Gilreath v. Greenville County, 63 S.C. 75, 40 S.E., 1028. In the recent case of Townsend v. Richland County et al., 190 S.C. 270, 2 S.E.2d 777, 781, the Court says: "The principle that a statute may be constitutional and valid in part and unconstitutional and invalid in part is generally recognized. The rule is that where a part of a statute is unconstitutional, if such part is so connected with the other parts as that they mutually depend upon each other as conditions and considerations for each other, so as to warrantthe belief that the Legislature intended them as a whole, andif they cannot be carried into effect, the legislature wouldnot have passed the residue independently of that which isvoid, the whole act is void.
of South Carolina: 233 S.C. 161, 103 S.E.2d 923; 240 S.C. 1, 124 S.E.2d 592; 99 S.C. 377, 83 S.E. 594; 66 S.C. 219, 44 S.E. 797. As to Article III, Section 34, Subdivision IX ofthe South Carolina Constitution restricting the power of theGeneral Assembly to adopt a special law for CharlestonCounty changing the time when real property shall be returnedfor taxation and shall be taxable as provided by ActNo. 415 of the Acts of 1973 in a case in which general lawcan be made applicable: Section 65-1620, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962, as amended; Section 65-2702, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962, as amended; 66 S.C. 219, 44 S.E. 797; 59 S.C. 114, 37 S.E. 226; 182 S.C. 249, 189 S.E. 196; 183 S.C. 368, 191 S.E. 51; 195 S.C. 7, 10 S.E.2d 157; 93 Am. St. Rep. 111; 132 S.C. 241, 128 S.E. 172; 85 S.C. 186, 67 S.E. 158; 214 S.C. 11, 51 S.E.2d 95; 186 S.C. 290, 195 S.E. 539; 216 S.C. 382, 58 S.E.2d 332; 233 S.C. 161, 103 S.E.2d 923; 240 S.C. 1, 124 S.E.2d 592; 242 S.C. 1, 129 S.E.2d 924; 190 S.C. 270, 2 S.E.2d 777; 216 S.E.2d 190. As to Section 7 of Amended Article VIIIof the South Carolina Constitution restricting the power ofthe General Assembly to adopt special legislation for CharlestonCounty changing the time when real property shall bereturned for taxation and shall be taxable as provided byAct No. 415 of the Acts of 1973, this being a law for a specificcounty: 216 S.E.2d 190; Act No. 999 of the Acts of 1966.
See, e.g., Fairway Ford, Inc. v. Timmons, 281 S.C. 57, 314 S.E.2d 322 (1984) ("The rule is that where a part of a statute is unconstitutional, if such part is so connected with the other parts as that they mutually depend upon each other as conditions and considerations for each other, so as to warrant the belief that the Legislature intended them as a whole, and if they cannot be carried into effect, the Legislature would not have passed the residue independently of that which is void, the whole act is void." (quoting Townsend v. Richland Cnty., 190 S.C. 270, ___, 2 S.E.2d 777, 781 (1930))). I also disagree that we may not strike as unconstitutionally vague only that portion of the statute—"any house used as a place of gaming"—which was challenged in this case without impacting the balance of the statute.
4 are dropped, Section 16-52 remains as a fully operative law. While we are here dealing with separate statutes, the governing principle is thus stated in Townsend v. Richland County, 190 S.C. 270, 2 2 S.E.2d 777: "On the other hand, where a part of the statute is unconstitutional, and that which remains is complete in itself, capable of being executed, wholly independent of that which is rejected, and is of such a character as that it may fairly be presumed that the Legislature would have passed it independent of that which is in conflict with the Constitution, then the courts will reject that which is void and enforce the remainder." In United Statesv. Jackson, supra, the following rule was approved: "The unconstitutionality of a part of an Act does not necessarily defeat * * * the validity of its remaining provisions.
Messrs. Price Poag, of Greenville, for Appellant, cite: As to Act No. 329 of the General Assembly of South Carolinabeing constitutional and the power of the General Assemblyconcerning streets is plenary, except where prohibitedby provisions of the constitution: 16 A.C.J.S. 179, Sec. 461; 16 A.C.J.S. 165, Sec. 456; 262 U.S. 182, 67 L.Ed. 937, 43 S.Ct. 534; 87 S.E. 421, 103 S.C. 21; 53 S.E.2d 316, 214 S.C. 451; 16 Wall. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394; 16 A.C.J.S. 169, Secs. 456, 458, 461; 289 U.S. 34, 77 L.Ed. 1015, 53 S.Ct. 431; 16 A.C.J.S. 331, Sec. 508; 12 Am. Jur. 138, Sec. 474; 232 S.C. 515, 103 S.E.2d 14; 236 S.C. 558, 115 S.E.2d 273; 127 S.C. 173, 120 S.E. 584; 126 S.E. 35, 130 S.C. 215; 181 S.E. 467, 177 S.C. 374; 71 S.E.2d 603, 222 S.C. 79; 176 S.E. 870, 174 S.C. 35; 191 S.E. 41, 177 S.C. 427; 2 S.E.2d 777, 190 S.C. 270. Messrs.
The marks of distinction upon which the classification is founded must be such, in the nature of things, as will in some reasonable degree, at least, account for or justify the restriction of the legislation. Sansing v. Cherokee County Tourist CampBoard, 195 S.C. 7, 10 S.E.2d 157; Townsend v. RichlandCo., 190 S.C. 270, 2 S.E.2d 777; Gillespie v.Blackwell, 164 S.C. 115, 161 S.E. 869; Sirrine v. State, 132 S.C. 241, 128 S.E. 172."
