"Ostensible agency," also known as agency by estoppel or apparent agency, does not depend upon an express appointment or actual authority but arises from the words, attitude, conduct, and knowledge of the principal, not the agent. Trahan v. Southland Life Insurance Company, 155 Tex. 548, 289 S.W.2d 753, 755 (1956); Prowse v. Whitehurst, 313 S.W.2d 126, 129-30 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In fact, an ostensible agent is not really an agent at all, but estoppel prevents the "principal" from denying the agency.

In this case, the Bank was not interested in searching for coverage; it was interested in obtaining coverage. Consequently, it could suffer no detriment solely from the lost opportunity to search; it suffered only if coverage was available elsewhere and if the Bank would have been able to purchase it. See, e.g., Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 1993); Foster v. Johnstone, 107 Idaho 61, 685 P.2d 802, 809 (1984); Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Trahan, 284 S.W.2d 207, 209-10 (Tex.Civ.App. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 155 Tex. 548, 289 S.W.2d 753 (1956); Goldberg v. Colonial Life. Ins. Co. of America, 129 N YS.2d 637, 639 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1954); Wallace v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 212 Wis. 346, 248 N.W. 435, 436 (1933); Professional Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Freytes Sons Corp., 565 So.2d 900, 903 (Fla.App. 1990). The lost opportunity to search, absent evidence of the existence of obtainable insurance coverage elsewhere, simply is not a cognizance injury in this context.

The policy is ambiguous whether "by any other means" is satisfied by notice to the employee or requires that the insurer be apprised of the employer's intention to terminate. The District Judge thought the latter, 210 F. Supp. at 759; and, under the settled rule "that in the case of doubt as to its meaning a policy of insurance should be construed strictly against the insurance company, whose language it is, and liberally in favor of the insured," Trahon v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 155 Tex. 548, 289 S.W.2d 753 (1956), we cannot say he was wrong. Although the evidence would support a finding that Lykes gave John Hancock timely oral notice of termination of Pittman's employment as of December 31, 1955, the judge's finding that no such notice was given, so that the March 26, 1956 written notice was the first, is surely not clearly erroneous, F.R.Civ.P. 52(a).

Southwest Title Ins. Co. v. Northland Bldg. Corp., 552 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tex. 1977). See also Trahan v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 155 Tex. 548, 289 S.W.2d 753, 755 (1956) (holding that it is the principal's conduct, attitude, and knowledge that determines whether an agent had apparent authority). NationsBank correctly argues that it cannot be held vicariously liable for Price's fraud on a theory of apparent authority because it established that it never took any action that would lead a reasonably prudent person to conclude that it had authorized Price to make representations regarding an investment in MEL.

The court also found that the insurer had no obligation to issue the endorsement but, having done so, was bound by it. In Trahan v. Southland Life Insurance Co., 155 Tex. 548, 289 S.W.2d 753 (1956), the insured rejected a life insurance policy offered by defendant because it contained two aviation riders, one covering military flight and the other covering civilian flight. The insured was in the Air Force and wanted full coverage, even while flying.

This creates an ambiguity which is to be construed against the insurer. Trahan v. Southland Life Insurance Co., 155 Tex. 548, 289 S.W.2d 753 (1956). The United Liberty policy in question provided that the policy would be incontestable after it had been in force for two years from the "policy date."

None of this evidence is competent to show that he was working for Dallas Flight Center because the acts and statements of the agent do not prove agency. Trahan v. Southland Life Insurance Co., 155 Tex. 548, 289 S.W.2d 753, 755 (1956); Gulf States Paint Co. v. Kornblee Co., 390 S.W.2d 356, 359 (Tex.Civ.App. Texarkana 1965, writ ref'd n. r. e.). We also reverse as to Astro-Wing Airlines, Inc. Although it is undisputed that Boyar was president of Airlines while he was dealing with appellee, this fact alone will not bind his principal for conversion. For a principal to be liable for the tort of his agent, the agent must be acting within the scope of his general authority.

(1) An insurance policy will be construed strictly against the insurer; (2) when the terms of an insurance contract are capable of two or more constructions and under one a recovery is allowable and under the other it is denied, the construction which permits recovery will be given the policy; (3) forfeitures of insurance coverage are not favored; and (4) if a fair and reasonable construction of an insurance contract will permit, a meaning will be given to its language that effectuates a contract of insurance rather than defeats it. Southwestern Fire and Casualty Co. v. Atkins, 346 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston 1961, no writ); See also Trahan v. Soughland Life Insurance Co., 155 Tex. 548, 289 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Tex. 1956). We conclude that the policy is ambiguous. Article I, paragraph 7 of the master policy defines Medicare as:

Proof of apparent authority or 'agency by estoppel' as it is sometimes called, is shown by the attitude, conduct and knowledge of the principal, not the agent. Trahan v. Southland Life Insurance Company, 155 Tex. 548, 289 S.W.2d 753 (1956), Williston, Contracts (3d Ed.), § 277A, 2 C.J.S. Agency § 96e(2), p. 1214, 3 American Jurisprudence 2d, Agency § 74. Viewing the evidence in the most favorable light in support of the finding, and considering only the evidence and inferences which are supporting, and rejecting the evidence and the inferences which are contrary, we hold that there is no evidence of any act or conduct of appellant or its employees to support the finding that Fuller had apparent authority to bind appellant.

It is an exclusion from the coverage previously granted by the terms of 'Coverage Y', and, in effect adds the words 'and occurring after the execution of such contract.' It also modifies the language used in paragraph IV of the insuring agreements which implies that coverage is granted to all accidents that occur after the effective date of the endorsement. In view of the rule requiring strict construction of the policy against the insurer, the language would not be considered to modify the words 'written agreement' used in the column 'Designation of Contracts.' Trahan v. Southland Life Insurance Co., 155 Tex. 548, 289 S.W.2d 753 (1956). American Motorists undertook the investigation of this case on July 21, 1961, one day after the accident.