Tran v. Tran

6 Citing cases

  1. Annette R. v. Dakiem E.D.

    2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 175 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024)   Cited 1 times

    Given the father's conduct concerning the child's medical condition, Family Court's decision to modify custody based on a change in circumstances and the best interests of the child has a sound and substantial basis in the record (see Matter of Solangee Z. v Kahir E., 107 A.D.3d 428, 429 [1st Dept 2013]; Trinh Quoc Tran v Tau Minh Tran, 277 A.D.2d 49, 49 [1st Dept 2000], lv dismissed 96 N.Y.2d 853 [2001]). The record shows that the father, notwithstanding medical evidence to the contrary, expressed doubt that the child has asthma and testified that the child never experiences asthma symptoms while in his care, failed or refused to communicate with the mother about the child's medical condition, neglected or refused to administer the child's asthma medication, and failed to abide by court-directed COVID safety measures while the child was in his care.

  2. Cohen v. Cohen

    177 A.D.3d 848 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)   Cited 15 times

    The Supreme Court found that the mother's reason for changing the therapist on the eve of trial was "suspect," and disregarded the therapist's testimony as biased. We conclude that the mother's actions regarding the children's therapy had the effect of interfering with the father's role and warrant awarding decision-making authority to the father with respect to the children's mental health treatment (see Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 24 A.D.3d at 592, 808 N.Y.S.2d 352 ; Trinh Quoc Tran v. Tau Minh Tran, 277 A.D.2d 49, 49, 716 N.Y.S.2d 5 ). The father further challenges the Supreme Court's direction that he provide the children with exclusively kosher food and make "all reasonable efforts to ensure that the children's appearance and conduct comply with the ‘Hasidic’ religious requirements of the [mother] and of the children's schools as they were raised while the children are in [his] physical custody."

  3. Chamberlain v. Chamberlain

    24 A.D.3d 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)   Cited 82 times
    In Chamberlain v Chamberlain (24 AD3d 589), the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the trial court providently exercised its discretion in awarding defendant 30 percent of the value of the degrees and license that constituted the enhanced earning capacity achieved by plaintiff during the marriage, based upon his indirect contributions to the attainment of that enhanced earning capacity by paying all of the family's living expenses while plaintiff was a student and modifying his employment schedule in order to enable him to care for the parties' older child, who was born during that period.

    Here, the only predicate for granting decision-making authority with respect to most of the significant issues in child-rearing — the children's extracurricular activities, religious upbringing and schooling — to the defendant, the noncustodial parent, was the finding that the plaintiff had interfered with the defendant's parental role by scheduling the children's extracurricular activities during his parenting time. While this finding is supported by the record and justified removing from the plaintiff the decision-making authority that she had abused ( see Trinh Quoc Tran v. Tau Minh Tran, 277 AD2d 49, 49-50), it was not a basis for depriving the plaintiff of all decision-making authority normally incident to the role of sole custodial parent ( see Crane v. Crane, 264 AD2d 749, 750-751; Matter of Davis v. Davis, 240 AD2d 928, 930). Since the Supreme Court's concern could have been addressed by prohibiting the plaintiff from scheduling certain activities during the defendant's parenting time without his consent, the Supreme Court's grant of decision-making authority to the defendant was an improvident exercise of its discretion.

  4. Anthony E.F. v. Karen T.L.

    2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 50171 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005)

    Such decision making authority may be granted to one parent in matters affecting the welfare of the children. See, Follansbee v. Richards, 237 AD2d 437, 656 N.Y.S.2d 876 (2nd Dept. 1997); Tran v. Tran, 277 AD2d 49, 716 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1st Dept. 2000). Allegations of Alcohol Abuse

  5. Ferguson v. Ferguson

    2 Misc. 3d 277 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003)

    ny possible reconciliation (see, O'Brien v O'Brien, 66 NY2d 576 [1985]; Corsel v Corsel, 133 AD2d 604 [1987]; Ginsberg v Ginsberg, 104 AD2d 482 [1984]; Kaye v Kaye, 102 AD2d 682 [1984]; Van Ess v Van Ess, 100 AD2d 848 [1984]). A similar concern over the sensitive nature of the issues relevant to a custody litigation and the potential for exacerbating the antagonisms incident to such litigation has resulted in the general prohibition of pretrial depositions on the issue of custody (see, Garvin v Garvin, 162 AD2d 497 [1990]; Ginsberg v Ginsberg, supra; Hunter v Hunter, 10 AD2d 291 [1960]; K. v K., 126 Misc 2d 624 [1984]; P. v P., 93 Misc 2d 704 [1978]; Coderre v Coderre, 1990 WL 312774 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 1990]). The law has become well settled, that in an appropriate case, a court may award physical custody to one parent and divide "spheres or zones of decision making" between the parents (see, Arenson v Arenson, 2003 NY Slip Op 50573[U] [2003]; Mars v Mars, 286 AD2d 201 [2001]; Tran v Tran, 277 AD2d 49 [2000]; Frize v Frize, 266 AD2d 753 [1999]; Davis v Davis, 240 AD2d 928 [1997]; Winslow v Winslow, 205 AD2d 620 [1994]; Trapp v Trapp, 136 AD2d 178 [1988]; Hugh v Fhara L., NYLJ, June 1, 2000, at 29, col 6). In the instant case, the husband contends that the educational decision made by the wife to enroll Christine in the Grace Christian Academy is contrary to the child's best interests and that there are deficiencies in the education and socialization opportunities offered by said academy that will limit and restrict her development.

  6. Ferguson v. Ferguson

    2 Misc. 3d 277 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003)

    A similar concern over the sensitive nature of the issues relevant to a custody litigation and the potential for exacerbating the antagonisms incident to such litigation has resulted in the general prohibition of pretrial depositions on the issue of custody (see, Garvin v. Garvin, 162 A.D.2d 497; Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, supra; Hunter v. Hunter, 10 A.D.2d 291; K. v. K., 126 Misc.2d 624; P. v. P., 93 Misc.2d 704; Coderre v. Coderre, 1990 WL 312774). The law has become well settled, that in an appropriate case, a court may award physical custody to one parent and divide "spheres or zones of decision making" between the parents (see, Arenson v. Arenson, 2003 WL 1389057; Mars v. Mars, 286 A.D.2d 201; Trann v. Trann, 277 A.D.2d 49; Frize v. Frize, 266 A.D.2d 753; Davis v. Davis, 240 A.D.2d 928; Winslow v. Winslow, 205 A.D.2d 620; Trap v. Trap, 136 A.D.2d 178; Hugh v. Fhara L., NYLJ June 1, 2000, p29, col 6).