Messrs. Samuel Want, Sam Rogol, and Leroy M. Want, of Darlington, for Respondent, cite: As to if part of an Actis held to be unconstitutional, the whole of the Act will bestricken down if it is apparent that it was the legislative purposeto enact a single plan: 188 S.C. 250, 198 S.E. 857; 190 S.C. 270, 2 S.E.2d 777; 191 S.C. 271, 2 S.E.2d 36; 197 S.C. 217, 14 S.E.2d 900. As to theoffice of school trustee not being a constitutional office: 211 S.C. 106, 44 S.E.2d 101; 153 S.C. 106, 149 S.E. 760.
From all of which it is clearly manifest that the Legislature would have passed this Act entirely independently of inland water and actually did so and furthermore, expressed its intent of so doing by the use of the words just quoted. In Townsend v. Richland County, 190 S.C. 270, 31, 32 2 S.E.2d 777, 781, the Supreme Court says: "The rule is that where a part of a statute is unconstitutional, if such part is so connected with the other parts as that they mutually depend upon each other as conditions, and considerations for each other, so as to warrant the belief that the Legislature intended them as a whole, and if they cannot be carried into effect, the legislature would not have passed the residue independently of that which is void, the whole act is void.
As to Power ofGeneral Assembly, Under Constitution of 1895, to Authorizea County to Issue Bonds or Levy a Tax for EducationalPurposes: 121 S.C. 5, 113 S.E., 345; 66 S.C. 357, 44 S.E., 931; 95 S.C. 104, 79 S.E., 193; 107 S.C. 230, 92 S.E., 477; 133 S.C. 156, 130 S.E., 872; 133 S.C. 189, 130 S.E., 340; 137 S.C. 288, 135 S.E., 153; 137 S.C. 496, 135 S.E., 538; 61 S.C. 213, 99 S.E., 381; 109 S.C. 1, 95 S.E., 121. As to Power of General Assemblyto Enact Special Provisions in General Laws: 125 S.C. 389, 118 S.E., 779; 59 S.C. 110, 37 S.E., 226; 77 S.C. 351, 58 S.E., 145; 148 S.C. 118, 145 S.E., 695; 153 S.C. 106, 149 S.E., 760; 167 S.C. 476, 166 S.E., 637; 190 S.C. 270, 2 S.E.2d 777. As to Constitutionalityof an Act Being not Open to Question by OneWhose Rights are not Effected: 191 S.C. 19, 3 S.E.2d 686.
As to impairment of contracts: Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8; 193 S.C. 158; 7 S.E.2d 526; 295 U.S. 330; 79 L.Ed. 1468, 1476. Mr. John M. Daniel, Attorney General, Mr. Claude K.Wingate, attorney for the Tax Commission, Messrs. ThomasH. Pope, Jr., and W.M. Capers, attorneys for South Carolina Unemployment Commission, for respondents, cite: As tobackground of the Act: 81 L.Ed. 779, 57 S.Ct. 883; 109 A.L.R. 1293. As to decisions holding Act constitutional: 81 L.Ed. 811; 57 S.Ct. 868; 109 A.L.R. 1327; 174 So. 516; 127 S.W. 802; 62 P. 1037; 5 N.E.2d 720; 178 So. 95 (b); 2 N.E.2d 22; 27 S.Ct. 122; 3 S.E.2d 290; 2 S.E.2d 584; 2 S.E.2d 592; 114 S.W.2d 796; 91 P.2d 512; 93 Okla. App. 240; 140 P.2d 453; Commerce Clearing House, Unemployment Insurance Service, Vol. 2, Ark., Par. 8019; Vol. 6, Tex., Par. 8041. Asto injury to plaintiff: 81 L.Ed. 779; 57 S.Ct. 883; 109 A.L.R. 1293; Internal Revenue Code, Secs. 1600-1; 235 U.S. 571, 575, 576; 274 U.S. 603, 606; 2 S.E.2d 777; 190 S.C. 270; 3 S.E.2d 536; 190 S.C. 495; 2 S.E.2d 686; 191 S.C. 19; 167 S.E. 674; 168 S.C. 440; 167 S.E. 674; 295 Pa. 571; 145 A. 797; 85 N.H. 522; 154 A. 633. As to constitutionality of Act: 2 S.E.2d 36; 191 S.C. 271; 190 S.E. 826; 183 S.C. 263; 153 S.C. 114; 149 S.E. 763; 115 S.E. 202; 122 S.C. 158; 176 S.E. 870; 174 S.C. 35; 199 S.E. 425; 188 S.E. 377. As to violation of Art. 10, Sec. 1 of the Constitution: Constitution, Art. 10, Sec. 1; 103 S.C. 10; 87 S.E. 421; 59 S.C. 396; 38 S.E. 11; 144 S.E. 846; 147 S.C. 116; 17 R.C.L. 483; 166 S.C. 135; 164 S.E. 588; 286 U.S. 472; 164 S.E. 844; 166 S.C. 281; 182 S.E. 96; 178 S.C. 57; 301 U.S. 619; 81 L.Ed. 1307; 575 S.Ct. 904; 109 A.L.R. 1319; 62 P.2d 1307; 63 P.2d 810; 108 A.L.R. 595; 5 N.E.2d 720; 174 So. 516; 115 S.E. 202; 122 S.C. 158; 194 S.E. 439; 185 S.C. 472; 61 S.E. 1108; 81 S.C. 71; 6 S.E.2d 473; 192 S.C. 308; 2 S.E.2d 36; 191 S.C. 271; 164 S.E. 588; 166 S.C. 135; 164 S.E. 844; 166 S.C. 281; 144 S.E. 846; 147 S.C. 116; 113 S.E. 3