Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown

36 Citing cases

  1. City of Brentwood v. Metropolitan Bd.

    149 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 105 times
    Holding that courts "must construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff by . . . giving the plaintiff the benefit of all the inferences that can be reasonably drawn from the pleaded facts"

    Accordingly, many courts have recognized that local governments may have standing to challenge the land use decisions of neighboring local governments as long as the necessary aggrievement exists. Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684, 685 (2d Cir. 1968); City of New Rochelle v. Town of Mamaroneck, 111 F.Supp.2d 353, 358-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Village of Barrington Hills v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 81 Ill.2d 392, 43 Ill.Dec. 37, 410 N.E.2d 37, 40 (1980); Symmes Township Bd. of Trustees v. Hamilton County Bd. of Zoning App., 110 Ohio App.3d 527, 674 N.E.2d 1196, 1198 (1996); LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.318.10, at 674. In land use cases such as this one, the concept of "aggrievement" supplies the distinct and palpable injury needed to have standing.

  2. City of Boston v. Massachusetts Port Authority

    444 F.2d 167 (1st Cir. 1971)   Cited 8 times
    In City of Boston v Massachusetts Port Auth. (444 F.2d 167), the First Circuit articulated this very issue in a footnote, but did not determine it. The city, a municipal corporation, filed a complaint alleging that the noise of airplanes taking off and landing at a local airport diminished the value of public property and amounted to a deprivation of property without due process of law.

    A municipality may assert a due process claim but not one attacking the laws of the state which created it. See Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1968). Whether a municipality can assert such a claim against a state agency which is allegedly acting in a lawless manner is an issue, crucial to the City's case, which we do not reach.

  3. City of Sault Ste. Marie, Mich. v. Andrus

    532 F. Supp. 157 (D.D.C. 1980)   Cited 24 times
    Holding that a city is not a "person" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment

    ue process contention, the defendants make five arguments: (1) municipalities are not persons protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment; (2) taxation and regulatory powers are not property interests protected by due process; (3) the plaintiff received actual notice and a hearing; (4) the notice and hearing requirements for which the plaintiff argues would entail excessive fiscal and administrative burdens for the defendants; and (5) because of the binding consent decree, which precludes most possible regulatory disputes between the plaintiff and the Tribe's housing project, and because of the minimal tax dollars at stake, the plaintiff cannot be harmed by the acquisition of the land in trust; therefore no notice and hearing were required. The first of these arguments, that municipalities are not persons within the meaning of the fifth amendment, runs contrary to the weight of logic and clear precedent. City of Santa Clara v. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660, 675 (9th Cir. 1978); Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1968) ("We hold that a municipal corporation like any other corporation is a `person' within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment and is entitled to its protection."). The second argument, that municipal taxing and regulatory powers are not property interests protected by the fifth amendment, is similarly unavailing.

  4. Shames v. State of Nebraska

    323 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Neb. 1971)   Cited 7 times
    In Shames v. State (323 F. Supp. 1321, 1332 [D Neb 1971]), it was held that a statute uniformly denying all nonresident aliens the right to inherit certain Nebraska lands was not unconstitutional either facially or as applied under Zschernig (supra).

    See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 [1888]; Wormsen v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19, 29 N.Y.S.2d 798 [1941]; Templar v. Michigan State Board of Examiners, 131 Mich. 254, 90 N.W. 1058 [1902]; Torao Takahaski v. Fish Game Commission, 30 Cal.2d 719, 185 P.2d 805, rev'd on other grounds 334 U.S. 410, 68 S.Ct. 1138, 92 L.Ed. 1478 [1947]. See also River Vale Tp. v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684 [2d Cir. 1968]; Cermeno-Cerna v. Farrell, 291 F. Supp. 521 [C.D.Cal. 1968]. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment presents a somewhat different situation in that it reads: "[N]o State shall * * * deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law * * *."

