Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 41(a), the trial judge included in the record his "Certification, Findings and Imposition of Sentence for Criminal Contempt" (Findings). W.R.Cr.P. 41(a) requires the trial judge to "certify" he witnessed in court the contemptuous conduct and recite the facts supporting the contempt. See our discussion of the "procedural safeguards" required for summary disposition of criminal contempt under W.R.Cr.P. 41(a) in Horn, 647 P.2d 1368 and Townes v. State, 502 P.2d 991, reh'g denied 504 P.2d 46 (Wyo. 1972). The State claims the trial court adequately advised appellant of the consequences of her disobedience if she refused to testify.
"We have repeatedly recognized that the power of a court to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of general jurisdiction, and * * * that such [power] exists independently of any special or express grant of power." Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. District Court of Ninth Judicial Dist. of Fremont County, 735 P.2d 709, 713 (Wyo. 1987) (citing Horn v. District Court, Ninth Judicial Dist., 647 P.2d 1368, 1374 (Wyo. 1982); Townes v. State, 502 P.2d 991, 993, reh'g denied, 504 P.2d 46 (Wyo. 1972); Estate of Mayne, 345 P.2d 790, 795 (Wyo. 1959); Application of Stone, 77 Wyo. 1, 305 P.2d 777, cert. denied 352 U.S. 1026, 77 S.Ct. 593, 1 L.Ed.2d 598, reh'g denied 353 U.S. 943, 77 S.Ct. 818, 1 L.Ed.2d 764 (1957)). A contempt action for failure to make support payments pursuant to a divorce decree is an appropriate remedy.
The trial judge characterized such conduct as "play[ing] fast and loose with the Court," and it must be assumed that he imposed a penalty as a means of vindicating the dignity and power of the court. Horn v. District Court, Ninth Judicial District, supra; Townes v. State, Wyo., 502 P.2d 991, reh. denied 504 P.2d 46 (1972). We conclude that, in acting to penalize Mrs. Anderson for her conduct, the court held her in criminal rather than civil contempt.