Opinion
24A-CR-1650
11-15-2024
Joshua T. Trammell, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Lisa Johnson Brownsburg, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theordore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General, George P. Sherman Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Brandon D. Smith Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Franklin Circuit Court The Honorable J. Steven Cox, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 24C01-2108-F4-713
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Lisa Johnson Brownsburg, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theordore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General, George P. Sherman Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Brandon D. Smith Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BAILEY, JUDGE.
Case Summary
[¶1] Joshua T. Trammell appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to modify his sentence. Trammell presents one issue for our review, namely, whether the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In Trammell's direct appeal, this Court stated the facts and procedural history leading to his conviction as follows:
On July 7, 2023 [sic], police responded to a two-vehicle crash on U.S. 52 in Franklin County. When police arrived, they observed a 2014 Kia Soul was "off the side of the roadway, fully engulfed in flames" and a 2001 Chevy Silverado was turned over on its side on the roadway, "with a trailer that had detached nearby." The driver of the Kia Soul, identified as Jenni Fasbinder, was pronounced dead at the scene.
The driver of the Silverado truck, identified as Trammell, was transported to the hospital by ambulance with injuries to his head and face. Because of the extent of Trammell's injuries, officers were unable to conduct standard field sobriety tests at the scene. While at the hospital, Trammell's preliminary breath test revealed no alcohol in his blood. A licensed phlebologist drew Trammell's blood "to be submitted for analysis to detect the presence of alcohol and/or illegal controlled substances." The toxicology "analysis determined the presence of both amphetamine and methamphetamine in Trammell's blood," both of which are Schedule II controlled substances.
Trammell "claimed that the other vehicle crossed left-of-center, which caused the collision. His claim was not supported by what [Deputy Jason Lovins] observed at the scene." "Based on the relative positioning of the vehicles, it appeared that the Silverado operated by Trammell had crossed left of center into the opposite lane of travel, causing a head-on collision with the Soul." After road crews turned the Silverado upright, debris was found where the vehicle had been on its side. "Among the debris were two hypodermic needles, . . . common for intravenous drug use[,]" and a cooler containing unopened alcoholic beverages.Trammell v. State, No. 23A-CR-700, 2023 WL 5607071, at *1 (Ind.Ct.App. Aug. 30, 2023) (mem.) (record citations omitted).
[¶3] The State charged Trammell with operating a vehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance causing death, as a Level 4 felony (Count 1); operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing death, as a Level 4 felony(Count 2); reckless homicide, as a Level 5 felony (Count 3); and one count of possession of a syringe, a Level 6 felony (Count 4). The State also alleged that he was a habitual offender. On January 30, 2023, Trammell pleaded guilty, without the benefit of a plea agreement, to Count 1 and admitted to being a habitual offender. The court entered judgment of conviction accordingly and, on the State's motion, dismissed the remaining counts.
I.C. § 9-30-5-5(a)(3).
I.C. § 35-42-1-5.
I.C. § 16-42-19-18.
I.C. § 35-50-2-8.
[¶4] The court held a sentencing hearing on March 1. During the hearing, the court identified as mitigating circumstances that Trammell was remorseful, he accepted responsibility, he had a moderate risk of reoffending, he had family support, and his incarceration would be a hardship on his family. As aggravating, the court identified his extensive criminal history, which includes four adjudications as a juvenile delinquent, more than twenty misdemeanor convictions, and fourteen felony convictions. Accordingly, the court sentenced Trammell to twelve years on Count 1, enhanced by twenty years for the habitual offender adjudication. The court then ordered that Trammell is eligible to participate in the Recovery While Intoxicated Program and that, should Trammell successfully complete the program, "he shall be permitted to Petition the Court for modification of the sentence herein, but the Court will not be bound to grant the modification." Direct Appeal App. Vol. 2 at 126.
[¶5] Trammell appealed and argued that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. This Court affirmed his sentence. See Trammell, 2023 WL 5607071, at *4.