  5. United States v. Ng Lap Seng

    934 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2019)   Cited 39 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that " McDonnell ’s ‘official act’ standard does not pertain to bribery as proscribed by § 666"

    Read together, these two definitional provisions signal that, unless the statutory context indicates otherwise, the word "organization," whenever used in Title 18, applies broadly to all legal "persons," whether large or small, domestic or international, public or private, governmental or nongovernmental. See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2010) (defining "legal" or "artificial" person as "entity, such as a corporation, created by law and given certain legal rights and duties of a human being"); cf. Town of River Vale v. Orangetown , 403 F.2d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that municipal corporation, like any "corporation," is person within protection of Fourteenth Amendment). The context in which "organization" is used in § 666, however, does signal some definitional narrowing; specifically, governments and their constituent parts are not among the legal persons that Congress intended to include within the word as used in that statute.

  6. King v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

    415 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2005)   Cited 166 times
    Holding that allegations that a prison official denied a prisoner access to computer programming books, where the prisoner had no access to prison computers, were sufficient to state a First Amendment claim

    Suppose he learned that termites were eating away at his house and that serious damage could be avoided only if he were permitted to telephone an exterminator, and the prison refused for no reason to allow him to make the call. The reduction in the value of the house as a result of the termite damage that the call would have prevented would be a deprivation of property, Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, 57 F.3d 505, 512-13 (7th Cir. 1995); Soldal v. Cook County, 923 F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (7th Cir. 1991), reversed on other grounds, 506 U.S. 56, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1541 (11th Cir. 1991); River Vale Township v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684, 685 (2d Cir. 1968), and being arbitrary would be a denial of due process of law. The case at hand is not precisely analogous.

  7. Creek v. Village of Westhaven

    80 F.3d 186 (7th Cir. 1996)   Cited 26 times
    Noting that a racially motivated lawsuit may still be protected as an exercise of free speech

    But it is one thing to hold that a municipality cannot interpose the Fourteenth Amendment between itself and the state of which it is the creature, Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628, 637-38 (Mass. 1978), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 439 U.S. 1060 (1979), and another to hold that a municipality has no rights against the federal government or another state. Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1968), distinguishes between these two types of case. Even if municipalities do have First Amendment rights, however, a question we need not decide, we do not think they have the right to foment, whether through speech or otherwise, governmental discrimination on grounds of race.

  8. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights

    616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980)   Cited 103 times
    Affirming the district court's approval of a consent decree ordering site-specific relief

    Similarly, with respect to Mount Prospect's interests, it has generally been recognized in Illinois and elsewhere that municipalities may also have legally cognizable interests in zoning matters which affect tracts contiguous to their borders. See, e. g., Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684, 685 (2d Cir. 1968) (municipality has standing to challenge amendment to zoning ordinance in a municipality across the state line, where an allegation is made that the rezoning will depreciate property values); City of Hickory Hills v. Village of Bridgeview, 67 Ill.2d 399, 10 Ill.Dec. 539, 541, 367 N.E.2d 1305, 1307 (1977) ("From an examination of the authorities . . . it would appear that the general rule that `an aggrieved person with a real interest in the subject matter of the controversy may challenge a zoning ordinance' is applicable to municipal corporations.)"; Forestview Homeowners Association, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 Ill. App.3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763 (1974) (Village of Northbrook permitted to intervene in zoning litigation involving tract one and one-half miles outside its borders); cf. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1613-14, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979) (Village has standing to bring an action challenging alleged racial steering practices of realtors).

  9. City of Santa Clara, Cal. v. Andrus

    572 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1978)   Cited 117 times
    In Santa Clara, this court voided a "sale" of federal power to a privately owned utility where such a transaction was in violation of the preference clause contained in section 9(c) of the Reclamation Project Act.

    We are by no means convinced that PGE's argument is correct. See Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 2 Cir., 1968, 403 F.2d 684, 686, holding that "a municipal corporation like any other corporation is a `person' within the meaning of the [Constitution]." See also, Aguayo v. Richardson, 2 Cir., 1973, 473 F.2d 1090, 1100-01, cert. denied, 1974, 414 U.S. 1146, 94 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed.2d 101.

  10. Warth v. Seldin

    495 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1974)   Cited 14 times
    Finding no associational standing under Sections 1981, 1982, and 1983

    Both the Diocese and the Association clearly had an interest in land. In Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1968), this court held that plaintiff town had standing to sue defendant town which had rezoned property adjoining plaintiff on the allegation that the zoning was arbitrary and capricious and would injure plaintiff by reducing its revenues. We held that plaintiff need not be a resident of the town whose zoning practices were challenged.