Opinion
Case No. 1:06-cv-305.
May 22, 2006
ORDER
Plaintiff, a resident of Cincinnati, Ohio, brings this civil action alleging a violation of his rights. By separate Order issued this date, plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of plaintiff's complaint to determine whether the complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a "litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(I). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or "wholly incredible." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199.
Congress has also authorized the dismissal of complaints which fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or which seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii-iii); 1915A(b)(1-2). In order to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must allege that the persons engaging in the conduct complained of were acting under color of state law and that this conduct deprived plaintiff of some right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Graham v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 804 F.2d 953, 957 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 517 (1984)). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief "if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action against David R. Caudill, the Clermont County, Ohio Clerk of Court, "Judge Haddad Court," "Security Woman," the Union Township Police Department, the Captain of Police, Officer Jim McClannahan, and Lisa Banks, the CEO of Summit Behavioral Hospital. Plaintiff's complaint appears to be a repeat of several previous complaints filed by plaintiff. As best the Court can discern, plaintiff alleges the "Security Woman" framed him on a charge of public indecency, and that defendant McClannahan arrested him on this charge. He alleges "Judge Haddad Court" found him incompetent to stand trial and had him probated. The remaining allegations appear to be a compilation of unintelligible and disjointed thoughts. The Court is unable to discern the type of relief plaintiff is seeking.
In this case, plaintiff has failed to assert any claim with an arguable basis in fact or law, or alternatively, has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted in this federal court. Plaintiff's factual allegations are virtually incomprehensible and, to the extent intelligible, fail to rise to the level of a violation of federal law. In addition, plaintiff's complaint alleges that both he and the defendants reside in Ohio. Therefore, there is no diversity of citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. There is no logical construction of plaintiff's complaint from which the Court can divine a viable claim against the defendants over which the Court might have jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that plaintiff's complaint is subject to dismissal as frivolous, or alternatively, on the ground that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The complaint is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In addition, this appears to be at least the sixth time plaintiff has sought relief from this Court based on the same frivolous allegations. See, e.g., Trammell v. Caudill, Case No. 1:04-cv-795 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 2004); Trammell v. Caudill, Case No. 1:05-cv-561 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 2005); Trammell v. Caudill, Case No. 1:05-cv-740 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2005); Trammell v. Caudill, Case No. 1:06-cv-129 (S.D. Ohio March 10, 2006); Trammell v. Haddad, Case No. 1:06-cv-210 (S.D. Ohio April 14, 2006); Trammell v. Caudill, Case No. 1:06-cv-228 (April 20, 2006). Mr. Trammell is hereby NOTIFIED that if he continues to submit complaints raising claims identical or similar to those that have already been adjudicated, he may be subject to sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. R. 11(a), a pro se litigant must sign every pleading, written motion, and other paper submitted to the Court for filing. The signature constitutes a certificate by the litigant that "to the best of [his] knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances," the pleading, motion, or paper "is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation" and "the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(1), (2). The Court may impose appropriate sanctions against a pro se litigant for his violation of Rule 11. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 548 (1991) (Rule 11 "speaks of attorneys and parties in a single breath and applies to them a single standard."); Spurlock v. Demby, 48 F.3d 1219 (table), No. 92-3842, 1995 WL 89003, at * 2 (6th Cir. Mar. 2, 1995) (unpublished) (Rule 11 does not provide a different standard for attorneys and non-attorneys); see also Doyle v. United States, 817 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 854 (1987). "[P]ro se filings do not serve as an `impenetrable shield [from the application of Rule 11], for one acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.'" Patterson v. Aiken, 841 F.2d 386, 387 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986)).
Accordingly, in sum, it is hereby ORDERED that the instant complaint be sua sponte DISMISSED, with notice to Mr. Trammell that he may be subject to sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 if he continues to submit complaints or other pleadings with this Court raising claims identical or similar to those that have already been adjudicated by this Court.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that for the foregoing reasons an appeal of this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore denies plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Plaintiff, a non-prisoner, remains free to apply to proceed in forma pauperis in the Court of Appeals. See Callihan v. Schneider, 178 F.3d 800, 803 (6th Cir. 1999), overruling in part Floyd v. United States Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 277 (6th Cir. 1997).