[¶6] On May 17, 2024, Trammell filed a petition to modify his sentence in which he alleged that he had "demonstrated a pattern of behavior consistent with evidence of rehabilitation" and that his "willingness to avail him[self] of the multitude of drug rehabilitation and educational chances demonstrates a pattern of rehabilitation consistent with a person who has learned his lesson." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 60. The State objected to a modification, and the trial court denied Trammell's petition on May 21.
[¶7] On May 31, Trammell filed a motion to reconsider the order denying his petition for modification. Trammell attached to that motion several exhibits, including a conduct report from his correctional facility that indicated that Trammell had not had any conduct reports; certificates demonstrating that he had completed several programs, including RWI; and an offender evaluation report, which commented that Trammell "is doing a great job in his position. He shows up for work when needed and performs to the best of his ability." Id. at 80. The State again objected, and the court denied Trammell's motion to reconsider. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[¶8] Trammell contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to modify his sentence. We review a trial court's decision regarding modification of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. State, 36 N.E.3d 1130, 1133 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or when the court misinterprets the law. Id.
[¶9] Sentence modifications are governed by Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-17, which provides in relevant part that, at any time after a convicted person begins serving his sentence and the court obtains a report from the Department of Correction concerning his conduct while imprisoned, "the court may reduce or suspend the sentence and impose a sentence that the court was authorized to impose at the time of sentencing." I.C. § 35-38-1-17(e).
[¶10] On appeal, Trammell asserts that the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to modify his sentence because he "is a model prisoner" who "has not received a single disciplinary write-up" since he began his incarceration, and he "has literally taken advantage of every opportunity to better himself in prison" by completing RWI and "numerous other programs." Appellant's Br. at 15. And he maintains that he "does 'a great job' and 'performs to the best of his ability'" working as a suicide companion. Id. at 16 (quoting Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 80).
[¶11] We acknowledge that Trammell has completed several programs and has not caused any trouble while incarcerated. However, "a trial court does not abuse its discretion in declining to modify a defendant's sentence even where there is plentiful evidence presented of his efforts at rehabilitation." Newman v. State, 177 N.E.3d 888, 891 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021). See also Catt v. State, 749 N.E.2d 633, 643-44 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001) (affirming the denial of a sentence modification even though Catt had participated in several rehabilitative programs, was employed in prison, and made restitution).
[¶12] Further, we have previously concluded that the "heinousness of a person's crime alone can serve as the basis for denying a sentence reduction." Myers v. State, 718 N.E.2d 783, 789 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999). And, here, Trammell drove his truck while high on methamphetamines and amphetamines, crossed into the opposite lane of travel, and struck Fasbinder's vehicle head-on, killing Fasbinder. At the time, Trammell was transporting hypodermic needles and a cooler that contained unopened alcoholic beverages. In other words, as a result of Trammel's decision to use drugs and drive his vehicle, he caused another person to lose her life.
[¶13] Additionally, and importantly, Trammell has an extensive criminal history that spans more than thirty years and includes crimes in two states. While Trammell acknowledges his criminal history, he contends that it includes offenses "for misdemeanors and low[-]level felonies" and that his adult convictions "are for non-violent offenses." Appellant's Br. at 16. However, Trammell minimizes the extent of his criminal history. Indeed, Trammell was adjudicated a delinquent four times, which included one status offense, two offenses that would be felonies if committed by an adult, and one offense that would be a misdemeanor if committed by an adult. Further, as an adult, Trammell has been convicted of thirteen felonies and twenty-three misdemeanors, and he has had his placement on probation revoked ten times. And while Trammell's entire criminal history may not be filled with violent, high-level felonies, that does not change the fact that he continues to break the law despite repeated terms of incarceration and attempts at leniency.
Conclusion
[¶14] In light of the nature of Trammel's offense and his extensive criminal history, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Trammell's motion for a sentence modification. We therefore affirm the trial court.
[¶15] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Foley, J., concur.