v. Seminole County, 670 So.2d 95 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996);Transgulf Pipeline Co./Dep't of Community Affairs v. Bd. of County Comm'rs., 438 So.2d 876, 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) ("[T]he use of a hearing officer to conduct a hearing and make recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law [does not] constitute a pure judicial function"), rev. denied, 449 So.2d 264 (Fla. 1984); but cf. La Rosa 505 So.2d at 423-24(a county ordinance empowering an administrative agency to award actual damages, including compensation for humiliation and embarrassment, to victims of race discrimination violated, inter alia, the separation of powers provision of Article II, Section 3). IV
Accordingly, it does not appear that the proceedings of the SFRPC to determine whether to appeal a local government development order are quasi-judicial proceedings subject to the holding in Jennings. Cf., Transgulf Pipeline Company/Department of Community Affairs v. Board of County Commissioners of Gadsden County, 438 So.2d 876, 880 (1 D.C.A. Fla., 1983).
As was stated in Florida Dep't of Transportation v. J.W.C. Co., Inc., 396 So.2d 778, 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), "We view it as fundamental that an applicant for a license or permit carries the `ultimate burden of persuasion' of entitlement through all proceedings, of whatever nature, until such time as final action has been taken by the agency." We have recognized this principle, at least inferentially, in Harbor Course Club v. Department of Community Affairs, 510 So.2d 915, 919 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); accord Transgulf Pipeline Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 438 So.2d 876, 878-79 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), review denied, 449 So.2d 264 (Fla. 1984). The hearing officer also had the discretion to order that the applicants would have the burden of going forward.
Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 1981); and Fox v. Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council, 442 So.2d 221, 227 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). As stated by the hearing officer, the term "appeal" as used in section 380.07(3) should be used in its broadest, non-technical sense. Transgulf Pipeline v. Board of County Commissioners, 438 So.2d 876, 878 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Section 380.07 contemplates that FLWAC will conduct a de novo evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 120.57 in reviewing DRI's.
The Respondents Harbor Course Club, Inc. and Driscoll Properties have the burden of proof in this de novo proceeding since they are seeking a permit to clear land in Monroe County, or in the alternative are seeking an exemption from such permitting requirements. Sections 380.07 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes; Transgulf Pipeline v. Board of County Commissioners of Gadsden County, 438 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) [, rev. denied, 449 So.2d 264 (Fla. 1984)]; Florida Department of Transportation v. J.W.C. Co., Inc., 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). "The property involved in this case, which is the subject of the application for a permit to develop a golf driving range, is located in that portion of Monroe County designated as an Area of Critical State Concern. Section 380.0552, Florida Statutes.
Primarily, however, they contend that the 1972 amendments to article V gave the legislature power to change by general law the circuit court's exclusive original jurisdiction over disputes involving the legality of tax assessments, and that the appropriate administrative agency has been given, by implication, concurrent jurisdiction with circuit courts to decide the legality of tax assessments as a result of the enactment of the 1974 amendments to the Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Appellees urge that the constitution has authorized this grant of quasi-judicial power to administrative officers or boards in matters connected with the functions of their offices, citing Transgulf Pipeline v. Board of County Commissioners, 438 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), pet. for rev. denied, 449 So.2d 264 (Fla. 1984); State, Department of Administration v. Stevens, 344 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), and other cases. Appellees further argue that appellants have had the merits of the legality of the assessment fully and fairly litigated in the administrative proceeding, that the administrative decision has been upheld upon review by the appellate court, and that, therefore, the application of res judicata will not defeat the ends of justice.