In the alternative to the ambiguity argument, the Government contends that under Florida law, the insurance policy provision does not rise to the level of an assignment, and as such American States has no vested interest in the funds. In support of this assertion, the Government cites to Trak Microwave Corp. v. Medaris Management, Inc., 236 So.2d 189 (Fla.App. 4th Dist. 1970) for the proposition that the language of an assignment must expressly empower the assignee to collect monies directly from any of the assignor's obligors. In addition, the Government cites to the following commentary quoted in Trak from Williston on Contracts: "The distinction is to be drawn between a promise that the promisor will pay out of a particular fund when he collects it and an agreement that the promisee may collect a particular fund, or part of it, and keep it when he has collected."

V. In Florida, an assignee of an interest in an estate may require the personal representative of the estate to distribute the assigned interest directly to the assignee. In Trak Microwave Corporation v. Medaris Management, Inc., 236 So.2d 189 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970), a Florida Court of Appeal considered the enforceability of an assignment of an uncertain future contractual interest as against the assignor. Although Trak dealt with an assignment of income from a possible future contract, rather than an expectancy of a possible beneficiary of an estate, the court in that case cited the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Richardson v. Holman, 160 Fla. 65, 33 So.2d 641 (1948), as the statement of Florida's policy on the assignment of uncertain future interests.

In short, section 627.409 was never implicated under these facts, and therefore summary judgment should not have been entered by the trial court. It is well settled that, as a general rule,"parties are free to `contract-out' or `contract around' state or federal law with regard to an insurance contract, so long as there is nothing void as to public policy or statutory law about such a contract."King v. Allstate Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1537, 1540 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Foster v. Jones, 349 So.2d 795, 799-800 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)(same);Baxter v. Royal Indemnity Co., 285 So.2d 652, 655 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973) (same); Trak Microwave Corp. v. Medaris Management, Inc., 236 So.2d 189, 193 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970) (same) (citing Richardson v. Holman, 160 Fla. 65, 33 So.2d 641 (1948)). Further,

It is well settled that, as a general rule, “parties are free to ‘contract-out’ or ‘contract around’ state or federal law with regard to an insurance contract, so long as there is nothing void as to public policy or statutory law about such a contract.” King v. Allstate Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1537, 1540 (11th Cir.1999); see also Foster v. Jones, 349 So.2d 795, 799–800 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)(same); Baxter v. Royal Indemnity Co., 285 So.2d 652, 655 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973) (same); Trak Microwave Corp. v. Medaris Management, Inc., 236 So.2d 189, 193 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970) (same). Because the State Farm policy makes no exceptions regarding notice of non-renewal of the automobile policy issued to Sapp, we find that coverage existed at the time of the accident, 15 August 2009.

Central Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cropper, 296 So.2d 69 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). It is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that parties sui juris, i.e., having the capacity to manage their own affairs, may make any contract they desire to make so long as it does not violate any law or public policy of the state. Trak Microwave Corp. v. Medaris Management, Inc., 236 So.2d 189, 193 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); Foster v. Jones, 349 So.2d 795, 799 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). The text of the policy is where the establishment of the rights and liabilities of the parties to an insurance contract must find their basis.

We find merit in this contention and reverse. See Trak Microwave Corporation v. Medaris Management, Inc., 236 So.2d 189 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). Reversed and remanded for further proceedings upon the counterclaim.

It is important to keep the above reasoning in mind in the following discussion. Plaintiff has cited numerous cases for the proposition that counterclaims are not allowed in special statutory proceedings: Trak Microwave Corp. v. Medaris Management, Inc., Fla.App. 1970, 236 So.2d 189; Seven Seas Frozen Products, Inc. v. Fast Frozen Foods, Inc., Fla. 1949, 43 So.2d 181; National Leasing Corp. v. Bombay Hotel, Inc., Fla.App. 1963, 159 So.2d 111; Maco Supply Corp. v. Masciarelli, Fla.App. 1968, 213 So.2d 265. All of the above, except Trak, were replevin cases. F.S. section 46.08, F.S.A. which governed the cases, specifically prohibited the joinder of replevin with any other cause of action.